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The Common Thread:  
Slavery, Cotton and Atlantic Finance  
from the Louisiana Purchase to Reconstruction!
 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation focuses on the relationship between cotton, slavery and finance. 
At its core is a consideration of the Atlantic credit networks that supported the cultivation 
of cotton across the antebellum South. Planters relied on credit to finance their operating 
costs from year to year. The credit they received from British merchant banking houses 
made slavery a tenable labor regime in the antebellum South and enabled the plantation 
complex to function. This in turn contributed to the expansion of the American economy. 
The evolution of banking practices and credit mechanisms prompted by the burgeoning 
trade in cotton and the banking infrastructure developed to support this activity 
stimulated British industrialization and economic growth. The links between slavery and 
the development of an Anglo-American financial world are traced here through an 
examination of cotton sales, consignments and advances made to Southern planters. This 
dissertation highlights how cotton and the long reach of international finance in turn 
shaped banking practices across the Atlantic world. 
The role cotton and slavery played in the growth and development of banks and 
financial houses as well as British and American economies is made clear when looked at 
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from a perspective larger that moves that of the Nation-State or national economy. This 
dissertation utilizes an Atlantic perspective to make sense of slavery, cotton production 
and economic development. In this light, slavery does not seem perversely unique to the 
American landscape. In fact, it looks like an externalized labor practice that markedly 
boosted British economic growth. In fact, this is more or less how nineteenth-century 
contemporaries understood the world they had created.  In the end, the world of cotton 
and finance was one the slaves made, and although they do not have center stage here, 
they are at the heart of this story and the most fundamental argument of this dissertation: 
slave labor was vital to financial development and the evolution of banking practices in 
both the United States and Great Britain.  
 !
! v!
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........................................................................................................................VI.
LIST.OF.TABLES.AND.FIGURES............................................................................................................X.
INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................................1.
CHAPTER.ONE:.THE.COMMENCEMENT.OF.THE.REIGN.OF.COTTON.............................29.
CHAPTER.TWO:.MAKING.MONEY:.COTTON,.SLAVERY.AND.FINANCE.ACROSS.THE.
ATLANTIC.1815A1837..........................................................................................................................71.
CHAPTER.THREE:.THE.WORLD.THE.SLAVES.MADE:.ANGLOAAMERICAN.FINANCE.AND.
THE.ATLANTIC.COTTON.TRADE.1837A1848.............................................................................112.
CHAPTER.FOUR:.LESSONS.LEARNED,.AND.NOT.LEARNED,.FROM.COTTON:.1848A1861
..................................................................................................................................................................147.
CHAPTER.FIVE:.THE.GREAT.UNRAVELING................................................................................176.
CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................................208.
BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................................................................................................221.!
  
! vi!
 
Acknowledgements 
 Words!fail!to!express!the!gratitude!I!feel!towards!the!readers!of!my!dissertation:!Sven!Beckert,!Walter!Johnson!and!Emma!Rothschild!provided!guidance!advice!and!support!that!ensured!the!eventual!completion!of!this!project.!Seth!Rockman!in!particular!provided!feedback!and!encouragement!throughout!this!project!and!consistently!challenged!my!thoughts!and!arguments,!which!I!always!appreciated.!!He!also!gave!me!my!first!roll!of!microfilm!and!directed!me!to!many!sources!I!would!not!have!found!on!my!own.!!
Niall!Ferguson!initially!directed!me!towards!the!Rothschild!archive,!a!resource!I!would!not!have!considered!on!my!own.!Likewise!his!emphasis!on!the!importance!of!finance!proved!deeply!infectious!and!influential.!His!generosity!with!time!and!advice!while!I!was!in!the!early!stages!of!research!I!appreciated!deeply.!Susan!O’Donnell!provided!astute!commentary!on!initial!project!proposals!and!had!an!exacting!vision!of!what!this!project!could!be.!!Robin!Blackburn!provided!stimulating!discussion!and!insightful!commentary!on!this!project,!which!I!found!particularly!gratifying!since!he!initially!spurred!my!interest!in!the!history!of!slavery!and!the!economic!realities!of!the!Atlantic!world.!Oz!Frankel!has!been!an!informative!and!helpful!reader!of!much!of!my!writing!and!a!keen!interlocutor!regarding!my!thoughts!since!my!student!days!at!the!New!School.!I!have!always!valued!his!patience!and!his!comments.!Harold!James!and!Cathy!Matson!provided!encouraging!and!challenging!feedback!on!some!of!my!ideas!regarding!foreign!investment!effects!on!
!vii!
national!financial!systems!at!different!points!during!this!project!and!this!project!benefitted!from!their!generous!sharing!of!their!insights.!
This!study!would!not!have!been!possible!without!the!generous!assistance!of!many!organizations.!I!have!been!the!fortunate!recipient!of!a!good!deal!of!financial!as!well!as!intellectual!support.!A!fellowship!from!the!Center!for!American!Political!Studies!at!Harvard!University!permitted!me!to!spend!a!year!immersed!in!archives!across!the!southern!United!States!and!England.!Grants!from!the!Harvard!University!history!department!and!the!Charles!Warren!center!for!Studies!in!American!history!funded!further!research.!The!GilderWLehrman!Center!allowed!me!to!spend!a!month!immersed!in!the!papers!of!the!Browns!Brothers!and!the!manuscripts!of!other!merchant!banking!houses!deposited!at!the!New!York!Historical!Society.!!The!trustees!of!the!Rothschild!archive!funded!exploration!of!collections!in!New!York,!London!and!Roubaix,!France.!A!bursary!from!the!center!for!slavery!studies!at!the!University!of!Hull!allowed!me!to!attend!their!short!course!on!Slavery!in!All!Its!forms!very!early!in!my!research.!This!seminar,!along!with!the!NEH!seminar!on!the!history!of!Economic!thought!at!Duke!University!had!a!decisive!impact!on!my!thinking.!!
I!have!received!feedback!on!many!of!the!chapters!here!at!conferences!hosted!by!Brown!University,!Harvard!University,!and!The!Program!on!Early!American!Economy!and!Society.!I!am!particularly!thankful!to!Steven!Mihm!and!Julia!Ott!for!organizing,!and!inviting!me!to!participate!in!the!conference!on!Capitalizing!on!Finance!at!the!Huntington!Library!in!the!spring!of!2013.!!I!also!benefitted!greatly!
!viii!
from!an!invitation!to!speak!at!the!conference!they!hosted!in!Warsaw!on!Foreign!Financial!Institutions!and!National!Financial!Systems.!!
Archivists!likely!had!one!of!the!largest!influences!on!this!work!and!my!thinking!and!I!owe!all!of!them!my!profoundest!thanks.!Ted!O’Reilly!and!Tammy!Kiter!at!the!New!York!Historical!Society!were!invariably!gracious,!helpful!and!accommodating.!At!the!very!beginning!of!this!project,!when!I!was!new!to!archival!research!and!overwhelmed!by!the!chaos!of!the!Brown!Brothers!Harriman!papers!Ted!O’Reilly!guided!me!through!the!tangled!thicket!of!the!Brown!Bros!papers.!Maurita!Baldock’s!subsequent!development!of!a!new!finding!aid!I!appreciated!as!well.!Moira!Lovegrove!at!the!ING!!/!Baring!archive!provided!helpful!advice!on!sources!at!the!beginning!of!my!research.!Melanie!Aspey,!at!the!Rothschild!Archive!embraced!this!project!with!a!care!and!tenacity!that!bolstered!me!through!my!own!periods!of!doubt.!Archivists!at!the!Bank!of!England,!Liverpool!records!office!and!the!John!Rylands!library!were!generous!with!their!time!and!suggestions.!In!the!South,!archivists!at!Louisiana!State!University!Baton!Rouge,!Duke!University,!the!University!of!North!Carolina!at!Chapel!Hill!and!in!the!historic!New!Orleans!collection!provided!further!suggestions!of!sources!and!areas!of!inquiry.!!
My!fellow!graduate!students!were!also!a!source!of!inspiration,!often!challenging!my!thinking!in!unexpected!ways.!Louis!Hyman!in!particular!prodded!me!to!think!about!issues!of!capitalism!in!a!much!deeper!way.!!Di!Yin!Lu,!Anna!Bergren,!and!Lauren!Coyle!provided!stimulating!discussion,!feedback!on!drafts!and!friendship!during!our!years!of!study!together.!!Eli!Cook,!Shaun!Nichols!and!members!
! ix!
of!the!political!economy!dissertation!group!provided!very!helpful!feedback!on!an!initial!draft!of!the!second!chapter.!The!nineteenthWcentury!dissertation!group!at!Harvard!provided!invaluable!feedback!on!the!original!prospectus!for!my!dissertation!and!early!draft!chapters!that!was!incredibly!influential!on!the!direction!of!my!research.!!
I!thank!Harriet!Park!for!support,!criticisms,!editing!and!being!a!supportive!presence!throughout!this!project.!Her!patience,!feedback!and!bonhomie!were!invaluable!throughout!my!years!of!graduate!school.!She!listened!to!my!initial!ramblings!about!slavery!and!capitalism!and!as!my!work!progressed!read!multiple!drafts!of!this!dissertation!and!was!not!shy!about!pointing!out!where!I!had!been!less!than!clear,!and!where!I!could!improve!sections,!chapters!and!arguments.!She!also!made!sure!I!ate!and!took!time!out!for!running,!movies!and!walks!in!the!woods.!I!hope!that!some!day!I!am!able!to!repay!her!in!kind.!
 
! x!
List of Tables and Figures 
           
Table 1: Cotton production globally, 1791-1860, in millions of pounds .......................... 40!
Table 2: Cotton exports to Great Britain from U.S. ports ................................................. 40!
Table 3: Cotton production by individual states (in millions of pounds), percentage and 
relative rank 1821-1859 .................................................................................................. 151!
  
 
Figure 1: Cotton as a percentage of total annual exports from the United States ............... 8!
Figure 2: Page from the cotton sample book of N. M. Rothschild, 1802. ........................ 54!
Figure 3: Cotton prices in New York (cents) per pound ................................................. 156!
Figure 4: Cotton prices at Liverpool, 1800-1859, pence per pound ............................... 157!
Figure 5: Erlanger bond. ................................................................................................. 197!
Figure 6: Coupon from the Erlanger bond. ..................................................................... 201!
 
 !  
! 1!
Introduction 
In the nineteenth century cotton stood at the center of the global economy, and was the 
primary export item produced by the United States. Throughout the century the United 
States was the largest producer and Great Britain the largest consumer.1 The commodity 
proved deeply important to the economic development and industrialization of both 
countries. As Friedrich Engels noted, ‘England and the United States are bound together 
by a single thread of cotton, which, weak and fragile as it may appear, is, nevertheless, 
stronger than an iron cable.’2.  The economic undercurrents that influenced political 
allegiances and policy decisions throughout the antebellum period were well understood 
in the nineteenth century by merchants and bankers on both sides of the Atlantic, as was 
noted in Punch: 
Tho’ with the North we sympathize, 
It must not be forgotten 
That with the South we’ve stronger ties 
Which are composed of Cotton.3  
 
Yet the need to maintain these ties was problematized by differing patterns of 
development across regions of the United States: the hardy mechanics of New England !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1See Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860  (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1961).,10. 
 
2 Quoted in Brian Schoen, The Fragile Fabric of Union: Cotton, Federal Politics, and the Global 
Origins of the Civil War  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).225. 
 
3 John Crosby Brown, A Hundred Years of Merchant Banking: A History of Brown Brothers and 
Company, Brown Shipley & Company and the Allied Firms, Alexander Brown and Sons, 
Baltimore; William and James Brown and Company, Liverpool; John A. Brown and Company, 
Browns and Bowen, Brown Brothers and Company, Philadelphia; Brown Brothers and 
Company, Boston  (New York: [s.n], 1909)., 225.  
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developed an economic system rooted in the production of goods for local trade.  
Economic relations in the early nineteenth-century North have been characterized in 
much of the literature as rooted in mutuality and the employment of small-scale credit.4 
In contrast, economic development in the southern States revolved on the planting and 
harvesting of agricultural crops for sale in an international marketplace.5 These 
agricultural goods were the primary export of the young nation and were a source of 
much needed capital.6 Of course, the production of all these commodities for the 
international market was accomplished with slave labor, and this became problematic as 
the nineteenth century progressed.  
This common thread of cotton, clearly, was not only woven from a raw fiber but 
also from increasingly sophisticated ways of providing credit. The provision of capital, 
through advances, consignments and the expansion of banks across the southern United 
States cleared the way for mills to be constructed, mules to spin, ships to alight from busy 
ports and for planters to purchase the slaves, land and goods that allowed them to focus 
exclusively on the harvesting of agricultural commodities for commercial sale.  In short, 
the economic world that cotton made was one that benefitted the United States as a 
whole, and that was deeply reliant on credit. The pivotal role of finance is one that has !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 See for example Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the American 
Working Class, 1788-1850  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).; Christopher Clark, The 
Roots of Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780-1860  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1990). 
 
5 See Joyce E. Chaplin, An Anxious Pursuit: Agricultural Innovation and Modernity in the Lower 
South, 1730-1815  (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993). 
 
6 See North, Economic Growth; Peter Temin, The Jacksonian Economy  (New York: Norton, 
1969).; Stuart Weems Bruchey, Cotton and the Growth of the American Economy, 1790-1860: 
Sources and Readings  (New York: Harcourt, 1967). 
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too often been elided in the creation of the cotton kingdom. !Additionally, this domain of 
cotton extended beyond American borders, as did profit from trade in the article. The 
dictates of the trade in cotton, including the need for large advances, shaped American 
political policies, and the habits and practices of merchants and bankers that engaged in 
the business. Since the realm of cotton included a nation of debtors, without some 
financial system in place cotton would never have become king. Following the money 
paints a different picture of the ascendancy of cotton, explaining why cotton became such 
an important crop to the American economy, and why southern planters, with initial 
reluctance, entered into a long and fruitful association with British capital. These 
financiers in turn were greatly influenced by their involvement in cotton markets in the 
South as well as Liverpool.  
Given the importance of cotton to both Britain and the United States the vital role 
of slave labor in the production and sale of this crop is noteworthy for its contribution to 
self-sustaining economic growth across the Atlantic world. Yet the role of slavery in the 
development of this larger Atlantic financial system is rarely discussed. Historians of 
slavery are relatively silent on the role credit played in the formation of the cotton South. 
Likewise, financial historians have little to say about the methods of production of cotton 
although their nineteenth-century subjects were just as concerned with the peculiar 
institution as they were with bond issues, exchange rates and the prices of commodities in 
various global markets.  
 In everything from the purchasing of slaves and supplies to run the plantations to 
the sending of harvested crops to market, plantation agriculture was dependent on both 
coerced labor and frequent infusions of money to keep things running smoothly. What 
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happened on plantations in Georgia, Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi contributed 
directly to economic development and growth in places like New York, Massachusetts 
and Rhode Island. An exploration of cotton bridges the worlds of finance and slavery and 
makes clear how one facilitated the expansion of the other across the nineteenth-century 
Atlantic.  
The international market in cotton is testament to the vital role played by an 
Atlantic hinterland in European, and specifically British industrialization.7 This system of 
production required land, labor and, just as critically, capital. During the antebellum era 
agricultural, commercial and industrial expansion across the Atlantic was facilitated by 
the proliferation of banks capitalized with money flowing from London and New York 
into the American South. In the North, canal building and the rise of New York as the 
preeminent American port stimulated commercial activity and established it as a vital 
economic and financial hub.8  Much of this commercial activity in the city revolved 
around cotton, which assumed an increasingly important position as the most profitable 
export article for the young nation, and as a raw material that fueled the textile mills of 
Lancashire.9   
This dissertation focuses on the relationship between cotton, slavery and finance. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7See Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern 
World Economy  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
 
8 On the development of New York as the premier commercial port and financial center of the 
United States in the nineteenth century see Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Jennie Barnes Pope, 
The Rise of New York Port, 1815-1860  (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939). 
 
9 On the vital role played by the fiber in Lancashire see D. A. Farnie and David J. Jeremy, The 
Fibre That Changed the World: The Cotton Industry in International Perspective, 1600-1990s  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). On the pivotal importance of cotton to American 
economic development see North, Economic Growth. 
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At its core is a consideration of the Atlantic credit networks that supported the increasing 
cultivation of cotton across the antebellum South. Rather than looking at how a plantation 
worked, or how Southerners conceived of their own economic worlds I consider how 
credit functioned to allow plantations to run and cotton to cross the Atlantic. 
Correspondingly, I am also concerned with how the world of cotton in turn shaped the 
sensibilities and business practices of the creators of an Atlantic world of finance.  I have 
looked to financial institutions and credit to understand slavery, and although the Bank of 
England might seem far from the reality of slaves picking cotton in the Louisiana heat, 
that is in fact not the case. Cotton, slavery and finance were amiable companions from 
the founding of the early American Republic through the Civil War. This alliance also 
formed the basis for many later disagreements, quite a few of which also had ties to 
cotton. 
Southern planters, and Americans generally, did not have access to large amounts 
of cash, or capital, in the first half of the nineteenth century.10 Correspondingly, planters 
in the South simply were not interested in plowing funds into manufacturing or the 
development of infrastructure in spite of their anger and resentment at what was widely 
perceived as exploitation by the North. The majority of planters spent money on slaves 
and land. This behavior was noted at the time: ‘to sell cotton in order to buy negros – to 
make more cotton to buy more negros “ad infinitum,” is the aim and direct tendency of 
all the operations of the thorough going cotton planter; his soul is wrapped up in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 See Clark, Rural Capitalism. 
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pursuit.’11 The planter would spend profits, potential profits and future profits in this 
relentless quest for more slaves, and more land, to grow more cotton.12 The increase in 
prestige, and the potential to make even more money seemed to obviate any potential risk 
in the planter’s mind.  
That being said, the use of credit for plantation improvements, expansion and the 
purchasing of slaves was not mere vanity on the part of planters. These were business 
decisions meant to increase productivity and profits from trade in what was in some years 
an incredibly lucrative crop. External finance, the advances received from outside of the 
cotton South enabled some farmers to give up subsistence farming and move into cotton 
planting. In some cases access to finance also allowed other planters to move from cotton 
planting to sugar, which was much more capital intensive and necessitated both slaves 
and machinery.13 Often the money borrowed was invested in equipment and supplies to 
increase capital and productivity, resulting in gains for the planter and for the economy as 
well. Much of this money came into the cotton belt directly, borrowed from European 
financiers without running through banks or other intermediaries. This makes the foreign 
funds flowing through the cotton South difficult to account for, and to track.14  One of the 
problems was that the majority of these improvements in efficiency remained on the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 J. H. Ingraham, The South-West  (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1835)., 91. 
 
12 See Harold D. Woodman, King Cotton and his Retainers: Financing and Marketing the Cotton 
Crop of the South, 1800-1925  (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990).,131-8. For 
a more critical consideration of planter fantasies and the relentless motivations to buy slaves with 
a focus on the market itself see Walter Johnson, Soul by Soul: Life Inside the Antebellum Slave 
Market  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
 
13 See George D. Green, Finance and Economic Development in the Old South: Louisiana 
Banking, 1804-1861  (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972).  
 
14 See ibid.ch. 3. 
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plantation and larger investments in the development of infrastructure in the South were 
not considered desirable or even necessary until the 1840s and 1850s. Planters remained 
narrowly focused on the production of cotton and making money. 
In the short term this behavior made sense. Yet short-term planning often 
conflicted with long-term concerns, and this focus on immediate profit had far-reaching 
consequences for economic development that were not fully understood at the time. 
Because of this mentality, the South lagged behind the North in terms of developing 
infrastructure and local industries. The economy of the South, while based on the growth 
of commodities for commercial sale, militated against regional economic development. 
Since these products were produced for an international marketplace, and Southern 
planters had no need to lure laborers to towns or regions, the South did not develop much 
local or regional infrastructure.15 Additionally, the South produced few of the necessities 
of nineteenth-century life; all of these items were imported, often from Great Britain or 
the Northeast. The end result was a dependence on other regions that had evolved local 
industries but lacked commercial products to sell on a world market. 
 In the 1850s planters agitated for the transcontinental railroad to pass through the 
South, and began to address the need to develop manufacturing and production in 
Southern states but still vehemently opposed tariffs and restrictions on trade.  Slaves and 
land remained important to Southern planters for social as well as economic reasons: 
their reliance on slave labor to produce crops and manage larger landholdings, at least 
theoretically, translated into larger harvests as well as increased prestige. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 See Gavin Wright, The Political Economy of the Cotton South: Households, Markets and 
Wealth in the Nineteenth Century  (New York: Norton, 1978). 
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Correspondingly, many financial houses and agents in the cotton belt were just as eager 
to make large advances to finance and derive profit from this trade. These same 
merchants and bankers were ill disposed to encourage or support any type of 
developmental projects in the South, especially after the repudiation of state and 
municipal debts in 1841 and 1842.16  
 
!
Figure 1: Cotton as a percentage of total annual exports from the United States 
 
From Bruchey, ed., Cotton and the Growth of the American Economy, 22. 
 
In many ways, the worlds of Manchester and the Mississippi River Valley were 
closer than we might imagine today. It is increasingly clear that cotton planters and 
factors had a distinctly international perspective that in some ways was more advanced 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 On these types of projects see John Majewski, forthcoming.  
 
 
funded and sustained the South, as westward expansion and the protection of slavery for the 
Sou h became complexly interrelated in the antebellum era. The cotton trade powerfully 
affected the direction of the entire national economy, occupying 41.4% of national export in 
1830, and 57.5% by 1860. Eventually cotton and slavery became central components in the 
increasing sectionalism, the two factors that solidified the ideological view of southerners in 
the antebellum era (fig.5.1).3   
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Source) Bruchey ed., Cotton and the Growth of the American Economy, 1790-1860, 22.  
 
   The richest soil for cotton production was the alluvial river bottoms along the Mississippi 
River in the states of Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas, and the Red River region of 
Louisiana, all of which were admitted to the Union after 1800. Not surprisingly, highly 
                                                  
3 Philip Foner, Business and Slavery: The New York Merchants and the Irrepressible Conflict (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1941); Brian Schoen, “The Fragile Fabric of the Union: The Cotton 
South, Federal Policies, and the Atlantic World, 1783-1861” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 
2004). Statistics from Stuart Bruchey, Cotton and the Growth of the American Economy, 1790-1860: 
Sources and Readings (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967). 
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than that of their New England brethren toiling away in their regional manufacturing 
enterprises and weaving homespun. As early as 1820 products derived from cotton 
accounted for roughly 59 percent of British exports. Cotton planters and their slaves 
harvested 60 percent of the raw material used in the production of these goods. This 
ranged up to 75 percent within a decade and remained at that level through the Civil War. 
Raw cotton was a significant export item for the United States as well (see figure 1). 
Some historians have delineated the development of a cohesive planter class that drove 
political decision-making.17 Others have explored the workings of the interstate slave 
trade and the day-to-day rhythms of planter life.18 Still others have considered the 
economic visions and intellectual outlook of the planter class.19 Gavin Wright has 
suggested that Southern dependence on cotton retarded economic development in the 
region.20  Given that credit was more often available for cotton than infrastructural 
projects it seems that finance played a role in the development of the built environment as 
well, and southern repudiation of state and municipal debts after the panics of 1837 and 
1839 did little to bolster enthusiasm for investment in development in Southern states. 
Simply put, cotton looked like a much better bet than the development of regional !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 William Kauffman Scarborough, Masters of the Big House: Elite Slaveholders of the Mid-
Nineteenth-Century South  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003). Schoen, 
Fragile Fabric of Union. 
 
18 On the interstate slave trade see Johnson, Soul by Soul. On planter life and sensibilities see 
Scarborough, Masters of the Big House. Wright, Political Economy of the Cotton South., Walter 
Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom  (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2013). Drew Gilpin Faust, James Henry Hammond and the Old South: 
A Design for Mastery  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982). 
 
19 In particular see John D. Majewski, Modernizing a Slave Economy: The Economic Vision of the 
Confederate Nation  (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).  James Oakes, 
Slavery and Freedom: An Interpretation of the Old South  (New York: Knopf, 1990). 
 
20 Wright, Political Economy of the Cotton South; ibid. 
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infrastructure.  
Credit extended on cotton, and the purchase of the commodity outright occurred 
with the most frequency when European markets were flat and, as is particularly evident 
in 1848, when political uncertainty made European investment less palatable. The types 
of credit extended on cotton took many forms, and some are more easily traceable than 
others.21 The most common variations included: whether through consignments, 
advances or on cotton used as collateral with Southern banks. Many Anglo-American 
financial houses sought productive deployment of their capital in the United States at 
these points, with political circumstances in Europe driving American financial 
expansion.  
The Louisiana Purchase is one early example of this intertwining of global 
markets. The loan for the purchase was financed by Barings and Hope and Co. to aid the 
United States in a purchase that raised much-needed capital for France. This sale was 
financed outwardly by the Dutch to avoid the direct involvement of a British bank in 
providing funds to France, which might be used to finance a war with Britain. The British 
government had been less than happy with the involvement of Barings, and issued 
specific instruction to the bank not to fund the deal, given that they felt the sale could 
fund a potential invasion of the British Isles by Napoleon.  France was eager to sell 
because of the desire for capital, and an increasing inability to defend these territories 
from British, Spanish and American incursions. The United States was interested, 
particularly because this would open access to the port of New Orleans, and allow for the 
shipment of commodities all the way down the Mississippi, in addition to doubling the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 See Green, Louisiana Banking_Ch. 3.  
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territory of the emergent nation. Later, political events and the interests of European 
financiers drove expansion of the cotton trade, particularly in the 1820s, 30s and 50s. 
Credit continued to be vital to the development of the United States in the years 
immediately after the founding. 
 The Louisiana Purchase involved finance on a grand scale, yet the early Republic 
benefitted from much smaller financial operations as well. Initially advances on crops 
bolstered the tobacco trade, and the establishment of a factorage system in the 
Chesapeake around tobacco heavily influenced the mechanisms later adopted to facilitate 
the Atlantic trade in cotton.22  
Southern cotton was a commodity produced for an international market and for 
this reason it stitched together diverse communities and regions. This in turn made 
Manchester mule spinners acutely aware of the political economy of the cotton South and 
involved them in a dialogue around slavery. Likewise, with most operations being funded 
by British capital, the actions of the Bank of England exerted financial pressure in the far 
reaches of the Mississippi valley, affecting agents, factors, cotton planters and their 
slaves as well. They were all connected by a common thread of cotton and the flows of 
capital across the Atlantic. Slave traders, purchasers of cotton in New Orleans, or 
Natchez, planters and yeoman farmers, closely followed Cotton production in Brazil, 
India and sales on the market in Liverpool. Throughout the antebellum period harvests 
around the globe had pronounced effects on markets in Liverpool and the selling price of 
cotton in New York as well as in port cities across the South.  As planters spread further !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Stuart Weems Bruchey, The Colonial Merchant: Sources and Readings  (New York,: Harcourt, 
1966).  
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inland, becoming pivotal presences in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas and 
Tennessee consumption continued to match production, as Britain increasingly purchased 
more, and yet more, cotton. Eventually a domestic trade in cotton opened with mills in 
Massachusetts, yet the trade with Great Britain continued to be the most vital, and this 
trade shaped the development of free-trade ideology in the South, and the business 
practices and fortunes of many larger Anglo-American houses.  
Credit and, by extension, debt was a pressing topic in the United States from the 
beginning. This question has been explored in terms of the eighteenth century, where 
changing conceptions of debt and credit created circumstances amenable to the evolution 
of a market economy. Bruce Mann describes this shift in Republic of Debtors. Indeed, 
Mann argues that ‘debt was an inescapable fact of life in early America’ and that debt and 
credit intertwined with other issues, fueling debates around dependence and 
independence and becoming imbricated in both republican and federalist arguments.23  
One of the key shifts Mann documents is the transformation of debt from a personal issue 
to something more commercial, and impersonal, which had the effect of altering moral 
perceptions of debt. These changes in perception of debt laid the groundwork for the 
transformation from a moral to a market economy. By the time cotton planters are 
seeking advances on their crops, conceptions of debt had changed, and the economy had 
correspondingly changed course as well.  
Banking and business histories have been remarkably silent regarding the 
relationship between slavery and finance. Even at this relatively early point in American !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Bruce H. Mann, Republic of Debtors: Bankruptcy in the Age of American Independence  
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002)., 3.  
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financial development there was a deep reliance on British credit.24 The need for credit 
was made manifest in the development of the trade in cotton. George Green highlights 
how this credit drove economic expansion and that often, this credit was employed 
productively.25  Yet few histories of banking firms discuss the cotton trade all that much, 
with the exception of Edwin Perkins’ Financing Anglo-American Trade: The House of 
Brown, 1800-1880. Perkins’ history of the Browns illustrates just how important 
consignments of cotton were to the firm. He highlights the innovations the Browns 
brought to the system of advances and later, to working with bills of exchange. Yet 
Perkins has little to say about slavery even though it is evident that the influence of 
slavery on the dynamics of southern commerce did motivate their exit from the cotton 
trade in the 1840s.  
Histories of Barings and Rothschild likewise devote little time to cotton or 
slavery, even though both houses were involved in the trade. Niall Ferguson notes that 
the trade in cotton was important in “The rise of the Rothschilds: The Family Firm as a 
Multinational” yet gives less consideration to the impact of the cotton trade on the 
development of the Rothschild houses in his two volume study The House of 
Rothschild.26  To simply say, as Austin does in his more recent book on the House of 
Baring, that to trade with America in the nineteenth century seems, in the end, a bit 
reductive. A more nuanced consideration of the dynamics of this trade tells us a good !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Ibid., ch. 1.  
 
25 See  Green, Louisiana Banking., 37-70.  
 
26 Niall Ferguson, "The Rise of the Rothschilds: The Family Firm as a Multinational," in The 
World of Private Banking, ed. Youssef Cassis (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009); Niall Ferguson, The 
House of Rothschild  (New York: Viking, 1998).  
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deal about the nature of these firms, how they evolved over time, as well as providing a 
different understanding of how national economies developed in response to international 
conditions.  
In the nineteenth century these financiers were keenly aware of the use of slavery, 
and particularly concerned with the fragility of the institution as well as a perceived 
necessity in its perpetuation. This is a point on which bankers with the most ardent of 
abolitionist sentiments would have been forthright.  Many of the merchant bankers and 
financiers involved with cotton had abolitionist views but saw slavery as necessary to the 
production of cotton, sugar and other Southern staples. They simply could not imagine 
how their world would function without it.  Jay Sexton has examined some points of 
intersection between slavery and finance but suggests that abolitionist sentiments 
outweighed pragmatic concerns around profit and risk. That decidedly was not the case.27 
In spite of all of this, slavery and finance, for some reason, are rarely discussed in 
conjunction with one another, even when we make allowances on occasion for wide-
ranging discussions that might bring together the larger realities of concepts like labor 
and capital. Some work has been done looking at the development of slave mortgages, 
most notably by Richard Kilbourne and Bonnie Martin. But slave mortgages were a 
small-scale localized practice that did not result in an appreciable increase of the money 
supply, either in the colonial period with which Martin is concerned or the later era 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Jay Sexton, Debtor Diplomacy: Finance and American Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era, 
1837-1873  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005); Jay Sexton, "Transatlantic Financiers and the Civil 
War," American Nineteenth Century History 2, no. 3 (2001).  
 
!15!
Kilbourne considers in Feliciana parish.28 Nevertheless, slaves played a vital role in the 
shaping of our larger economic world: they planted and harvested the labor-intensive 
crops that were eagerly purchased in European markets in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Ed Baptist outlines the contingent nature of the development of the cotton 
South through a consideration of two counties in Florida, noting that white, black and 
Native-America residents of Florida were all attempting to fashion different plots and 
outcomes for the region, often violently.29 The creation of the image of a changeless 
South is one with which he disagrees, noting this belies much of the struggle and 
contingency of development in the region. His history nevertheless illustrates how their 
exertions drove economic, industrial and financial expansion along with disagreement 
and on occasion, rebellion. The need shared by planters and many citizens of the young 
United States for money and credit in turn contributed to the creation of the plantation 
economy in the Deep South, leading to the embrace of cotton planting as an answer to the 
economic woes of the cash poor region after the Revolutionary War.  The system of 
cotton production, the world of finance that provided the credit, and the profits from 
sales, provided benefit to citizens of the early Republic and to Britain as well.   
There is a tendency to view slavery and the cotton economy as a Southern 
anomaly, and to suggest the South was insular and economically backward. Like many 
recent studies of the American South this project sees the region in a very different light. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Bonnie Martin, "Slavery's Invisible Engine: Mortgaging Human Property," The Journal of 
Southern History 76, no. 4 (2010); Richard Holcombe Kilbourne, Debt, Investment, Slaves: 
Credit Relations in East Feliciana Parish, Louisiana, 1825-1885  (Tuscaloosa: University of 
Alabama Press, 1995). 
 
29 Edward E. Baptist, Creating an Old South: Middle Florida's Plantation Frontier Before the 
Civil War  (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). 
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The South produced a commercial crop for sale in international markets. This benefitted 
the United States as a whole, and combined what we have come to see as North and 
South into one larger economic unit with each unit making different contributions to a 
larger economy.30 These cotton planters were integrated within a larger global network of 
credit, finance and exchange as has been noted in more recent work on the antebellum 
South.31 These same planters were well aware of the political thought and ideological 
sentiments of their era, both in the United States and across the Atlantic. The majority of 
planters in the cotton belt, and the writers of the works they read, tended towards 
decidedly classically liberal economic views, embracing free trade but not free labor. 
This seems contradictory now, similar to claiming that freedom for some is freedom for 
all, but this was not the case at the time. Many residents of the cotton belt saw no 
contradiction or tension between the ideas at all, and additionally failed to see their ideas 
as anything other than modern.32 The rise of scientific racism and eugenics from the 
1830s forward only added fuel to the flames, as thoughts with tenuous links to the 
enlightenment seemingly justified enslavement and ideas of racial superiority and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Recent works that see the South as more modern and forward looking include John D. 
Majewski, A House Dividing: Economic Development in Pennsylvania and Virginia Before the 
Civil War  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Johnson, Soul by Soul; Johnson, 
River of Dark Dreams. Schoen, Fragile Fabric of Union. L. Diane Barnes, Brian Schoen, and 
Frank Towers, The Old South's Modern Worlds: Slavery, Region, and Nation in the Age of 
Progress  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). Of course, James Oakes noted the global 
aspirations of southern thinkers in Oakes, Slavery and Freedom. See also Mark M. Smith, 
Mastered by the Clock: Time, Slavery, and Freedom in the American South  (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997). The division of the United States into discrete regions 
labeled North and South is a shallow gloss for slave and free states, an ex post facto interpretation 
that suggests much more ideological, social and economic separation than existed at the time. 
 
31 See for example Barnes, Schoen, and Towers, Old South's Modern Worlds. 
  
32 See Majewski, House Dividing; Schoen, Fragile Fabric of Union; ibid.and Drew Gilpin Faust, 
A Sacred Circle: The Dilemma of the Intellectual in the Old South, 1840-1860  (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1977)., especially 126-9 
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inferiority.33 
Long before planters in the antebellum South embraced cotton their interests were 
already yoked to the Atlantic trade, and this relationship is one that puts the political 
squarely back into play as a concern in studies of the history of political economy. 
Initially these planters sought out access and relationships in markets outside of British 
domination and control, an outgrowth of virulent anti-British sentiment. Their passionate 
Anglophobia, a lingering result of the Revolutionary War, led them initially to a heartfelt 
embrace of federalism, and to support for the War of 1812. Yet cotton reinforced extra-
national ties to international trade and altered the relations of the cotton South to the 
emergent nation. As the cultivation of cotton was pushed ever more deeply inland and 
production increased Britain became the primary trading partner of the Southern states. 
Ironically, free trade with Great Britain came to dominate the economic vision of the 
South, and this shaped the way the South responded to the War of 1812, westward 
expansion, manifest destiny and the preservation of commercial and financial 
relationships across the Atlantic world.  
Unfortunately, the dictates of cotton planting and the needs of local and regional 
manufacturing interests more prevalent in the Northeast, were radically different and 
pulled at the bonds of the Union as divergent ideologies, trade policies and labor regimes 
grew increasingly pronounced over the course of the nineteenth century. As the 
nineteenth century progressed Southerners had decreasing faith in the earlier notions of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 See Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812  
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968); George M. Fredrickson, Racism: A Short 
History  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Andrew S. Curran, The Anatomy of 
Blackness: Science and Slavery in an Age of Enlightenment  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2011). 
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Madisonian plurality and tolerance of different labor regimes. By 1860 it was abundantly 
clear that a recently unified South did not believe a Republican administration would 
respect their interests, production practices and investment in slaves as property. I would 
suggest that the threats and bellicosity of the South would have received a very different 
reception had they occurred earlier, before money and the United States as a whole had 
moved away from a keenly felt reliance on cotton. Numerous historians have argued 
compellingly that slavery was the primary cause of the Civil War and this is a claim that 
is hard to deny. Nevertheless, had the cotton belt states threatened secession in 1848, the 
outcome might have been very different.34 An international perspective, one actually in 
line with the actors discussed here, reveals a different picture of the development of 
American and Atlantic finance as well as industrialization in England and the United 
States, and perhaps most pivotally, the American Civil War.  
 
On the other hand, British financiers had different views of cotton, planters and 
the political economy of the cotton belt. British investment in American markets 
increased from the 1820s forward. By the outbreak of the Civil War British investment in 
the United States totaled $444,000,000. Britain had become deeply reliant on the United 
States for cotton as well as grain. Yet at this juncture most of the investment of larger 
Anglo-American houses no longer centered squarely on cotton. In fact, of all the major !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 See Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before 
the Civil War  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Charles B. Dew, Apostles of Disunion: 
Southern Secession Commissioners and the Causes of the Civil War  (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 2001). William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification 
Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836  (New York: Harper & Row, 1966). William W. 
Freehling, The Road to Disunion, 2 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). William 
W. Freehling, The Reintegration of American History: Slavery and the Civil War  (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994). See also Elizabeth R. Varon, Disunion! The Coming of the 
American Civil War, 1789-1859  (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008). 
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Anglo-American houses, none was heavily invested in cotton by 1860. The house with 
the most involvement with cotton in the 1850s, Barings, bought no cotton at all in the 
1859 season. In 1860 planters held back a good deal of their crop so, once again, Barings 
bought little. As the United States moved towards disunion and Civil War the decidedly 
neutral stance of most of Great Britain was in essence a rejection of the Southern 
Confederacy, which simply did not have the same material resources that the North had 
to fund a war; the lack of support from European powers was deeply damaging to the 
Confederacy. 
It is helpful as well to place this work in the context of the larger debate around 
slavery and capitalism. Most discussions of the issue focus on the slave trade, and profits 
derived from the sale of slaves. The debate around the precise nature of the relationship 
between slavery and capitalism has its roots in Eric Williams’ Capitalism and Slavery.35 
Williams argues that the profits from the slave trade and the Atlantic economy financed 
industrialization in Britain, and further, that the profitability of slavery declined 
dramatically after the American Revolution. Williams considered both the trade in slaves 
as well as the profit derived from the labor, a fact dismissed by many of his initial critics.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 C.L.R. James’s The Black Jacobins is also often cited in this context, but deals with capitalism 
in France. Cyril Lionel Robert James, The Black Jacobins  (New York: The Dial Press, 1938). 
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World the Slaves Made  (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974). 
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His second argument, that emancipation was driven more by economic expediency than 
by humanitarian sentiment is also economic in character. Engerman and others in the 
1970s refuted Williams’ arguments, claiming first that the slave trade itself could not 
have contributed enough profit to finance industrialization, and some later arguing that 
the entire economic trade was not even that significant.36  Many also questioned 
Williams’ contention that abolition and emancipation were economically motivated, 
preferring instead to locate the origins of abolition in humanitarian sentiment. More 
recent works have acknowledged the role played by the slave trade and goods produced 
by slaves in the economic development of Great Britain, as well as the American 
colonies. However, there are no books presently published that specifically address the 
economic importance of the slave trade and slave labor to economic development and 
industrialization in the United States.  
Much of this historiography has been primarily concerned with the relationship 
between the slave trade and the Industrial Revolution in England. Central points of debate 
have focused on the profitability of the slave trade, and on Williams’ arguments around 
the decline in profitability in slavery.37 Early arguments tended to dispute Williams’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Some historians that have disagreed with Williams: Roger Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade 
and British Abolition, 1760-1810  (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1975). Stanley L. 
Engerman, "The Slave Trade: A Comment on the Williams Thesis," Business History Review 46, 
no. 4 (1974). and Seymour Drescher, Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of Abolition  
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977). For rebuttals to Engerman and others disputing 
Williams’ thesis see: Hilary Beckles, "Down But Not Out: Eric Williams' Capitalism and Slavery 
After Nearly Forty Years of Criticism," Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs 8(1982). Barbara 
L. Solow, "Caribbean Slavery and British Growth: The Eric Williams Hypothesis," Journal of 
Development Economics 17(1985). J. E. Inikori, Slavery and the Rise of Capitalism, Elsa Goveia 
Memorial Lecture; 1993. Mona, Jamaica: Dept. of History the University of the West Indies, 
1993, J. E. Inikori, Africans and the Industrial Revolution in England: A Study in International 
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arguments but in the 1980s there was a shift in the historiography, and historians like 
Hillary Beckles, and Joseph Inikori began to defend and expand upon his original 
argument. Joseph Inikori in particular has worked to resurrect the thesis and encourage 
further work on the relationship between slavery and capitalism. Inikori and other 
proponents of the thesis have also highlighted the fact that Williams argued that it was 
the entire system of economic connections that made slavery such a catalyst to the British 
economy.  
Inikori’s work in particular raises some important questions. One is why the focus 
remains on England in these debates, with the Americas playing an ancillary role. The 
fact is the United States produced the cotton that was converted into textiles. Not only did 
the British take advantage of American land, they also externalized their reliance on slave 
labor by purchasing American cotton.  A second, and larger question is what is the 
precise relationship between coerced and free labor in the rise of capitalist systems? And 
additionally, how is it that capitalism, freedom and democracy work with and against one 
another? 
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By acknowledging the Atlantic character of these transactions and events we 
benefit through a more complete understanding of states and economies that remained 
deeply entwined after the American Revolution. In turn, our understandings of slavery, 
capitalism and finance are also expanded. We are left with a more complete picture of 
what happened, how, and why. We also reach an understanding of the nineteenth-century 
Atlantic world that aligns more closely with the participants that lived at that time. Cotton 
planters, merchants, factors, stevedores, barkeeps and deck hands all had a much more 
cosmopolitan outlook than can be adequately captured in a history narrowly confined to 
the nation state. Cotton factors were monitoring prices in India and British reactions to 
articles in the American press. Manchester mule spinners were aware of American 
slavery, and Afro-British sailors were suspected of spreading unrest among slaves in New 
Orleans. How can we make sense of this world solely through a national lens?  
Unfortunately, the implicit assumption in Atlantic history tends to be that the 
Atlantic world vanished around 1800. In this way, many Atlantic histories have actually 
been histories of empire by another name.38 This limitation in the conventional !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Two illuminating works on methodological approaches in Atlantic history are David Armitage 
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periodization observed in Atlantic history has a distorting effect on the histories that 
presently fall under the Atlantic rubric. The result is that the history of Anglo-American 
finance and its connections to the slave system in the American South is not considered 
within the contexts of larger Atlantic connections, and divorced from the historiography 
surrounding slavery and capitalism as well.  The conventions of fields and periodization, 
in this case, work against a full understanding of the history of connections between 
North and South, and slave-based and nominally ‘free labor’ economies.  
Work on industrialization in the United States tends to either see industrialization 
as a uniquely Northern story, or a financial one that does not pay much attention to how 
cotton was in fact produced. This is an issue that has been addressed in the historiography 
of industrialization in Britain, first by Eric Williams and later by Joseph Inikori and 
Kenneth Pomeranz. In contrast, works on the Industrial Revolution in the United States 
can be categorized as being more concerned with explaining why the United States 
experienced unprecedented economic expansion in the nineteenth century, or with the 
transformation of social relations and institutions in conjunction with the transition to a 
capitalist economy.  Douglass North’s The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-
1860, attempts to explain why the United States experienced rapid development when it 
did. He argues that exogenous trade is vital to economic development in any system. In 
his model, the income from trade spurs endogenous expansion of the market, resulting in 
greater integration of markets within the system. The commodity that spurs the 
exogenous trade vital to sustained economic growth in North’s version of American 
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industrialization, or expansion, is cotton. Ironically, the plantation system of production 
receives no mention in North’s book.  
Unfortunately, many global historians writing on the Industrial Revolution have 
ignored the United States, focusing instead on industrialization in Great Britain. Kenneth 
Pomeranz does not. Although his work is concerned primarily with explaining why Great 
Britain industrialized when other Eurasian cores did not, he gets to the heart of why 
slavery, and access to an American hinterland, was vital to British industrialization.39 
Pomeranz’s work demonstrates how important slavery, as well as the Louisiana Purchase, 
was to economic development in Britain and by extension in the United States as well.  
In the United States, the larger thread of historical inquiry that links capitalism, 
slavery and industrialization has been ignored. Yet the fact remains that  ‘canals did not 
dig themselves any more than cotton picked and converted itself into shirts and pants. 
Early republican boosters and their historians have pretended otherwise, erasing 
unfreedom from the story of American capitalism.’40 When historians ignore the role of 
coerced labor they systematically deny the contributions made by African slaves, Native-
Americans, and indentured Europeans. The resulting political and economic picture is a 
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gross parody of the realities on the ground and has resulted in a spurious association of 
free markets, capitalism and democracy which has no really basis in the American past 
and represents an ideal of development in which few nations with struggling economies 
have any really hope of creating strong independent economies.  
The influence of present concerns on the past is not something unique, or 
particularly exceptional in terms of American historiography. As Fredric Hayek noted in 
Capitalism and the Historians,  ‘political opinion and views about historical events ever 
have been and always must be closely connected. Past experience is the foundation on 
which our beliefs about the desirability of different policies and institutions are mainly 
based, and our present political views inevitably affect and color our interpretation of the 
past.’41 The tinting of the past with shadings from the present, whether lightly, heavily or 
with a wholesale whitewashing is common to this thread of the historiography of the 
Industrial Revolution in its entirety. Eric Williams was heavily influenced not only by C. 
L. R. James, but also by the enduring legacy of British colonial practices in Africa. 
Engerman’s response to Williams’ thesis was rooted in the political concerns of the Cold 
War as well as prevalent economic discourse. The shift in the consideration of the 
relationship between capitalism and slavery in England has been attributable to changes 
in methodologies and the unrelenting work of scholars influenced by decolonization. 
Likewise, current shifts in the understanding of the American past and an opening of the 
historiography to Atlantic and global perspectives is reflective of an increasing awareness 
of the United States as one nation among many, as opposed to an exceptional one guided 
by one or another form of manifest destiny !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Friedrich A. von Hayek, Capitalism and the historians  (London: Routledge, 2003)., 210. 
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Recent writings have focused on seeing the South as a much more modern and 
cosmopolitan place. Works like John Majewski’s  Modernizng a Slave Economy: The 
Economic Vision of the Confederate Nation and the essays in The Old South’s Modern 
Worlds  encourage a different view of the South, and southern planters as forward 
thinking and cosmopolitan in outlook.42  Yet, aside from Philip Foner’s Business and 
Slavery few histories have tackled the interconnectivity of regions in American economic 
development.43 The interconnectivity of different regions in the United States allowed the 
South to focus on producing commodities for commercial sale. From the beginning, the 
United States economy was a national one and slavery was just as important to New York 
as New Orleans. Examining the links between North and South in the American colonies 
and the antebellum United States would not only shed light on the validity of reparations 
debates presently involving numerous banks and corporations but also provide a much 
deeper and more nuanced understanding of the American past.44  To truly understand 
capitalism, despite our wishes to the contrary, capitalism seems invariably to have certain 
favorites that run roughshod over the less fortunate.  
The following chapters are roughly chronological and demonstrate both how the 
trade in cotton developed and contracted as well as the conflicts that arose in the context 
of the demands of the Atlantic trade. Chapter one considers the development of the cotton !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 See Majewski, Modernizing a Slave Economy.,Barnes, Schoen, and Towers, Old South's 
Modern Worlds. 
 
43 A few who have made the effort include Edward Baptist, forthcoming,  
 
44 Brown University recently published an investigation of its own links to the slave trade. See: 
http://www.brown.edu/Research/Slavery_Justice/. On the reparations debate see John Torpey, 
Making Whole What Has Been Smashed: On Reparations Politics  (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2006).  
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kingdom and how a crop that had grander associations with locales such as Brazil and 
India became the primary crop and number one export in the United States in very short 
order, in large measure based on the availability of credit.  
Chapter two considers how a financial system evolved to support the cotton trade, 
examining in particular the rapid proliferation of banks across the American South. This 
chapter highlights the involvement of British merchant bankers in this process, and how 
this contributed to economic expansion across the United States as well as the panic of 
1837.  
Chapter three considers how the trade comes together, considering the heightened 
presence of Barings and entry into the trade by the Rothschilds. After 1837 these two 
firms moved in to fill the void left by the Browns’ slow departure away from the 
consignment business.  The Rothschilds and Barings had a brief but intensive 
involvement with cotton that informed their understandings of American markets 
generally. This chapter also considers how trade worked in the South, examining the role 
of factors and agents, as well as how planters did business through a consideration of the 
career of Rice Ballard, who entered the trade in 1837 as well. All of these larger firms 
learned a great deal from their involvement in cotton markets, and all of them eventually 
moved on from cotton, taking their profits and knowledge and applying them in other, 
more lucrative ventures.  
Chapter four examines how these major firms shifted their allegiances to cotton 
up to Lincoln’s election and the secession of South Carolina. By the advent of the Civil 
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War none of the three major houses was purchasing the article or making advances. In 
fact, the Browns were considering exiting the South entirely.  
Chapter five returns squarely to finance demonstrating that the larger financial 
houses had all learned their lessons and moved on, while planters did not see, at least 
initially, that the world, and their place in it, had irrevocably shifted. These shifts had 
profound consequences for the South and these strategic miscalculations around the 
power of a commodity assured the South would not prevail in the Civil War. 
! !
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Chapter One: The Commencement of the Reign of Cotton !
Over the course of the nineteenth century the landscape of the American South 
was transformed from what some might consider frontier, into neatly spaced parcels for 
sale. Previous to his surveying of land and its division into neat, rectangular parcels 
represented on maps this land had been charted differently by the Native American tribes 
that hunted in the woods and fished in the rivers, using topographical markers as their 
guides. These people were unconcerned with European ideas of ownership and paid scant 
attention to notions of boundaries, soil quality or ease of irrigation. They were more 
concerned with the presence of game in the woods and hunting for fur pelts to trade to 
Europeans. The first squatters to arrive cleared land, planted corn and built small cabins. 
They settled the land but their clearing and improvements rarely extended beyond their 
homesteads. With the surveying of the land, division into neat lots and eventual sale 
formal settlement followed as yeoman farmers tried to reconcile the surveyors’ 
mathematical precision with the natural reality of the parcel they had purchased. Often 
these lots cut across geographical features like woods, rivers, streams, hills and ridges. 
Initially settlers arrived with families. The first decades of settlement were characterized 
by subsistence-oriented farmers carving out homes and small farms in what still in many 
ways resembled a wilderness. Eventually, as cotton became an increasingly attractive and 
lucrative crop, a plantation based economy emerged.  
The transformation of the American landscape and economy through cotton 
production was instigated by a sequence of unrelated, international events that coalesced 
to create the cotton kingdom. These events occurred in different locales and through the 
long reach of capitalism contributed to the formation of an integrated Atlantic economy 
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based around cotton and the productions of textiles. In Great Britain, a series of changes 
in conceptions of the self, personal hygiene and the emergence of a working class 
purchasing ready-made fabrics created a demand for raw cotton. Revolutions, political 
compromises, ideological shifts and a series of negotiated settlements in the formation of 
the United States created a need in the southern United States to find a crop suitable for 
commercial production. In this environment the United States generally, and the 
American South in particular, needed to find new trading partners, as well as ways of 
doing business. The allegiance of many nation states to mercantilist ideas made it 
difficult for the United States to form international trade relationships, something the 
country needed to spur economic growth and development.45 Additionally, technological 
advances in the production of cotton, the opening of the Deep South through the 
Louisiana Purchase and the development of a domestic slave trade resulted in a dramatic 
shift away from Jefferson’s vision of an agrarian republic where slavery would eventually 
fade away with the establishment of a nation of independent farmers. Instead, the 
Louisiana Purchase resulted in a second life for the peculiar institution and the 
development of a domestic slave trade that moved slaves out of Virginia and the 
Chesapeake and into newly opened areas amenable to cotton and sugar cultivation.46  The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 On mercantilism see Jacob Viner, "Mercantilist Thought," in Essays on the Intellectual History 
of Economics, ed. Douglas Irwin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); William Allen, 
"Modern Defenders of Mercantilist Theory," A History of Political Economy 2(1970)., A. W. 
Coats and William R. Allen, "The Interpretation of Mercantilist Economics: Some 
Historiographical Problems; With a Rearguard Response," History of Political Economy 5, no. 2 
(1973). 
 
46 On the internal slave trade see Johnson, Soul by Soul. Johnson, River of Dark Dreams. Adam 
Rothman, Slave Country: American Expansion and the Origins of the Deep South  (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2005). The Deep South is defined generally as Alabama, Florida, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas. These states, 
through which the cotton belt runs, include the first seven states that seceded from the United 
States during the Civil War. 
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development of the cotton kingdom was the result of the creation of very strong demand 
and a corresponding need in the American South to find a good to produce for sale 
internationally, along with access to credit. These two factors combined with 
technological advances and the opening of large amounts of land through the Louisiana 
Purchase to extend the reach of slavery throughout lands initially intended for small-scale 
settlement. These events had a profound influence on the development of the of the 
newly formed United States, and an understanding of the political economy of the early 
republic is pivotal to an understanding of the creation of the cotton kingdom. After a brief 
consideration of the forces that made cotton a viable international crop, this chapter will 
examine the political economy of the newly formed United States in terms of cotton.  
Technological Development 
The rate at which fibers could be spun into yarn constrained the textile industry’s 
growth until 1769, when James Hargreaves, an illiterate woodworker and weaver, 
invented the spinning jenny, a simple, hand-cranked improvement upon the spinning 
wheel that allowed one operator to spin multiple threads simultaneously. Wealthy mill-
owner Richard Arkwright employed John Kay, a clockmaker, to devise a spinning jenny 
of much greater capacity. Known as the spinning frame, this machine was operated by 
waterpower and later by steam engines. In 1785 another Englishman, Edmund 
Cartwright, invented the power loom. Power-operated looms enabled cloth to be 
produced cheaply and in quantities never before possible, creating a demand for cotton 
that outstripped supply. The pressing need for a fiber that was more plentiful and cheaper 
than wool became apparent. Cotton became the fiber of choice. Cotton imports increased !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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more than tenfold between 1750 and 1790, to 25 million pounds. England’s cotton 
suppliers remained the Levant, the West Indies, Brazil, and Dutch Guiana. Cotton was a 
scarce and expensive commodity, however, because it was necessary to separate the 
seeds from the fiber by hand, a slow and tedious process. An American, Eli Whitney, 
overcame this last hurdle constricting the manufacturing process in 1793, when he 
invented the saw gin, a simple machine that separated cotton lint from the seeds.47 
The rise of the British cotton manufacturing industry and invention of the cotton 
gin changed the trajectory of economic and political development in the United States. 
Prior to Whitney’s development of the gin, cotton was a sideline crop grown mostly in 
small garden plots for making homespun cloth.48  Slave labor was not employed in cotton 
growing on a large scale. It appeared that slavery was becoming economically unviable 
as agricultural labor in the South as had already happened in the North. The cotton gin 
created a tremendous new demand for field hands to pick the cotton bolls, and thus 
reinvigorated slavery. Of equal importance to the gin was the introduction of a variety of 
cotton, Gossypium hirsutum, more commonly known as ‘Petit Gulf,’ the first seeds of 
which were obtained from central Mexico at an uncertain date around 1800. Prior to the 
introduction of Petit Gulf, the upland cotton grown in the United States was Gossypium 
herbaceum, the foundation seed of which came from the Near East in the 1600s. Petit 
Gulf cotton was a hardy upland plant that adapted readily to the soil and climate of the 
lower Mississippi Valley, and it provided the foundation stock of all subsequent 
American varieties known collectively as ‘New Orleans’ cotton. Petit Gulf cotton yielded !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Ezekiel J. Donnell, Chronological and Statistical History of Cotton  (New York: J. Stutton & 
Co., 1872)., 25-69. 
 
48 For more on the development of the cotton gin see Angela Lakwete, Inventing the Cotton Gin.  
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more per acre than the Near Eastern variety previously grown for domestic homespun, its 
seed were easier to remove, and its longer staple length and fiber characteristics imparted 
superior spinning qualities.49 
The Stimulation of Demand 
By the time Southerners first understood the potential power of cotton production 
to ease their burdens, and the greater ease with which it could be cultivated, demand for 
the article was already strong in England. Printed calicoes had become fashionable in the 
eighteenth century and demand exploded when these calicoes, and cotton textiles in 
general, were popularized by the East India Company. Until the mid-1700s, sheep wool 
remained the staple material of the English textile industry. Cotton fabrics were luxury 
goods imported from India by the East India Company and from the Ottoman Empire by 
the Levant Company.  Indeed, cotton fabric became popular enough that English weavers 
felt the pinch and pushed through legislation prohibiting initially the sale, in 1700, and 
eventually, in 1721, the production of pure printed cotton cloth. The distinction here is an 
important one. Cotton blends, most notably fustians, a fabric worn by the working 
classes, were composed of linen and cotton. Because of this association, blends were not 
eagerly embraced. The wearing of cotton clothing, however, could not be prohibited 
because there was by that time a small English handicraft cotton spinning and weaving 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Joseph Addison Turner, The Cotton Planter's Manual: Being a Compilation of Facts from the 
Best Authorities on the Culture of Cotton; its Natural History, Chemical Analysis, Trade, and 
Consumption; and Embracing a History of Cotton and the Cotton Gin  (New York: C.M. Saxton, 
1857)., 94-128. Popular antebellum varieties were known as Sugar Loaf, Vick’s 100, Tarver (also 
called Alabama), Brown’s, Pitt’s Prolific, Hogans, Prout, Chester, Pomegranate, Multibolus, Rob 
Smith’s 25-cents, Mammoth, and Mastodon. 
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industry. To supply it with raw material, England imported about 2 million pounds of raw 
cotton per year from 1700 until 1750, most of it from the West Indies and the Near 
East.50 When the sale and production bans were lifted in 1774 the cotton manufacturing 
industry quickly moved into the British Midlands and production accelerated to at least 
attempt to meet demand. Lancashire manufacturers quickly seized the global lead in 
terms of annual cloth production and in just a few decades Manchester was transformed 
into one of the largest and most powerful manufacturing metropolises in the world. 
Neighboring communities in Lancashire were carried along on her meteoric rise. 
Oldham, just a few miles north of Manchester grew even more quickly as essentially a 
factory town, becoming the largest producer of cotton cloth in Great Britain by the 
1850s.51 During the nineteenth century the cotton textile production of Oldham was 
double that of Germany and France combined. Other towns, like Salford, Rochdale, 
Bolton, and Altrincham, experienced similar socio-economic transformations, resulting in 
extreme class struggle and the development of urban poverty as well as the production of 
incredible amounts of cloth.52 
 The popularity of the cloth is not such a surprise. The fact is cotton is more 
comfortable than wool and can be woven or printed with a variety of patterns that had, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 R. Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain  (London: Macmillan, 1957).; Donnell, History of 
Cotton., 16-25. 
 
51 R. McNeil and Michael Nevell, A Guide to the Industrial Archaeology of Greater Manchester  
([England]: Association for Industrial Archaeology, 2000). 
 
52 John Foster, Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution: Early Industrial Capitalism in Three 
English Towns  (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974). See also McNeil and Nevell, Industrial 
Archaeology of Greater Manchester. 
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and still have, fashionable appeal (see Figure 2).53 Cotton was easier to dye and process 
than wool and cheaper than wool, silk or linen. As production increased to meet demand, 
prices fell even more and the fabric became even more accessible by a wider range of 
people by virtue of the economy of scale.  Given the increasingly reasonable price it 
gained more universal appeal.54 Aside from the practical, dress choices began to shift and 
there was a move towards increasing refinement in the presentation of self.55 British 
women began to favor printed cotton dresses, waistcoats and white stockings. The ease of 
cleaning cotton compared to wool also appealed to an increased concern with personal 
hygiene and cleanliness. A nascent awareness of fashion and the ability to participate in 
sartorial trends subsequently became something more easily within reach of a greater 
variety of people. This burgeoning interest in the presentation of self across a wide 
demographic swath of society occurred in the United States as well, as people of various 
social classes evinced a burgeoning interest in fashion and possessed the means to afford 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 On the enduring allure of cotton, and how global capital flows continue to move with the article 
through the global economy see Pietra Rivoli, The Travels of a T-Shirt in the Global Economy: 
An Economist Examines the Markets, Power and Politics of World Trade  (Hoboken: John Wiley 
& Sons, 2005). 
 
54 On eighteenth-century fashion, and by extension, the increasing popularity of cotton in terms of 
fashion see Beverly Lemire, Fashion's Favourite: The Cotton Trade and the Consumer in Britain, 
1660-1800  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). and Sarah Levitt, "Clothing," in The 
Lancashire Cotton Industry: a History Since 1700, ed. Mary B. Rose (Preston: Lancashire 
County Books, 1996). 
 
55 See Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process, 1st American ed. (New York: Urizen Books, 1978). 
and Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste  (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1984). Bourdieu highlights how refined and exclusive products that are 
initially vey desirable become more affordable over time and greater numbers of people enjoy 
these items or pleasures. This process occurred with sugar, see Sidney Wilfred Mintz, Sweetness 
and Power: the Place of Sugar in Modern History  (New York: Viking, 1985). 
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items based on current trends and taste in addition to strict necessity.56  
This shift added an additional impetus to a demand for cotton textiles that had 
been growing across Europe and beyond. This in turn created an unprecedented demand 
for raw cotton. The problem, at least initially, was one of supply. Britain first looked to 
her colonies as a source. The West Indies was one place some British planters sought 
success. Unfortunately, the climate proved less than ideal, insects were a perennial 
problem and, ultimately, sugar simply proved more profitable. In the face of so many 
obstacles there was little land available for cotton cultivation, and even less motivation to 
devote any land to it when sugar planting was so much more lucrative.57 The British also 
attempted cotton cultivation along the west coast of Africa in the late eighteenth century. 
Again, the climate was ill-suited to the crop, the soil was poor, insect infestation was a 
problem and in the end low crop yields convinced investors that their efforts were wasted 
in these areas.58  
India seemed a viable locale, and indeed over the course of the nineteenth century 
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56 Kathy Peiss discusses this shift in the behavior of nineteenth-century working women in Kathy 
Lee Peiss, Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in Turn-of-the-Century New York  
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986). See also Michael Zakim, Ready-Made 
Democracy: A History of Men's Dress in the American Republic, 1760-1860  (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003). The eighteenth century roots of some of these shifts are noted 
as well in Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln  (New York: 
Norton, 2005). Dror Wahrman, The Making of the Modern Self: Identity and Culture in 
Eighteenth-Century England  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). 
 
57 See J. R.  Ward, "The British West Indies 1745-1815," in The Oxford History of the British 
Empire, ed. William Roger Louis, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998)., 421-4 and P. J. 
Marshall, "Britain Without America," in The Oxford History of the British Empire, ed. William 
Roger Louis, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998). 
 
58 Michael M. Edwards, The Growth of the British Cotton Trade, 1780-1815  (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1967). 79, 82. 
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produced enough raw cotton that Southern planters could not view their trade with 
Britain as monopolistic.59 This perpetuated a healthy fear in the cotton belt that Britain 
could find other sources of the commodity if necessary.  It!is!important!to!note!here!that!in!transforming!Indian!subcontinent!into!a!supplier!of!raw!cotton!as!opposed!to!purveyor!of!finished!goods,!which!she!was!previously,!competition!to!British!textiles!was!effectively!eliminated!within!the!empire!and!Britain!created!more!consumers!for!British!textiles.!India!had!the!additional!advantage!of!being!a!colonial!holding!and!had!India!been!able!to!meet!British!demand!this!would!have!been!the!preferable!option.!!
Brazil seemed another potential source, and a good one. The country had been a 
large supplier of raw cotton in the eighteenth century. In fact, at the close of the 
eighteenth century most would have said Brazil would be a more certain locale for an 
expansion of cotton planting and production. Yet, Brazil was also outside the empire and 
could not produce enough of the article to satisfy the increasingly hungry mills of 
Lancashire. The majority of the cotton was also rough and ill suited to clothing an 
increasingly discerning public. In sum, there was a good deal of demand looking to be 
filled at the end of the eighteenth century. Much to the chagrin of many Britons, 
especially those with mercantilist leanings, it seemed no source of cotton within the 
empire would prove sufficient to meet the very large and increasing need for the raw 
good. The former colonial hinterlands of the British Empire were not the most desirable 
place to look given the recent revolution. Nevertheless, Britain was advantageously !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 For one account of this process see C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: 
Global Connections and Comparisons  (Malden: Blackwell, 2004). C. A. Bayly, Imperial 
Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830  (London: Longman, 1989)., 100-32. 
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positioned in terms of developing trade relationships with the former American colonies.  
More than any other factor, what worked most in the favor of the Deep South as a 
site for cotton production was that the Manchester mills had fairly quickly become 
exceptionally partial to American Petit Gulf cotton, which happened to grow fantastically 
well in the sandy upland areas containing acres and acres of fallow land. Suddenly, this 
land looked much more valuable. The only strains spinners liked more were Sea Island 
and Egypt’s exceptionally fine and expensive arboreal ‘Jumel’ variety. These preferences 
held constant with consumers as well.  American cotton could be spun into much finer 
yarn than could the Indian Surat or similar coarse, short-staple varieties from Brazil and 
the Near East. Finer diameter, softer yarn meant that cloth woven from American cotton 
was much softer, smoother, and more comfortable to wear than cloth made from Indian 
cotton. Spinners optimized their machinery to the characteristics of American cotton, an 
adaptation that made it extremely difficult to spin coarser, shorter staple Surat-type 
cotton. This further reinforced the American monopoly, since even if the economic and 
physical obstacles to obtaining cotton elsewhere could be overcome, that cotton was not 
suitable for the machinery in British mills. Modifying the machines was also a near 
impossibility. In 1860 it would have involved modifying or replacing more than 30 
million individual spindles.60 
The downward trend in prices that occurred in conjunction with the exponential 
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60 Sir R. Arthur Arnold, The History of the Cotton Famine, From the Fall of Sumter to the 
Passing of the Public Works Act  (London: Saunders).,36. Sven Beckert, "Emancipation and 
Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the Civil War " 
The American Historical Review 109, no. 5 (2004). 
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increase in American production was disastrous for cotton growers in other parts of the 
world. Cotton prices fell below their costs of production and transportation, and they 
either stopped growing cotton entirely or reduced their planting to the amount needed to 
sustain local textile manufacture by traditional handicraft methods. The British West 
Indies, for example, exported 11,223,446 pounds of cotton to England in 1815. The 
quantity had declined to half that in 1825, to a tenth in 1840, and to just 427,735 pounds 
in 1850. In the Ottoman Empire, once continental Europe’s major cotton supplier, exports 
virtually ceased and production plummeted as English manufactured yarn and cloth 
forced local handicraft textiles out of the market. Brazilian planters, although they did not 
abandon cotton growing as did those in the West Indies, did not increase the size of their 
crop. England’s yearly imports from Brazil remained stagnant at around 20 million 
pounds for four decades. India’s output of cotton and the volume that it exported to 
Britain increased substantially, but because of high transportation costs and the low 
quality of indigenous Indian ‘Surat’ cotton, its share of the English market declined from 
26 percent in 1815 to an average of less than half that for the next forty-five years. That 
Indian cotton retained the share that it did is probably because it found a niche in the 
production of coarse cloth used for making grain sacks. By the 1850s, Brazil, India, and 
the British West Indies, which between them supplied 49 percent of the cotton consumed 
in English mills in 1815 versus 46 percent from the United States, had shrunk to 
insignificance, leaving the United States as the monopoly supplier, as is demonstrated in 
Tables 2 and 3.61 
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61 James A. Mann, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain: Its Rise, Progress, and Present Extent  
(London: Frank Cass, 1968)., 42-3; Charles Philip Issawi, The Economic History of Turkey, 
1800-1914  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980)., 233-4. 
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Table 1: Cotton production globally, 1791-1860, in millions of pounds 
Bruchey, Cotton and Economic Growth, 7 
 
 
Table 2: Cotton exports to Great Britain from U.S. ports 
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Ezekiel K. Donnell, Chronological and Statistical History of Cotton (New York : J. 
Sutton & Co., 1872). 
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Led by cotton planters and manufacturers in South Carolina, many southerners began to 
advocate the need to diversify southern industry, beginning with encouraging the 
development of cotton factories. Ideally, this would combat the overproduction problem not 
only by turning out final products and yield higher profit, but also by strengthening the 
manufacturing sector of the South. Diversification, in their view, would work to lessen 
dependency on the North by producing imported goods within the region.  
 
Table 5.16  Cotton Production by Areas Worldwide, 1791-1860 (million pounds)  
 
 1791 1801 1811 1821 1831 1840 1850 1860 
 
Brazil  
West Indies 
Egypt 
Rest of Africa  
India  
Rest of Asia 
Mexico and          
  South America   
Other Areas 
United States 
 
Total  
 
U.S. Share    
 
22 
12 
- 
45 
130 
190 
 
68 
- 
2 
 
469 
 
0.4 
 
26 
10 
- 
46 
160 
160 
 
56 
15 
48 
 
531 
 
9.0 
 
35 
12 
1 
44 
170 
146 
 
57 
11 
80 
 
556 
 
16.3 
 
32 
10 
6 
40 
175 
135 
 
44 
8 
180 
 
630 
 
28.6 
 
 
38 
9 
18 
36 
180 
115 
 
35 
4 
385 
 
820 
 
49.6 
 
30 
8 
25 
34 
185 
110 
 
35 
13 
654 
 
1044 
 
62.6 
 
40 
3 
30 
34 
210 
120 
 
40 
15 
990 
 
1482 
 
67.8 
 
36 
6 
34 
35 
450 
132 
 
57 
100 
1650 
 
2500 
 
66.0 
Source) Bruchey, Cotton and Growth, 7.   
 
Conventions continued in the 1850s after the long depression in the previous decade at a 
larger, southern-wide scale, with the increasing tension in the political front surrounding 
slavery. J.D.B. DeBow was an active proponent of gathering proslavery southerners together 
to discuss the future of the region. They were held in major southern cities such as Baltimore, 
Charleston, Mobile, New Orleans, and gained more attention every year. Among other issues, 
the topics that generated heated debate were the South American trade and opening the 
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from foreign sources on the basis of crop expectation became active again.  
 
Table 5.5  Cotton Exports to Great Britain from U.S. Ports 
 
 1830-32  1853-55  
 bales % bales % 
New Orleans 
Mobile 
Savannah 
Charleston  
New York  
 
623,631 
161362 
371004 
424768 
189701 
33.67 
8.71 
20.03 
22.94 
10.24 
2453150 
683770 
386848 
558378 
654360 
 
50.90 
14.19 
8.03 
11.59 
13.58 
Source) David M. Williams, “Shipping,” 56. 
Also see E.J. Donnell, Chronological and Statistical History of Cotton (New York: J. 
Sutton & Co. printers, 1872). 
 
       The panic and the following recession was a turning point for cotton planters’ confidence 
and their view toward management and the southern economy in general. As we shall see, it 
raised voices amongst southerners promoting diversification of the economy and financial 
independence from the North. Although the free-trade policy they continued to embrace 
involved much risk, southerners turned to even grander schemes to facilitate free trade, while 
southern planters increasingly acknowledged that their managerial skills and entrepreneurial 
strategies toward their crop production would become their individual safety-net. Thus 
sophistication in plantation management became a key to survival at the time when Ballard 
made his move to the West.  
 
The Plantation Empire of Ballard and Boyd: Speculation, Production, and 
Management  
 
 One of the earliest accounts of Ballard’s plantation operation can be found in 1838, on his 
“Magnolia” plantation in Warren County, Mississippi. Magnolia remained the main 
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The Development of the Cotton Kingdom 
 
Although cotton was not much of an export crop for the American South until the 1790s 
the foundation for the eventual formation of the cotton kingdom was laid during the 
colonial period. As early as the 1760s Southern planters had requested their West Indian 
correspondents send them cotton seeds so they might find out what types of cotton could 
be cultivated in American soil. In the 1780s the return of loyalists from Florida and the 
Caribbean brought both planters and slaves with experience growing and harvesting the 
crop. These slaves knew how to grow, pick, and gin cotton and provided the necessary 
knowledge and work models for successful plantation production in the Deep South.62 In 
1788 The Georgia Gazette featured a sale advertisement for a male slave from St. Croix 
‘well acquainted with the culture of cotton’ who had the ability to build and operate 
ginning equipment. It is clear that these slaves and their skills were already desirable to 
planters who sensed opportunity in the crop, and aspired to find commercial crops that 
would readily sell.63  
This relationship between England and the United States, especially planters in 
the American South, was initially tense, and few would have predicted that the hatred and 
resentment felt towards the British would be set aside in favor of a firm, stable and 
enduring trade relationship following hard on the Revolution. This was especially true of 
the Deep South, where British occupation and manumission of slaves was remembered 
with a bitter and lingering resentment. After the Revolution acts of vengeance and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 This exchange of knowledge of crop cultivation and production from slave to owner occurred 
also with rice. On rice cultivation see Judith Ann Carney, Black Rice: The African Origins of Rice 
Cultivation in the Americas  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
63 Chaplin, Anxious Pursuit. 154. 
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murder of loyalists and British subjects had become such a problem that state and 
municipal leaders demanded an end to the violence.64 Suffice it to say that after the 
Revolution, economic reintegration did not come easily and it looked like Anglophobia, 
violence and pent-up rage might trump the need to fill coffers. Southerners, and 
Americans generally, looked to develop trade relationships with other European nations, 
most notably France and the Netherlands. Yet both of these nations remained committed 
to restrictive mercantilist policies, particularly France, and Americans were left with few 
alternatives to the British, who even then offered the best terms on credit and were open 
to forming trade relationships with the former colony. In many states British 
sympathizers and loyalists were stripped of their citizenship and their property 
confiscated. Yet at the same time, the economic dislocations of the war forced leaders in 
the lower South to make concessions. Georgia officials allowed British merchants to 
remain in the state, provided they did not abuse their monopolistic position. In South 
Carolina, merchants were allowed to take the classification of ‘neutrals’ and could remain 
in Charleston after the withdrawal of troops in 1782.65 Thus it seems very early on an 
alliance was formed between planter and merchant in the Deep South, one that benefitted 
both and permitted the free flow of funds that maintained the plantation system. It is 
clear, even at this early point, that Southern planters and elites understood the vital 
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64 On Anglophobia after the American Revolution see Lawrence A. Peskin, "Conspiratorial 
Anglophobia and the War of 1812," Journal of American History 98, no. 3 (2011). Sam W. 
Haynes, Unfinished Revolution: The Early American Republic in a British World  
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010). More generally these patters of vengeance, 
including murder, occurs with regularity in post-colonial societies. See Martha Minow, Between 
Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence  (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1998). 
 
65 See Schoen, Fragile Fabric of Union., ch 1. 
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importance of maintaining strong links to an international economy and actively 
engaging in trade internationally. This is a far cry from the insular portrait of the Deep 
South as a marginalized and reclusive region that has been a recurrent view of the region. 
Once Southerners discovered that cotton, a commodity Britain desperately 
wanted, would grow in the South they began very early on to work at improving yields as 
well as the commodity itself. They saw they had found a crop they could produce for a 
world market, for a consumer willing to advance credit and do business free of the long 
shadow of mercantilism. In other words, Southern planters recognized a chance to do 
business if they could overcome their own biases.  In a letter from Hindley and Gregorie 
the Charleston cotton factors to McConnel and Kennedy, it is evident that planters 
frequently experimented with hybridizing seeds to create an improved crop or ‘staple.’66 
Over the course of the nineteenth century planters would also strive to formulate cotton 
strains that were easier to pick, grew in patterns that made them easier to harvest and 
thrived in the upland areas and piney woods where cheaper land was readily available.67 
This is a theme that carries forward throughout the history of cotton production in the 
antebellum South and is demonstrated by the publication of magazines like The Cotton 
Planter and more commonly in the notebooks, journals and letters of planters like James 
Henry Hammond, who mulled extensively over increasing the productivity of his fields 
and, more ominously, his slaves.68 Just as these planters endeavored to find and develop 
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66 Hindley and Gregorie to McConnel and Kennedy, July 13, 1809, MCK 1/1/105, The University 
of Manchester Library. 
 
67 See Johnson, River of Dark Dreams. 
68 See Faust, Design for Mastery. Johnson, River of Dark Dreams. For examples of planters 
efforts to increase efficiency see for example, the papers of James Henry Hammond Library of 
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greater efficiencies through experimentation with varieties of cotton and the hybridization 
of crops, they also sought to increase the labor efficiency of their slaves, all in the name 
of increasing profit and productivity, as Walter Johnson has demonstrated in his analysis 
of planter thought in terms of ‘bales per acre per hand.’69  
The Political Economy of Cotton 
Not long after the ratification of the Jay Treaty in 1794, South Carolina and 
Georgia assumed global leadership in the production of raw cotton, a development made 
possible by political changes, diplomatic maneuvering, economic necessity, technological 
change and the luck of access to good soil. The end result was the development of a 
system of production of cotton that would alter a very large region of the United States 
and solidify a commitment to a brutal and deeply exploitative labor regime in which 
people were treated as property. Further, a hated dependence on a former colonial power 
would evolve into a cherished trade relationship for many Southern planters, who became 
deeply committed to free trade based upon a system of coerced labor. These forces 
created the cotton kingdom and in turn necessitated the development of a financial 
system to support the growth, sale and transport of this article from the Deep South to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Congress.  Additionally there is a series of letters from Hammond to Edmund Ruffin that are 
especially detailed regarding agricultural subjects and improvement of plantation production. 
After 1825, as is discussed by Hammond, planter experimented with fertilizing fields with 
manure, using guano, and composting. See also Freeman Hunt, Hunt's Merchants' Magazine. 
DeBow’s Review and The Southern Agriculturalist. Related to issues of production and efficiency 
is the changing relationship to time on the south and the embrace of timekeeping, on this see 
Smith, Mastered by the Clock. On planters attempting to increase the offspring of their slaves, 
whether through pairings or rape see Johnson, River of Dark Dreams. Amy Dru Stanley, From 
Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market in the Age of Slave Emancipation  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). also Amy Dru Stanley, forthcoming. 
69 For a discussion of measurements of slave productivity on antebellum cotton plantations see 
Johnson, River of Dark Dreams. 244-80. 
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British Midlands.  
Cotton gained increasing economic importance for the emergent nation in the 
1790s as an export crop to Great Britain. The mutually beneficial and incredibly 
profitable relationship formed between Southern planters, British manufacturers and 
Northern merchants has its origins here. An acknowledgement and understanding of this 
relationship is pivotal to a full understanding of American economic development as well 
as the relationship between the Deep South and the larger United States. In the nineteenth 
century Anglo-American trade centered on cotton. But cotton came to the fore in Atlantic 
commerce earlier, with Sea Island cotton. This initial trade in the commodity occurred in 
the midst of a series of revolutions that upset the previous global order.70 For Britain and 
the United States, the links formed through cotton involved the navigation of a difficult 
relationship between a former imperial power and colony, one deeply reliant on credit 
from the other, with Great Britain still caught in need of the raw materials produced by 
her former hinterland. The emergent nation was just as dependent on this trade, and this 
speaks to the legacy of colonialism in some ways. The deep dependence Britain had on 
her colonial hinterlands to circumvent ecological bottlenecks on the path to 
industrialization illustrates very well the large-scale advantages that accrue to imperial !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 On global revolutions see Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution  (New York: Vintage Books, 
1996). David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence: A Global History  (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2007). David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, The Age of 
Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760-1840  (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution  (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press 2004); ibid. and Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave 
Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787-1804  (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2004). For an overview that takes into account Anglo-American cultural histories see 
David Armitage, Conal Condren, and Andrew Fitzmaurice, Shakespeare and Early Modern 
Political Thought  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). This shift also involved a 
shift from the Mediterranean to a gradual reorientation around the Atlantic world. 
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powers.71 This dependence, ironically, is what in large measure enabled the independence 
of the early Republic since the nation was desperately reliant on international trade, 
especially in the aftermath of the British passage of the Navigation Acts, which 
effectively closed West Indian markets to American produced rice and tobacco. This had 
been devastating to the economy of the lower South, a region already committed to 
commercial agriculture. As Brian Schoen has noted, in 1770 the South produced 
approximately 64 percent of North American exports and 46 percent of the continent’s 
private wealth. By the 1790s Southern produce accounted for only 48 percent of 
American exports and held only 32 percent of the wealth.72  Yet even securing this trade 
their optimistic hopes of a post-revolutionary return to prosperity were dashed with the 
onset of a severe post-war depression.  
It seems that Southerners were well aware that they needed to work within larger 
international and, more prosaically, national systems as well. Additionally, non-
slaveholding states seemed just as aware of the need to come together to form a larger 
economic and political union. Southerners benefitted from the protection offered by the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 For more on this argument within a comparative context see Pomeranz, Great Divergence. 
Pomeranz compares the development of China and Great Britain, beginning with the premise 
that at 1800 both economies had a rough parity in terms of development and sophistication, but 
then Britain surpasses China during the nineteenth century. He attributes this advancement to 
access to colonial hinterlands and, just as critically, slave labor. 
 
72 See Schoen, Fragile Fabric of Union; Brian Schoen, "The Fragile Fabric of Union: The Cotton 
South, Federal Politics and the Atlantic World, 1783-1861" (University of Virginia, 2004)., 27. 
See also John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The Economy of British America, 1607-1789  
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985)., 375.James F. Shepherd and Gary M. 
Walton, "Economic Change after the American Revolution: Prewar and Postwar Comparisons of 
Maritime Shipping and Trade," Explorations in Economic History 13, no. 4 (1976). Stanley L. 
Engerman, "A Reconsideration of Southern Economic Growth, 1770-1860," Agricultural history 
XLIX(1975); ibid. and Timothy Pitkin, A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of 
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Improvements  (New Haven: Durrie & Peck, 1835). 
 
!47!
constitution and a larger federal government. This alliance offered increased social and 
economic stability. On very practical grounds given Spanish occupation of Florida and a 
region densely populated with slaves a relationship with other states to the north also 
provided protection. Southerners also knew that, in spite of any suggestions to the 
contrary, slaves were quite capable of rebelling.  As has been noted by other scholars, 
they were a dangerous form of property.73 Given these concerns the South was prepared 
to cede ground on trade agreements in exchange for the protection of the institution of 
slavery. Northern states, perceiving the vital need for the income from commodities 
harvested for sale on international markets yet also mindful of the need for protectionist 
policies to encourage the development of nascent industry in states in New England and 
the mid-Atlantic, found proverbial common ground with their fellow southern citizens.74 
Through a process of negotiated compromises slavery was protected in the constitution 
and trade was left to the federal government to regulate, meaning protection and tariffs 
would become much-resented thorns in the side of the South throughout the antebellum !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 On the development of slave codes and slave societies, particularly in the American South see 
Philip Morgan “British Encounters with Africans and African-Americans, circa 1600-1780” in 
Bernard Bailyn and Philip D. Morgan, Strangers Within the Realm: Cultural Margins of the First 
British Empire  (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991). On the threat planters 
felt in regard to slave rebellions in the American South see Rothman, Slave Country. ch 2, 
particularly 21-3. Southern planters had confirmation of their worst fears first with rebellion in 
Haiti and subsequent establishment of independence there in 1804. The German coast rebellion 
on 1811 confirmed southern fears and American military intervention to put down the 
insurrection confirmed for many southerners the wisdom of stronger ties with northern states. On 
the German Coast rebellion of 1811 see ibid. 106-17. 
 
74 On the ratification of the constitution see Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and 
Ideas in the Making of the Constitution  (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1996). On slavery and the 
constitution see William W. Freehling, "The Founding Fathers and Slavery," The American 
Historical Review 77, no. 1 (1972). Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: 
the Ordeal of Colonial Virginia  (New York: Norton, 1975). and Richard R. Beeman, Stephen 
Botein, and Edward Carlos Carter, Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and 
American National Identity  (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987). 
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era. 
This is not to suggest that the Southern states had anything like consensus on how 
to approach negotiations around the constitution. The Northern slaveholding states like 
Virginia avoided direct discussion of issues around slavery while those from the Deep 
South sought explicit guarantees and assurances around the institution, seeking genuine, 
concrete and specific concessions on the issue. In the debates John Rutledge 
demonstrated a deep understanding of both the issues and the perceived necessity of 
slavery to plantations in the South. He also made clear that slavery was about producing 
goods, and selling these for profit. He stated bluntly: ‘Religion and humanity have 
nothing to do with this question. Interest alone is the governing principle…. The true 
question… is whether the southern states shall or shall not be parties to the union’, adding 
that ‘the increase of slaves … will increase the commodities of which they become 
carriers.’75 At this early date Rutledge made clear what many Southerners felt: slavery 
was vital to the region and their production processes. This argument would become 
more refined and reframed later in the context of ‘traditions’ and a ‘way of life.’ In the 
end New Hampshire, Massachusetts and Connecticut delegates joined representatives of 
the slaveholding states of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Maryland in 
support of a compromise that prohibited government intervention with the slave trade 
until 1808. Further non-slaveholding states eventually settled on the three-fifths 
compromise that granted the South three-fifths representation for the enumerated slave 
population, increasing their seats in the House of Representatives and their influence 
within the electoral college without increasing voters in the region. The more slaves on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 United States Constitutional Convention (1787) and Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787, 3 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911). 364. 
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the plantation, the more representatives Southerners added to the House. Southerners also 
derived benefit from Southern states holding the balance of political power, granting 
white Southerners from slave holding states radically increased voting power per capita 
in comparison with their non-slaveholding peers. They paid higher taxes for the privilege, 
but this act gave the South incredible political power vis à vis the North.  
 It seems the Northern delegates perceived where the larger economic interests of 
the Union might lie, at least in terms of the raising of exogenous capital. Further 
bolstering the suggestion that individual states were well aware of their individual 
interests, Virginia opposed government inaction on the African slave trade preferring that 
it be closed immediately. 76 Closing this trade would keep the price of slaves in the 
United States high, and increase state revenue, as Virginians were well aware. In return it 
seems many Southern delegates supported the right of Congress to regulate commerce. 
This move was likely regretted repeatedly by Southern states after the passage of the 
Navigation Acts and approval of tariffs and restrictions on trade throughout the 
antebellum era. In the end, slavery remained protected and Southerners accrued an 
incredible amount of political power destined only to increase as slave populations 
increased. The federal government had the power to set trade policy and tariffs, yet 
Southerners had more power because of the three-fifths compromise.  
Additionally, many Southerners involved in international commerce were 
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cognizant that federalist policies would serve to protect their larger economic interests 
and promote trade more generally by offering greater stability. Private contracts, foreign 
treaties and the shielding of the currency from deflationary policies were all necessary to 
the maintenance of the nation’s economic and political standing, as was protection of 
private property, all of which had been threatened at various points during the 
Revolutionary era.77  All of this, in conjunction with the protection of a strong military, 
made a strong central Union very appealing to many Southern planters and merchants. 
Unfortunately, many European diplomats and merchants found the system difficult since 
it seemed there were two governments and it was unclear when national solutions to 
international problems would be implemented and how to resolve conflict when different 
states responded in unique ways. The resolution, and sometimes lack thereof, had a 
pronounced influence on the formation of the cotton south and the development of 
Atlantic financial relationships that grew out of the trade. Primarily, these conflicts 
resulted in the preservation of slavery but with restrictions on trade: with these types of 
compromises nobody was completely happy. The ratification of the Jay Treaty (formally 
the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between His Britannic Majesty and the 
United States of America) did little to mollify the South, even though the agreement 
resulted in increased trade and the uninterrupted peace was likely very conducive to the 
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77 On the importance of protection of property rights see Douglass Cecil North and Barry R. 
Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public 
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development of the Anglo-American cotton trade before the War of 1812. Southern 
animosity in regard to this treaty was particularly ironic given that the prolonged peace is 
what enabled Southerners to pay off many of their debts to English creditors and establish 
an industry to which many would remain committed through the Civil War. 78 Primarily, 
Jay’s Treaty deferred war until the United States was more capable to fight one, and this 
allowed for a good deal of economic development in the intervening years between 1794 
and 1812.  
These political decisions, acted out on an international stage, had profound 
repercussions across the United States, creating possibilities for trade, the expansion of 
slavery, economic development and eventually the severing of the Union. None of this 
would have been clear at the time. Instead, yeoman farmers and planters might simply 
have noted that there seemed to be a larger market for cotton, and it was growing better 
than indigo or tobacco. From there they may have simply planted more with each passing 
year. Planters would, perhaps, have purchased a few more slaves and put them to work, 
picking, harvesting, ginning, packing and carrying cotton on to Charleston or Savannah 
(in the earlier trade these ports exported more cotton that New Orleans). In Savannah a 
factor may have purchased the cotton and sold it to Alexander Brown in Baltimore or to a 
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broker in Liverpool, like William Rathbone. Alternately they might have sold to one of 
the agents of McConnel and Kennedy who would likely have bought the cotton. The firm 
had two very active factors in Savannah at the time, James Gregorie and James 
Speakman. The firm purchased Sea Island cotton for their own use in the manufacture of 
high-quality lace. They also purchased large amounts of cotton for resale to spinners in 
Paisley and Glasgow, turning a nice profit on their own speculative sales.79 Whoever 
bought the cotton, it would have been paid for with a draft drawn on a New York or 
London financial house and shipped to Liverpool, where another group of laborers, in 
this case, those working for a wage in Manchester, would transform the raw cotton into 
thread and textiles, which in turn would be sold, either in Manchester or further afield. In 
Manchester in the early nineteenth century some of those textiles would have been 
purchased by a young N. M. Rothschild, who had set up shop as a cloth merchant. From 
his sample book it is clear that he, like most cloth merchants, had to carry a wide variety 
of fabrics to appeal to the discerning tastes of his clientele. What Nathan Rothschild did 
that differentiated him from his peers was to buy large lots of a fabric in advance and 
store them for future sale. This was a move contrary to the practice of many of his fellow 
merchants and allowed him to make a larger profit on his sales in exchange for the risk of 
not selling all the cloth he had purchased. The textiles he purchased in the city and sold to 
clients were shipped from Hull to Hamburg and on to Frankfurt for resale in Germany 
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and continental European markets through an extensive network of kith and kin.80  The 
page from N.M. Rothschild’s sample book in figure 2 illustrates as well the variety and 
vibrancy of the printed textiles, illustrating the novelty and appeal of the fabrics produced 
in Lancashire in the early nineteenth century. At this early date the majority of cotton 
textiles were sold in continental European markets. Later, this cotton would be 
transformed into slop and ill crafted ready to wear clothing and dumped on American 
markets.81  
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80 See papers of N. M. Rothschild in Manchester c.1800-8, I/218, RAL, in particular the cotton 
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81 See Zakim, Ready-Made Democracy. 
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Figure 2: Page from the cotton sample book of N. M. Rothschild, 1802.   
I/218, RAL. 
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The emergence of cotton as an important export item in the 1790s, in conjunction 
with technological advances and the opening of new lands to planting, changed the 
direction and future of the entire region. Western lands acquired in the early nineteenth 
century suited the growth of the crop, and western movement of the slave population 
followed cotton’s geographical expansion. As previously mentioned, advances like the 
development of Cartwright’s water loom in 1785, more efficient carding machinery and 
eventually Eli Whitney’s cotton gin in 1793, made cotton increasingly important to both 
the United States and Britain.82  The cotton gin allowed short-staple cotton to be 
produced more efficiently. Since short-staple cotton could grow in areas where Sea 
Island, or long-staple cotton did not fare well this allowed for an increase in acreage 
planted with cotton.83 This cotton, planted and picked by slaves, in turn contributed to the 
development of credit and finance across the nineteenth-century Atlantic world, linking 
slavery and finance together with one supporting the other. This nascent financial world 
was deeply dependent upon their labor. By the same token, the maintenance of the 
institution of slavery was contingent upon the streams of credit provided by banks in 
London and merchants in Manchester and Liverpool. These funds allowed plantation 
owners to pay their operating costs over the course of a year and to purchase necessary 
equipment, supplies, slaves and land.  
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Of course, there are usually at least a few push factors involved in the move into 
new areas of production and commercial activity, and cotton was no exception. In the 
1790s the price of tobacco and indigo declined and crop infestations in turn made both 
articles more problematic and less profitable to cultivate.  At the same time cotton 
reached 25 cents a pound in 1791 and rose as high as 44 cents a pound in 1798.84  
Clearly, even at this early date the conditions for a cotton boom were favorable, leading 
one Louisiana planter to remark in 1799 ‘we are all in cotton now.’85 It is tempting to 
gloss over such a simple quote, especially given present preconceptions of the cotton 
South, but cotton planting was not the obvious choice. What made it attractive was a 
confluence of factors, developments and choices. The presence of several British 
merchants already established in the South, ready and able to offer credit at lower rates 
and to provision their clients with European goods, helped as well. In this, Southern 
merchants often could not compete. Cotton offered a perceived opportunity to prosper, 
but this very narrow focus came at a long-term cost to the region.  In the end this resulted 
in a drag on commercial development in the cotton belt states that was felt throughout the 
antebellum period, and sowed the seeds of dependence on foreign capital at a very early 
date. The comparative advantage that divided the American economy was at work here as 
well: British merchants granted citizenship after the Revolution had the advantage in 
terms of shop keeping and the provision of credit.86  The ‘native’ merchant class 
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perceived greater potential in staking their capital to western lands purchased cheaply, 
slaves and cotton.87  
As planters became more invested in cotton, and the article filled ships crossing 
the Atlantic, new ideas and ways of doing business had to be found, influenced by the 
heady revolutionary ideologies of the era. Interestingly, Southern planters tended to 
prefer large-scale or small-scale explanations in terms of how well they fit their needs at 
the time.  They often espoused very liberal economic principles on a macro level, when 
considering the relationships between states and nations, for example, while endorsing 
chattel slavery at the micro level and seeing no contradiction between the two. Although 
much ink has been spilt worrying over whether slavery was capitalist or pre-capitalist, at 
the time few people cared.88 Slavery simply was a part of cotton production and one labor 
regime among many. Some opposed it, some profited from it but the issue of how it fit 
within a capitalist economy did not really even keep Marx up at night in the end. The 
contradictions seeming so clear to the modern eye were not readily perceived by 
Southern planters. Modern economic principles of the time could be, and often were, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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used to defend slavery and when these needed bolstering the emergent racial 
classifications that would be incorporated into the development of phrenology were 
called on to justify the practice.89 And although some did object, many slave owners at 
the time believed free trade and slavery were natural, ineluctable and mutually 
supporting. 90 That these views served to justify slavery served an economic and political 
interest in the cotton states and across the country. The contradictions of these views 
when transplanted across the Atlantic were much more difficult to reconcile given the 
closing of the slave trade by the British in 1807 and the emancipation of slaves 
throughout the empire in 1833. Nevertheless, for much of the antebellum era British 
financiers, cotton brokers and mill owners across the Midlands purchased American 
cotton and viewed the production methods as necessary, if repugnant. In sum, many felt 
slavery was a necessary evil and threats to the plantations system in the South affected 
markets, interest rates and the provision of credit to planters, slave traders, agents and 
factors.   
The debates around the constitution and the Jay Treaty had lingering effects and a 
pronounced impact in terms of nineteenth-century political economy as well as the 
formation of divisive regional identities over the course of the antebellum era. Ironically, 
some Southerners had wished to develop a vibrant and more robust national economy 
through the encouragement of the development of manufacturing in the early Republic. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 Barbara Fields has pointed out that most slave holders of the nineteenth century could debate 
pro-slavery viewpoints with a great deal of eloquence and grace. See Barbara Jeanne Fields, 
Slavery and Freedom on the Middle Ground: Maryland During the Nineteenth Century  (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). 
 
90 On free trade and unfree labor See Peter S. Onuf and Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, Federal 
Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolutions, 1776-1814  (Madison: 
Madison House, 1993). and Schoen, Fragile Fabric of Union., ch 2. 
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Others actually embraced a thoroughgoing free trade ideology even at this early date and 
preferred direct trade with Britain to any potential sacrifice involved in nurturing national 
industries. This tension created contradiction and disagreement between Southerners, 
problematizing the often monolithic regional characterization of the ‘The South’ as a 
unified entity with a definite identity. The closest ‘the South’ ever came to this was when 
states began to secede from the Union to form the Confederacy. Speaking of the South as 
an ideologically cohesive region is deceptive at the dawn of the nineteenth century and is 
about as accurate as pretending that Americans across the early Republic agreed upon 
issues of political economy, foreign policy, slavery or appropriate actions for federal or 
state governments. In short, across the burgeoning United States, consensus was elusive. 
The passionate debates between Federalists and Republicans are testament to this 
conflict, and contained the seeds of much of the disagreements that eventually 
crystallized into the sharp regional divisions that characterized the United States in the 
1850s and precipitated secession of the confederate states. 
In the 1790s a Republican opposition gained a good deal of strength in opposing 
many Hamiltonian policies. These Republican critics were particularly scornful of the 
increasingly close trade relationship between Britain and the United States that was 
forming around the export of raw cotton and the importation of manufactured goods. 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison led this group of Jeffersonian Republicans that 
insisted Federalist policies would exploit the majority of Americans in favor of the 
interests of an elite group of merchants or, even more noisome, British financiers. 
Republicans had a better alternative, inchoate and ill formed, but one in which the 
country would not continue in a humiliating relationship of dependency with her former 
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colonial oppressor. Jefferson’s approach was much more pragmatic and inclusive than 
has been acknowledged in some scholarly works but it is a stretch to claim he had a 
coherent policy.91 What he had in essence was a utopian vision that was general enough 
to appeal to a wide swath of the population. On the one hand the lack of clarity meant 
broad appeal and many followers. Unfortunately, each different faction felt their cause to 
be uniquely representative of the true republican ethos and all saw themselves 
individually as the rightful heirs of the tradition resulting in a fractured and a seemingly 
contradictory movement.  
Like Federalists, these Republicans were concerned with commerce and the 
economic position of the United States, especially in terms of international trade. Yet 
despite advocating free trade theoretically they objected vociferously to Hamiltonian 
approaches to the development of Anglo-American exchange, stressing the necessity of 
neo-mercantilist policies to promote the development of American business, and 
ironically, agriculture.92 A faction of the movement that included Tench Coxe saw an 
alternative to an Atlantic-centered economic world that revolved around trade with Great !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Britain. They led the calls to ensure economic protection for burgeoning American 
industries, with Coxe himself arguing that cotton cultivation in the South would promote 
American manufacturing.93 Obviously, these types of policies did have appeal to those 
engaged in production, and did not have appeal to those involved in commercial 
agriculture. Since Hamiltonian policies had also highlighted the importance of imported 
goods, those that believed the United States needed to develop her own industrial sector 
fell more firmly in the Republican camp. This gave greater support to the call to 
implement protectionist policies to encourage the development of manufacturing. 
Hamilton had been unabashedly business friendly and decidedly supportive of trade 
relationships with Great Britain and he had very little patience with commercial 
discrimination, whether its roots lie in Anglophobia or the desire to promote the 
development of industry in the United States. Yet many disagreed and saw opportunity in 
policies that might restrict Britain’s economic advantages in the United States. American 
shippers, manufacturers, bankers and some merchants saw the appeal.  Ironically so did 
quite a few slaveholders, and planters. That the Jeffersonian vision was ambiguous meant 
that it seemed to have something for everyone and this perceived universality carried 
Jefferson into office in 1800.  Jefferson’s ‘four pillars of prosperity’ seemed to guide the 
early nation into an era of economic stability, finding a judicious balance between the 
interests of planters, manufacturers, mechanics and farmers.94 By 1804, economic 
prosperity and an increase in exports seemed just testimony to the efficacy of Jefferson’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 Tench Coxe, A Statement of the Arts and Manufactures of the United States of America for the 
Year 1810  (Philadelphia: A. Cornman, 1814). 
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manufacturing, commerce and navigation. See Thomas Jefferson “First Annual Message” in 
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policies. In fact, the early Republic experienced a period of unprecedented economic 
growth during Jefferson’s first term. This growth was partially attributable to an 
increased trade in cotton, which was made possible, in part by the expansion of short-
staple cotton production into newly opened lands in the Southwest.95 
As early as 1803, at the time of the Louisiana Purchase, intimations of a future 
radically differing from Jefferson’s vision of an agrarian republic were present. Planters 
had land and, more pivotally, the right kind of soil. The richest soil for cotton production 
was the alluvial river bottoms along the Mississippi River in the states of Mississippi, 
Louisiana, and Arkansas, and the Red River region of Louisiana, all of which were 
admitted to the Union after 1800. Not surprisingly, highly productive plantations with 
large concentrations of slaves quickly appeared in the area.96 Cotton became one way to 
rapidly accrue cash and credit, and profits were quickly reinvested to enlarge landholding 
and work forces. Unlike rice or sugar, cotton could also be grown on a small tract of land, 
and was often grown on family plots without the employment of slave labor.97 The 
majority of Southerners did not own slaves, and those who did generally had very few. In 
1850, 71 percent of slave owners owned less than 10, and 89 percent owned less than 20, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the threshold necessary to be considered a planter.98  
At the time of the Louisiana Purchase, the United States already produced 45 
percent of the cotton consumed in British markets and this market share continued to 
expand throughout the antebellum period. These conditions contributed to the expansion 
of a system of coerced labor that Jefferson had hoped and anticipated would fade away. 
The growth of cotton as an item produced commercially for sale in an international 
marketplace resulted in a marked increase in the demand for credit and bills of exchange. 
The Jeffersonian vision of a nation of farmers producing a surplus for sale in distant 
markets but not farming commercially gave way to the establishment of large plantations 
growing crops, primarily cotton, for sale in an international market to the detriment of 
regional development and the growth of domestic industries in much of the plantation 
South. Just as vitally, his vision of an agrarian republic, unintentionally resulted in the 
reality of an unprecedented expansion of slavery throughout the Union, financed with 
British capital.  
Additionally, as early as 1800, Alexander Brown, an Irish linen merchant who 
immigrated to Baltimore, was already purchasing cotton through a Savannah agent and 
sending it to England. With these initial purchases he laid the groundwork for a family 
firm that would dominate cotton consignments and later, the trade in bills of exchange 
throughout the antebellum period.  In 1805, Vincent Nolte made the first of his journeys 
into New Orleans on behalf of Baring Brothers and Hope & Co. He claimed that he was 
the foremost dealer in cotton in New Orleans, and that he had monopolized the market at !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98 Bruchey, Cotton.,165. See also Scarborough, Masters of the Big House. 
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one point.99 He continued to work peripatetically in the city engaging in the cotton 
business and other ventures through the 1850s but Nolte was seemingly unable to 
establish himself commercially, unlike Alexander Brown.  Although Brown did not have 
Barings’ capital behind him he entered into a diverse array of ventures, and was involved 
in the foreign exchange business at this early date as well, purchasing bills drawn by a 
Virginia tobacco exporter and selling them to Baltimore importers.100 Alexander Brown 
rode the initial effervescent years of the manifestation of Jefferson’s vision to early 
wealth. By 1810 he was able to establish his son in a branch office in Liverpool. The 
opening of this branch under the leadership of his son John allowed the firm to expand 
rapidly because of its ability to create its own sterling bills of exchange. The ability to 
write bills immediately, and for any amount, resulted in a substantial increase in business. 
The Liverpool office also stimulated consignments of cotton and tobacco, and the 
Baltimore office actively sought out these types of transactions. Alexander Brown 
attempted to drum up business with letters that advised: ‘when shipments are made to 
William Brown & Co., the bills of lading sent us and insurance ordered thro’ us, we are at 
all times ready to negotiate a reasonable advance free of any commission.’101  
Yet the very nature of Brown’s business model revealed some of the problems 
lurking under this newfound prosperity. First and foremost Southern planters were !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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dependent upon British markets to sell all of the cotton they were planting in all those 
newly opened lands, particularly in the states of Georgia, North and South Carolina, and 
Tennessee. To rub salt in the wound, Great Britain remained the primary destination for 
the tobacco grown in Virginia and North Carolina as well.102  In 1804 it seemed that a 
healthy and vibrant Atlantic trade coupled with an emerging domestic market had united 
to create a functional, profitable and unified national market.  The integrative approach 
had apparently worked, that is until 1805 when Britain objected to the use of broken 
voyages by American ships to carry goods from French and Spanish colonies to their 
home ports in Europe. The Essex decision resulted in British naval action against 
American vessels, resulting in the end of a period of goodwill and the disruption of a 
coalition of American economic interests.103 At this juncture the cotton South actually 
supported Jefferson’s administration in its attempts to protect American shipping and 
agrarian interests through commercial restrictions. Although the embargo threatened their 
livelihood, Southern planters also realized that the maritime autonomy of the nation was 
at stake: without the embargo the United States could be rendered powerless. This trade, 
while it was permitted between 1800 and 1804 resulted in a $20 million boost in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102 See Edwards, British Cotton Trade. Norman Sydney Buck, The Development of the 
Organisation of Anglo-American Trade, 1800-1850  (New York,: Greenwood Press, 1968). 
Thomas Ellison, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain  (New York: A. M. Kelley, 1968). C. H. Lee, 
A Cotton Enterprise, 1795-1840: A History of M'Connel & Kennedy Fine Cotton Spinners  
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American shipping revenue. The issue around the re-export trade created a dilemma, 
since this trade, although profitable, was of narrow benefit, primarily producing profits 
for American shippers but creating tension in Anglo-American markets. The behavior of 
these shippers was in effect threatening the trade in agricultural commodities produced in 
the South since if these crops could not be shipped they could not be sold. Planters and 
merchants perceived the conflict and that an embargo, although defending American 
shipping through commercial restrictions, nevertheless placed a disproportionate burden 
on planters and those engaged in commercial agriculture. This conflict also meant a lack 
of access to British manufactured goods with the passage of the Non-Importation Act in 
1806. After the Chesapeake incident in June of 1807 Jefferson’s embargo was ratified 
quickly and with a large amount of support in Congress, even though Georgia’s 
representatives in particular worried about the impact on the cotton trade.  
Unfortunately, the embargo was likely more damaging to the United States than 
nations in Europe. The Republicans had seriously overestimated, and not for the last time, 
the importance of American crops to European markets. The embargo’s effects were also 
reduced by the fact that Americans were still consuming British exports since only the 
Non-Importation Act remained in effect at this juncture.104 Americans had assumed, in 
essence, that the goods they supplied to European markets provided more leverage in 
forcing change. Part of the problem, obviously, was that they were still consuming British 
products. Yet the larger issue here recurs throughout the nineteenth century: the United 
States, and later the Confederacy, assumed again and again that American products, 
especially cotton, had more importance in international markets than they did in fact.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Instead, the embargo of 1807-8 had a deleterious effect on the cotton trade and the 
economy as a whole. Goods remained locked in storage as the American economy came 
to a standstill. Jefferson was heavily criticized for what was perceived to be a needless 
interruption of commercial activity, both from those in the cotton trade as well as those 
outside it. One Boston cooper decried Jefferson’s policies stating in a letter to the 
president that he would ‘pay $400 to four of my friends to shoat you… I can’t eat my 
house and …I can’t git no work by working about on the wharves for you have destroy’d 
all our commerce.’ 105  Undoubtedly, many cotton planters felt similarly, having finally 
found a crop they could readily market and sell only to be shut out of business yet again, 
and through the actions of a federal government to which they felt they had already 
shown great tolerance. Many thought the embargo gave up too much for very little return, 
and placed the majority of the burden of this coercive move on cotton planters left unable 
to sell their crops. These planters felt they were injured more deeply and had little 
sympathy for the grievances of Northern interests. The embargo increased sectionalist 
sentiment, at least among cotton planters, contributing to the early formation of an 
identity distinct from the North. Even though Southerners did feel unified in their 
suffering, this unity splintered once solutions to the trade and shipping issues were 
considered.  
Ultimately, the embargo was scuttled in 1809 but the problems with Britain 
remained unresolved. Non-intercourse and non-importation options were entertained by 
Congress but no resolutions were deemed acceptable, least of all simple submission. The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105 “To Thomas Jefferson,” September 19, 1808, in Jack McLaughlin and Thomas Jefferson, To 
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country had shown itself simply unable to carry out a complete embargo, whether from 
lack of discipline or too pronounced a reliance on British markets.  Non-intercourse and 
non-importation were not viable options because of their unequal effects on North and 
South. Facing the humiliation of complete submission to Britain, Madison began rallying 
the support of Republicans behind preparations for war, instigating a congressional 
debate that led to the declaration of war against Britain on June 17, 1812. This was a war 
that some may have expected, but that caught many merchants and bankers completely 
off guard. This is surprising given the importance of maritime power at this juncture. 
Nevertheless, Alexander Brown did not believe war would come, and was blindsided by 
the outbreak of fighting, with one son and a good deal of money in Liverpool. Alexander 
Brown passed the war in Baltimore and hoped for the return of peace and trade.  
Ironically, Barings continued to serve as the bankers of the United States in Europe 
during this time, processing payments and monitoring accounts. They also attended to the 
concerns of Stephen Girard throughout the war. What these merchants apparently missed 
was that this war was inevitable. Submission to British will in these areas was an 
unacceptable option because Americans would have been left at the complete mercy of 
British naval dominance, giving Britain a monopoly that likely would have ruined the 
United States economically. 
 The war drew to a close in 1815. Southern planters had in fact shouldered much 
of the economic hardship. The nascent cotton trade had been brought to a standstill and 
markets had been closed to American planters for three seasons.  Fortunately, cotton 
markets bounced back quickly. Nevertheless, manufacturing interests called out for 
increased protectionist measures and the imposition of tariffs, suggesting that 
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protectionist policies would bind the Union together. In contrast, Southern commitment 
to free trade policies seemed stronger than ever, especially in the face of debates over 
increasing policies to protect the development of manufacturing interests in the North. 
What prevented prolonged conflict around the issue was the re-election of Madison and 
his persuasive ability to make protection seem like a logical, and more importantly, 
temporary measure. Additionally, in 1817 Congress passed a Navigation Act that 
excluded foreign vessels from the inter-coastal trade, which provided Northern merchants 
with a virtual shipping monopoly. The bill, sponsored by John Forsyth of Georgia, 
displayed the cotton South’s commitment to the preservation and development of 
economic integration between regions and differing economic systems. It was one 
example of how Northern commercial and Southern agricultural interests might support 
one another. Unfortunately in the 1850s this Navigation Act would come to be viewed as 
one of the reasons for overdependence on a rapacious cabal of Northern elites, an irony 
given the initial sponsorship of the act by a Southern planter.  
The primacy of cotton as a crop in the southern United States was not in any way 
a given and the development of the system of finance that facilitated trade in the article 
was equally contingent. Ultimately, the availability of easy credit at good rates made 
trade with the British attractive in spite of a good deal of resentment towards the former 
colonial power. Without the need for trade, and a source of credit, cotton likely would not 
have been the first choice of crop for cultivation in the Deep South. If ever demand was 
able to create supply it seems the development and growth of cotton cultivation in the 
South would be a prime example. In the end the need for cotton, and money, brought the 
former metropole and colony together in a relationship guided by new terms, the initial 
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test of which was the War of 1812. This trade in cotton that developed between the two 
countries also slowly worked to give two regions very different ideologies, political 
motivations and labor regimes. From the beginning, the cotton belt was tied to 
international trade, the harvesting of crops on a commercial scale for a global market and 
the use of slave labor to accomplish these ends. And Britain, in spite of William 
Wilberforce and a good deal of abolitionist sentiment, became the primary supporter of 
this system and consumer of its products.  
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Chapter Two: Making Money: Cotton, Slavery and Finance Across the Atlantic 
1815-1837 !
By 1815 the United States was the largest producer and Great Britain the largest 
consumer of cotton. In the period from 1815-37 British merchant banks found productive 
deployment of capital in the Americas and all were eager to increase investments in 
American markets and, specifically, the trade in cotton. This in turn influenced their 
development, growth and the evolution of business practices across the Atlantic as 
Anglo-American finance became increasingly integrated. The development of this 
nascent Anglo-American financial world supported the plantation system in the United 
States while simultaneously contributing to the development of an increasingly 
sophisticated Atlantic financial system and the growth of British banks. Their 
involvement with cotton effectively increased the money supply and easy money fed 
increased speculation, in turn encouraging all parties towards more leveraged positions. 
The result of all this money coursing through the American economy was the creation of 
periods of exuberance and mania followed by panics, resulting eventually in the panic of 
1837, one of the largest in American history. From 1815-37 these firms metaphorically 
‘made money’ through consignments on cotton, the expansion of banks and banking 
through the American South, and the increase in the circulation of discount paper. The 
wealth created and profit gained by many of these Anglo-American houses resulted in 
profound shifts in the distribution of wealth and a consolidation of resources in the hands 
of larger houses and firms.  The money made by these firms also contributed to the 
expansion of the money supply in the United States. While there were profits to be taken 
here as well, it also contributed to economic instability. In the end, the firms that profited 
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had superior access to information and resources and large enough buffers not only to 
withstand economic downturns but to re-enter markets after economic shocks when 
prices were low.   The investment of these British and Anglo-American houses in the 
early American Republic transformed the United States and British economies as well as 
financial practices across the Atlantic world. 
After the War of 1812 it seemed to many citizens of the United States that the 
country would flourish and prosper, that good times and sustained economic expansion 
were assured. Peace brought a resumption of cotton trading and credit began to flow once 
again.  The chartering of the second bank in 1816 seemingly brought greater stability, 
with the bank sometimes assuming some of the functions of a central bank.  With the 
backing of a line of credit from Baring Brothers, the Bank of the United States was able 
to decisively direct capital flows throughout the country. Further, their access to these 
funds injected liquidity into American markets. Occasionally this liquidity was aimed 
squarely into cotton to shore up prices, much to the chagrin of European financiers who 
viewed this as an overstepping of boundaries by Nicholas Biddle. Few could understand 
what might impede a return to unchecked growth. The first in a series of nineteenth-
century panics, that of 1819, seemed a bolt from the blue for many caught in its midst.  In 
New York Charles King declared ‘a singular and rapid change has occurred… in the state 
of our money market.’ Banks would no longer extend credit, debtors could not make 
payments and ‘a very general and extensive pressure for money is experienced.’106 These 
statements became an increasingly familiar refrain of merchants in New York, factors in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the South and planters caught in the middle. Throughout the antebellum period American 
and British markets were embroiled at various points in panics. These contractions had a 
pronounced effect on cotton markets and credit flows across the Atlantic or, as James 
Campbell, an attorney in Winchester Tennessee put it in reference to Southern cotton 
markets, the South ‘begins to look rather gloomy.’ In a letter Campbell remarked that an 
old song ‘the chorus of which was “hard times,” that I think eminently applicable – for a 
funeral over the fallen prosperity of our cotton planters.’107 
The search for economic stability during the panic of 1819 cast a long shadow on 
political, economic and cultural developments in the young Republic: it played a direct 
role in the formation of a dual party system and engendered intense animosity towards 
financial institutions because of repeated failures and suspension of payments. Many saw 
banks as nothing more than tools of elites catering to the wealthy at the expense of more 
common men and women. Many also felt resentment that the United States had failed to 
escape the imperialist clutches of Great Britain, since Britain was still the primary 
creditor of the emergent nation. All this contributed to enthusiastic support of Andrew 
Jackson, the Democratic Party and a policy of free, open economic growth. By the same 
token, there were also calls for increased economic order, structure and controlled 
economic expansion, which seems contradictory; it was. There was resentment towards 
banks, and anger around the economic destructiveness of the war across the country.  In 
the South and West this resulted in increasing hostility towards merchants and financiers. 
The purported greed and rapacity of New York merchant bankers has its origins here, as 
does much of the anger planters and yeoman farmers felt towards urban elites. As !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Southerners grew increasingly defensive this gave rise to a renewed sense of honor that 
pulled on elements of earlier republican virtues. These views served to preserve and 
justify the institution of slavery. This in turn proved incredibly convenient for planters, 
mollifying their less privileged neighbors and allowing cotton and finance to continue 
their mutually beneficial alliance. In the end, the contradictory impulses to free the 
economy and exert control over growth fell loosely along regional lines and class-based 
sensibilities. Planters wanted free trade and growth. Manufacturers, artisans and 
mechanics argued in favor of a more controlled economy. Ironically, anger at Northern 
merchants and banks held a similar contradiction at heart in that planters as well as 
manufacturers were deeply reliant on their services.  
After the panic of 1819 many British merchant-manufacturers who had previously 
invested in cotton stepped back. The panic created an opening allowing new players to 
gain a larger share of the market, and Anglo-American financiers had abundant reason to 
do so. Between 1820 and 1830 over a third of American exports went to Britain, and 
more than 40 percent of American imports were British. A remarkable 80 percent of the 
cotton in Lancashire came from the southern United States.108  According to statistical 
records, in 1820 cotton yarns and manufacturers were valued at £22,532,000 of the 
£38,400,000 of British overseas trade.109  Further, because of a marked expansion in trade 
across the Americas, a relative dearth of investment opportunities in England and the use 
of British sterling as a global currency, British capital became an export item in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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1820s. London had become ‘the money meter of the world’ yet houses that failed to 
invest in the Americas stagnated.110 To wit, for the house of Baring this was a period of 
negligible growth. They were still regarded as a stable, prosperous and well-capitalized 
firm, but comparatively speaking they had lost ground. They returned to United States 
markets with renewed energy in the late 1820s, appointing Thomas Wren Ward their 
American agent in 1828. Yet in 1830, still seeking a foothold, the firm was losing ground 
to its main competitors. The combined resources of the five Rothschild houses amounted 
to ten times the capitalization of the once preeminent British financial house. Barings 
held a relatively modest £492,803, ($2,500,000 in American dollars) to the Rothschilds’ 
excess of £4,330,433.111 The combined capital of the Brown houses in Baltimore, New 
York, Philadelphia, and Liverpool stood at $3,230,000.112  
The!importance!of!cotton!produced!for!a!global!market!in!an!economy!reliant!on!credit!is!best!exemplified!by!the!growth!of!the!Browns’!network!of!offices.! They 
grew quickly after the war, as the firm continued to place increased emphasis on the 
financial elements of business and to seek consignments. The!Brown!family!firm!and!network!of!offices!grew!to!be!one!of!the!leading!firms!involved!in!the!Atlantic!trade!in!cotton,!and!later,!the!leading!house!in!foreign!currency!exchange!in!the!midWnineteenth!century.!With!the!establishment!of!linked!offices!in!Liverpool!in!1810,!
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Philadelphia!in!1818,!and!New!York!in!1825!the!Browns!came!to!assume!an!advantageous!position!in!the!Atlantic!market!in!no!small!measure!because!of!the!nature!of!the!organization!of!their!firm.113!By 1820, the Browns’ Liverpool office was 
the second largest recipient of cotton consignments in England and the firm continued to 
place increased emphasis on the financial elements of business and to seek consignments 
throughout the decade.114  
 It is not such a surprise that after the panic British capital coursed through the 
United States once more, leading to an era of immense financial expansion with 
exuberance and euphoria giving way to manic investing through 1826. British financial 
houses continued to invest in cotton and banks throughout the South and the effects of 
capital and credit coursing through the American system increased the price of cotton and 
had material effects in the lives of many citizens. On February 20, 1823 North Carolina 
congressman Lewis Williams penned an optimistic letter to his constituents claiming that 
after years of reduced spending the federal treasury was, once more, solvent and that the 
nation was on the path to economic recovery. ‘The people have resumed those habits of 
industry and economy from which they had been seduced by improvident issues of bank 
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papers, and a desire to engage in schemes of wild adventurous speculations.’115 Williams 
suggested that a renewed focus on hard work and financial independence would bring 
about a new era of prosperity and growth, which is quite ironic for a lawmaker from a 
region ineluctably dependent on speculation, credit and slave labor. Although the cotton 
belt was deeply reliant on credit, the Jeffersonian vision that guided the Louisiana 
Purchase still colored American conceptions of success. Williams spoke from the 
perspective of a man caught between worlds, confronting a new world order with 
understandings formed in a different time. The world of the American South was 
changing rapidly, and the panic of 1819 demonstrated some of these shifts in a way 
incomprehensible to most citizens at the time. The Southern economy was producing a 
crop for commercial sale in an international marketplace.116 This is a long way indeed 
from Jefferson’s vision of an agrarian republic, as noted earlier. This new way of life was 
difficult for many individuals to understand as well: plantations reliant on credit to 
function, and foodstuffs and manufactured goods imported from other states or Great 
Britain. This was not the world many expected to find in the wake of the Louisiana 
Purchase. Individual industry meant little in a world of cotton picked by slaves in which a 
fortune could be won or lost by fluctuations in distant markets and the easing or 
constricting of credit. Nevertheless, any observant individual would have perceived that 
the newfound capital underpinning the establishment of banks and financing plantations 
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was not native to the region. Given that cash was something invariably in short supply in 
the early Republic, it had to be coming from elsewhere.117 Likewise, it was equally clear 
that the majority of cotton harvested was being shipped to Liverpool and not being 
consumed in a local, regional or even national market.  
Obviously, many merchant bankers invested heavily in regional banks in the 
American South. Aside from providing an open line of credit to the Bank of the United 
States, Barings had extensive involvement with the plantation banks established in New 
Orleans. Rothschild had a large, and at times controlling, interest in the New Orleans 
Canal Bank. The Browns, however, pursued a different path and eventually other banks 
followed their lead.  After the war of 1812 they focused increasingly on the consignment 
of cotton shipments to Liverpool. In due course, other houses followed suit, but the 
Browns set the pace and established the business precedents. They also seemed to see 
earlier the most profitable directions in which to venture, arrived first and tied up the 
majority of business for themselves. On occasion they did ship cotton on joint account 
with Southern merchants and also purchased cotton on their own account, usually when 
they desired to give their ships some weight if they came up light. The firm realized early !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117 See Clark, Rural Capitalism. See also James A. Henretta, "Families and Farms: Mentalité in 
Pre-industrial America," The William and Mary Quarterly 35, no. 4 (1978); Winifred B. 
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that consignments and a focus on the provision of credit and financial services allowed 
them to profit from the cotton trade while radically reducing the risk of loss. Since the 
Browns never actually owned consigned cotton, price fluctuations were less of a concern. 
Likewise, they developed a system of consigning cotton that became the standard: they 
retained the bill of lading on all shipments of consigned cotton until it was sold and they 
were paid. This gave the house an incredible advantage in the trade in Liverpool.118 
Generally, advances on cotton ranged between two-thirds to three-quarters of the 
value of the crop on the local market. An advance of 75 or 80 percent would be risky 
even when cotton was priced lower. Simply put, an advance on cotton meant that the firm 
to which the article was consigned would provide the consignor with a portion of the 
anticipated sale price in advance. The consignor, whether he was a planter, factor, 
merchant or broker did not have to wait until sale for money – partial payment was made 
immediately. Upon the eventual sale of the article fees and commissions would be 
deducted before the final remittance on sold goods was made to the consignor. In 
addition, factors often carried costs and made advances to planters on crops still in the 
fields, a more informal type of credit that allowed plantations to bring crops to harvest119 
To consider offering an advance over that amount with prices already running 
inordinately high would be foolish, yet planters found creditors willing to indulge them 
again and again. William Bowen, the Browns’ trusted agent in the South, reflected later 
in a letter to Joseph Shipley, a partner in the Liverpool house: ‘it seems as if the cotton 
trade was never to be governed by the same commonsense rules that prevail in other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
118 See Perkins, Financing Anglo-American Trade., 24. 
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commercial transactions, there seems to be a charm in the great southern staple that leads 
people out of their sober senses.’120  
In conjunction with increased attention to consignments the Browns moved 
heavily in the 1820s towards the issuing of letters of credit. In this business they did very 
well, in no small measure because by 1826 their acceptances were passing ‘in Manchester 
as cash with as much freedom as … any other banker in the place which cannot be said of 
any other Liverpool house.’121 Their involvement in the extension of credit to merchants 
on both sides of the Atlantic continued to increase and they became thoroughly involved 
in these transactions as well as the issuing and acceptance of bills of exchange. Other 
houses followed in due course, and these various credit mechanisms contributed to an 
effective expansion of the money supply coursing through this Atlantic system, which 
fuelled speculation in cotton, banks and other investments in the United States. Since the 
United States lacked an effective central bank to check much of the speculative activity 
private merchant banks had much more influence in the financial affairs of the early 
Republic. The Browns effectively managed these markets in much the same way a central 
bank might have but for their own ends, sending money through various regions of the 
United States in conjunction with the seasonal needs for capital in the North, South and 
western United States.122 The incredible wealth amassed by the Browns in the cotton 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
120 William Bowen, "William Bowen to Joseph Shipley," in Brown Brothers Harriman Records 
(New York Historical Society, 1845).  
 
121 Brown Bros. & Co., New York, to Benjamin Story, New Orleans, April 5, 1826, Brown 
Brothers Harriman Records, MS78, NYHS. 
 
122 Killick, "Cotton Operations." On the Browns’ greater accommodation of risk handling bills of 
exchange, see Perkins, Financing Anglo-American Trade.,and Killick, "Cotton Operations."  
 
!81!
trade up to the passing of Alexander Brown in 1834 qualified them, at this point in time 
as ‘…one of the premier merchant-banking firms in the Anglo-American economy.’123  
The role of credit and financial relationships in the sale of cotton was just as clear to 
planters, who often relied on factors to keep them apprised of the state of cotton markets. 
Often, the most important business relationship a planter established was with his 
factor. Although private bankers, agents and brokers also purchased and offered advances 
on cotton in the South, the common belief was that factors provided the best service 
because it was often so individualized. Because of their congenial relations and in depth 
knowledge of their clients, factors were generally reputed to have a thorough knowledge 
of the credit-worthiness and legitimacy of planters and their business activities. 
Additionally, their own creditworthiness was key to operating successfully in Southern as 
well as Northern markets. Consequently, their notes and endorsements were trusted by 
both banks and the planters. The ability and function of the factor to draw capital 
resources from around the world, not only in sterling bills but also in French francs and 
Dutch guilders for tobacco and grain sales to Europe, made the commodity market and 
the credit structure in the South virtually unique. Factors and agents played a fundamental 
role in marketing and moving crops, and the structure of the Southern economy made 
such arrangements both possible and inevitable.124  
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Factors were usually held responsible for the marketing, but planters had some 
influence on their strategies, especially by holding their crop back and waiting for prices 
to improve. One factor complained that ‘notwithstanding our repeated advices to the 
planters there are a great many of them who either limit their crops or refuse to send them 
forward,’ which they thought was caused in part by ‘the anxiety of planters to pick their 
fields clean during the late fine weather, and not before, remarked the opinion of a large 
number that our prices must yet advance.’125 Although planters at times gave instructions 
on how they wanted their crop to be marketed and what transactions to make, factors 
were the experts in handling the crop to generate the highest profit and in the end 
followed their own judgment more often than not, to the benefit of all parties. Factors 
were familiar with the various types of cotton and how it was graded. They also tracked 
annual harvests and predicted price fluctuations according to the annual crop projections. 
If the amount of cotton in Liverpool was predictably high, prices would most likely drop. 
They also had cotton inspected by specialized brokers, one of whom wrote to southern 
planter Rice Ballard, complaining that, ‘so large is the proportion of low washy cotton 
that has some time past come in,’ that it would not sell in the market.126 Liverpool, being 
the center of the world cotton trade, had a diverse market and often even low and inferior 
qualities of cotton found buyers. Dupuy, Tate & Nalle indicated at various points to their 
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client Ballard that it would be to his advantage to ‘ship the inferior to Liverpool and 
intend to have it classed and valued and get an advance upon it.’127 
 All of these activities contributed to the expansion of the money supply 
nationally, as well as regionally. In the South it must have seemed money multiplied or 
expanded in the sunshine. All of these bills and advances meant more paper that passed 
as money was moving through the economy, and this paper, like cotton with plantation 
banks, served as collateral for the lending of yet more money. This is a process bound to 
create trouble on its own, as has been seen again and again in various times and places. 
Another way in which all of this financial activity increased the money supply and 
precipitated the panic of 1837 was with the issuing of racehorse bills, or bill kiting. These 
bills too increased the money supply. Racehorse bills were a type of accommodation 
paper often used to assist planters, or factors, when they had not received payment for the 
sale of the planter’s cotton but their bills had matured. In these cases the factor would 
issue a draft on a partnership firm in another city and then have this bill discounted at a 
bank. Then the factor would use these funds to pay off the initial matured bill. With this 
technique, factors were able to hedge. They could provide additional credit to planters, 
hold cotton inventories for sale at better prices, purchase more cotton and not pay until 
funds came through from New York or London to retire the debts.  This problem became 
compounded in places like New Orleans and Natchez when these mercantile credits were 
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cashed with banks, in that way becoming bank credits, and the bills becoming part of a 
bank’s reserve.128 
As more cotton was planted and sold, all these forms of speculative activity 
increased. Speculation in the article increased as well, with frenzied buying from 1824-6 
driving the commodity to excessive heights and resulting in a corresponding crash in 
price later in 1826. Prices fell by a third in the autumn of 1826 and many Liverpool 
houses involved in the American trade suspended payments, including Peter Pole and 
Company, one of the larger Liverpool cotton houses. Five London houses were pulled 
down in their wake. The frenzied monetary expansion of the early 1820s was over.  This 
crash, unlike the panic of 1837, had far greater effects in England than the United States, 
and resulted in a bullion drain and 20 percent drop in specie.129 The resolution of this 
crisis, in the form of an accidental intervention by the Bank of England, lends credence to 
the effectiveness of a lender of last resort. At the depths of the panic, Bank of England 
employees miraculously found a massive stash of £1 notes that had been previously taken 
out of circulation. As Bank of England Governor Jeremiah Harman later explained to 
Parliament, an old box containing a quantity of one-pound notes had been overlooked, 
and they were forthcoming at the vital hour.130 Buoyed with a larger reserve of notes than 
had been thought, the Bank increased its discounts accordingly, and the crisis began to 
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subside. The mysterious box of £1 notes, Governor Harman later testified, ‘saved the 
country.’131 Asked in Parliament whether there had been any foresight regarding the box 
of notes, Harman vehemently denied it.132 This accidental move on the part of the Bank 
of England effectively ended the crisis, but not the questions that began to percolate 
around British investment in American cotton, questions that would become more 
pronounced in the 1830s. In the interim, many English merchant-manufacturers who had 
previously been active in cotton operations pulled out of American markets, leaving the 
field open for larger merchant bankers eager to invest their capital in ventures that offered 
more potential for profit than was available in England or Europe. Given the conditions 
in Europe many Anglo-American houses were eager to invest in the United States, 
especially in cotton, in spite of the risks.  
Throughout the early 1830s the price of cotton increased steadily as the United 
States economy expanded. From 1834 to 1836 the price of cotton rocketed skyward, 
bolstered in large measure by access to easier credit in the southern United States. By 
1835 there were close to 700 banks operating in the American South, and over the course 
of the decade another 200 would open their doors for business with a total capital that 
exceeded $358m.133 Large advances on crops became common and the price of cotton 
rose in markets in New York and Liverpool. As cotton continued to rise in price and 
become more widely available, banking practices, most notably credit mechanisms, were 
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increasingly developed in accordance with the dictates of commercial production and 
marketing of the commodity. Cotton not only served as security for advances; when 
specie was scarce it also served as a reserve for the issue of notes, and as collateral for the 
issuing of stock by property or plantation banks.134 However they were ultimately 
financed, whether privately or capitalized by states, property banks sold bonds to 
planters, who paid for their stock with mortgages on their estates for up to two-thirds of 
their market value.  The banks, or in some cases, states, then issued bonds backed by this 
mortgage pool and typically sold them for working capital in the money markets of the 
Northeast, or in London.135 Subscribing planters could then borrow from the fund thus 
created, pledging their crops as security.136 So long as commodity prices held reasonably 
steady – and this was the key - the land bank system in the South provided capital and 
credit to a region chronically short of both. Cotton planters needed it and the banks 
provided one way they could convert cotton into cash, often employing British and 
Northern capital to do so. 
Part of the problem here was all the forces that might exert pressure on the price !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of cotton from one year to the next. Aside from environmental threats, damage to the 
cotton crop as a whole through weather or pestilence, there might be a glut of cotton – 
overproduction or decreased demand; all these factors contributed to fluctuations in price. 
But these were all only one piece of the puzzle. Cotton was a commodity produced and 
sold in an international market, a point highlighted by Benjamin Story, the New Orleans 
agent of the Browns, in a letter to Isaac Franklin, a slave trader, in 1835. Story noted that, 
regarding cotton ‘future prices depend on the raw material at Liverpool and Havre and at 
the manufacturer in England.’ He went on to note that the house was receiving reports 
that prices were currently too high, which would likely precipitate a decline in price by 
the end of the season. He also pointed out that despite the prediction that supply from the 
United States to Liverpool would be lower ‘the expected prices from Egypt and Bombay 
will have an effect to put down prices.’137 Story also ominously noted that ‘agitation for 
the abolition of slavery will cause those who have money out on interest in this country to 
withdraw those funds from this country.’138 Although Franklin was a slave trader, his 
world revolved around the elusive white boll as well and he understood the links between 
slavery, cotton and credit as well as the fact that the price of slaves was tied to the price 
of cotton.139 
It did not help that reckless speculation characterized the business throughout the 
antebellum period. Investment in cotton, and American operations generally, was widely 
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understood to be risky. As N. M. Rothschild & Sons noted in a letter to Alphonse de 
Rothschild, son of the head of the Paris house, James de Rothschild, during his American 
travels: ‘you will find while living among the Americans, that they are too fast in many 
more ways than with their horses. We have noticed …that upon getting our orders + 
credits in America they had a notion they were ‘great guns’ + that they could not do 
things on too large a scale or draw too largely on our capital.’140  Quite frequently, 
advances were made on cotton for the convenience of the planter or agent and to provide 
an incentive to use the services of a particular firm.  The lack of sense in both their 
granting and acceptance had pronounced repercussions. In the 1830s demand for cotton 
was often high and firms were more forthcoming to secure business. Agents and factors 
frequently offered advances backed by larger merchant-banking houses. The amount of 
the advance was important; too large an advance often meant a ‘reclamation’ on the 
shipper when the advance was secured with cotton. In cases where advances had not been 
secured, or plain and simply been beyond the planter’s capacity to meet the debt, firms 
had to suspend payment. S. L. Josephs & Sons, the New York agent of the Rothschilds 
until 1837, are but one example. They became over involved in mortgages on real 
property in the South and were compelled to suspend payment in March 1837. As they 
explained the situation to the Rothschild London house, they were taken down by the fall 
of associates in the South: ‘The unexpected suspension of Mssrs Hermann Briggs + Co. 
of New Orleans carrying with them Mssrs. Tho. Barrett + Co. and Mssrs Saint Germann 
+ Co. … for all of whom we are under acceptances to an amount exceeding two millions 
of dollars in the aggregate making it impossible for us to continue our own payments. … !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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This unfortunate occurrence has, as you may imagine, given a severe blow to our credit + 
we shall no doubt experience for some time considerable difficulty...’141 Invariably firms 
did what they could to avoid a loss, but at times prudence seemed to take a back seat to 
greed. Often, when planters were unable to pay, the end result was a loss of slaves or the 
entire plantation for the planter and a highly resented lock-up of funds for the imprudent 
creditor.  
By 1835, some actors in American markets, notably Thomas Wren Ward and 
Joshua Bates, the American agent for Barings and a partner in the London house 
respectively, had noted the formation of what we would call a bubble in cotton markets 
and anticipated a decline in cotton prices. Ward in particular spotted trouble and in a 
letter to Joshua Bates voiced agreement with his dour assessment of American markets. 
‘If your views of cotton are correct, business must be lessened considerably….we are 
now on top of a wave. It requires care in descending.’142 Ward also noted that the 
competition was fierce and that this created chaos in the markets because ‘…there is very 
little calculation to be made on what others are willing to do.’143  The frantic activity and 
abundance of easy credit in Southern markets contributed to rising cotton prices, along 
with advances. The cotton and the credit make this an Atlantic story. The origins and 
effects of this panic, likewise, are Atlantic in nature, with the effects of policies set in 
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London altering the lives and actions of cotton planters, and yeoman farmers as well as 
slaves picking cotton on plantations in Louisiana and Alabama. 
Empowered by Parliament to maintain the value of British paper money, the 
Governor and Directors of the Bank of England faced the daunting task of ensuring that 
the supply of gold coins in their vaults could sustain the circulation of paper money and 
simultaneously produce profits for private stockholders. Apart from selling shares in 
long-term Government loans, they made money by ‘discounting acceptances’ or using its 
specie to buy bills of exchange for slightly less than face value with the understanding 
that the commercial paper would be redeemable for the full value in specie after a short 
period of time.144 The Directors raised or lowered the discount rate, the amount they 
charged for these short-term loans, based on the supply of coins in the Bank’s vaults. 
Low discount rates encouraged higher volume of trade. When the vaults emptied, the 
Bank of England raised discount rates to protect the specie reserved for the currency.145 
The Bank of England was obligated to protect the national currency, even at the expense 
of international trade. Thus, the currency was steadied as mills in Lancashire eventually 
slowed down or closed because of the chaos generated in markets across the Atlantic and 
the disruption of the American cotton market. In this way a policy decision in the Square 
Mile was felt by an enslaved family in Louisiana or influenced the decision of a planter to 
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send cotton to market, and of a broker to purchase it.  
Although there were many sources of London merchant banking capital, the Bank 
of England was by far the largest and most powerful bank. It had acted as an effective 
lender of last resort for the government, ensuring that the British Empire remained 
solvent during the panic of 1826. As a lender to private merchant banks, the Bank’s 
responsibility in a crisis was less clear. Nevertheless, because it became involved in the 
discount trade it was also tied to global trade and finance, and when London merchant 
bankers extended credit to cotton brokers, factors and agents in New York or New 
Orleans, they loaned Britain’s specie to the United States and used British capital to 
support American financial and economic development.146 Thus the policies of the Bank 
of England directly affected planters, factors and even yeoman farmers in the American 
South. The credit and discounting policies of the Bank of England reverberated through 
the American South, a fact lost on many but abundantly clear to the heads of Anglo-
American houses, as is demonstrated by Joshua Bates’ increasing concerns regarding the 
Bank’s policies and their effects in global markets. In May of 1836, Bates grew 
concerned when he heard ‘a good deal of talk about gold going out and a sentiment of 
money matters in the City.’ While Bates felt some inquiry into specie flows and 
American markets would ‘probably do good,’ he was rightly worried that ‘if carried too 
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far it must end in panic.’147 The talk in the City eventually spread, and investors far 
outside the Square Mile grew alarmed. Having recently agreed to sell a bond issue for a 
Louisiana state bank, Bates’ correspondents in Amsterdam complained that newspaper 
reporting on American banking ‘was not calculated to strengthen the confidence in trans-
Atlantic loans.’148 Bates recorded in his diary that ‘the Newspaper contains accounts of 
the great increase of Banks in the U.S. and expressed fears that seem well founded that a 
crisis may happen in consequence.’ He concluded, ‘we must prepare for consequence.’149 
London houses, aware of the turning of the tide, braced themselves. In the meantime, 
planters went about their daily activities, slaves picked cotton, and cotton and capital 
continued to circulate across the Atlantic.  
Because of the interweaving of national responsibilities and involvement in 
international trade, the Governor and the Directors of the Bank of England were 
particularly concerned by the reports of the instability of the American financial system. 
In the months leading up to August, the Bank of England’s bullion holdings had declined 
by more than two million pounds, forcing the ratio of paper in circulation to metallic 
reserves well under the Bank’s target of thirty percent.150 The Governor became 
convinced that his institution was losing specie because London investors were sending it 
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to the United States to supply capital to America’s many new banks, many located in the 
American South. Joshua Bates warned Ward in early July that ‘the Governor of the Bank 
pretends to be or really is most alarmed about the gold going to America and the amount 
of American bills in circulation.’151  Troubled by declining specie levels it seems the 
Directors focused on withdrawals of gold from the vaults not considering that their 
coffers might have been fuller than reasonable because of gold pouring in after the end of 
the East India Company’s monopoly on trade with China as well as the indemnity to 
compensate slave owners after the 1834 Emancipation Act. Thus, rather noting what had 
come in, they focused only on the depletion of their coffers, and then blamed the 
American trade for the reduction of specie.  
While the Bank could not control the American financial system, it could 
influence British firms that offered commercial credit to American merchants and sold 
American bonds and stocks to British investors.152 In 1836 it seemed the Bank would no 
longer offer American houses the opportunity to discount bills of exchange. While bills 
of exchange were not directly tied to American banks or bank money, they were the 
principle financial instruments traveling between firms in the United States and London. 
Thus, the Bank would no longer provide short-term loans for firms that sold American 
stock, bonds, and other type of paper ‘however high may be their standing and credit.’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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This policy of not accepting commercial paper threatened the reputations of individual 
firms as well as investors’ confidence in the larger Anglo-American trade. Wiggin passed 
this information along to his firm’s American correspondents warning of dire 
consequences. He wrote, ’this decision places all houses in jeopardy that do business with 
American dealers in British merchandise.’ In response, he announced that his firm would 
contract the credit offered to American dealers in British merchandise. This letter, 
published in American newspapers, should have warned American confidence brokers 
and cotton merchants of the coming contraction of British credit.153 Apparently the news 
traveled faster and with greater effectiveness in Great Britain. The cashier of the Bank of 
England’s Liverpool branch ‘notified all the Banks at Liverpool’ that he had received 
orders to no longer accept the paper of American houses. England’s Liverpool-based 
cotton merchants had extended millions of pounds of credit to American cotton factors. 
They expected the year’s harvest to be easily large enough to cover their debts and turn a 
profit, but the cotton had not yet arrived. While they waited for shipments from such 
places as New Orleans, Natchez and Mobile, Liverpudlian merchants and bankers would 
be ruined if they could not continue to discount their bills. News of the Bank of 
England’s decision ‘excited such alarm that a deputation came immediately to London’ to 
seek the repeal of what Joshua Bates termed ‘the obnoxious edict.’154 
At the end of August 1836 the Treasury Committee members met with William 
Brown, the head of Brown Brothers’ Liverpool office. Brown recognized that the 
decision not to discount bills would be disastrous for the American trade, his family’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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firm and his own personal fortune. He offered calculations to ‘convince that the Bank has 
not at present any cause to apprehend a further drain of Gold’ to the United States. Brown 
blamed the specie drain of the previous months on the ‘measures of the President’ 
arguing that ‘to guard themselves against a run from their opponents ... [the banks] 
deemed it advisable to have more specie in their vaults than usual.’ Brown believed that 
political power struggles had threatened financial security but that the Specie Circular 
and distribution of the federal surplus had not precipitated a crisis because American 
banks acted wisely.155 Contrary to the argument in the Times article, Brown asserted that 
American banks were drawing specie not to finance. Thus, Brown reinterpreted the drain 
on British specie as a reason for increased confidence in American banking rather than a 
source of doubt. 
Brown’s letter made explicit to the Bank of England the folly of their policies. 
Historians estimate that at this juncture approximately $175 million of British capital was 
invested in American financial securities and tens of millions more financed American 
commercial endeavors.156 The British had invested a staggering amount of money and 
these funds effectively integrated the two economies through cotton. Brown informed the 
Directors that in the week following the Bank’s decision to no longer discount the bills of 
exchange of American houses, textile factors dealing in the Manchester market !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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‘suspended their orders as far as practical and apprised their correspondents in America 
of the measure taken by the Bank of England.’ Liverpool cotton prices fell, but after 
traders learned that the Bank had heeded Brown’s advice and agreed to continue 
discounting American paper, the cotton market rebounded. Even after Brown’s interview, 
one merchant sought his advice regarding whether ‘it would be safe to go on with the 
purchase of goods on American accounts.’157 Not for the first or last time, and not 
without reason, involvement with cotton and the American trade generally was perceived 
to be highly risky.  
Joshua Bates felt the Bank of England had been ‘playing some shabby tricks’ and 
predicted that this would cause ‘a crisis in the U. States.’ Having acted quickly by 
contacting Thomas Wren Ward earlier in the summer, Bates felt that Baring Brothers 
would stand to lose ‘not much probably.’ Nevertheless his outlook was not nearly as 
sanguine for other American houses.158  He wrote to Ward, in Boston, that, ‘the Bank 
seem [sic] incompetent and unqualified to comprehend what they are about.’ With 
‘incompetent’ men playing ‘tricks’ with the American trade, Bates instructed Ward to 
buy Barings’ own bills in order to ‘avoid getting loaded with a description of paper that 
will be no use in case of extreme pressure.’159 Bates wanted to avoid holding bills of 
exchange that might be dishonored when firms lost liquidity and failed to pay their debts; 
purchasing debts drawn on his house would prevent Barings becoming a creditor of 
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bankrupts. Ward was instructed to ‘manage cleverly so as not to let slip any word of 
hostility towards any one.’160 While he anticipated that his actions might increase 
economic difficulties in the United States, he also realized that ‘we cannot prevent a 
crisis on the U. States.’161 
  As September turned to October in 1836, the Bank of England continued to 
threaten the discounting privileges of American merchant bankers. Joshua Bates fumed 
that ‘the Bank has been on very bad principles for the last 18 months and it will be 
difficult to get matters righted.’162 Nevertheless, he recognized that the Bank of 
England’s folly left him in a very advantageous position, one he pointed out to Thomas 
Wren Ward in Boston: ‘we think the present crisis will operate beneficially for us and if a 
stop is put to the circulation of competitors we shall have the field to make ourselves.’ 
The Bank’s incredibly conservative monetary policies would bankrupt American houses 
that lacked capital reserves. Bates’ early awareness of the situation transformed the 
position of Barings from one of vulnerability to one of advantage in a troubled market. A 
master confidence broker, Bates anticipated the crisis and laid foundations for a future 
where the Bank of England, other American Houses and American correspondents would 
look to Barings for credit.163 Of course, events did not play out exactly as he had 
envisioned.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Like Barings, the Browns stepped back quickly, both in their discounting 
activities and their involvement with cotton markets. Although both firms missed 
claiming a share of the profits in 1836, they also avoided the catastrophic losses of the 
following year. Alexander Brown & Sons held their ground going into the 1836-7 season 
stating, ‘as regards cotton we have made up our minds to do nothing in it this season 
except to put a few hundred bales in our ships to give them a start in freight.’164 They 
further made clear they were not willing to advance over three-quarters or four-fifths of 
the present value of cotton, in spite of higher advances offered elsewhere. In the summer 
of 1836 President Jackson ordered the secretary of the treasury, Levi Woodbury, to issue 
the specie circular in an attempt to curtail rampant speculation in public lands paid for 
with paper money of questionable value. The circular permitted the use of paper money 
by settlers for purchases up to December of that year. Yet money continued to course 
through the American markets, and because of the amount of credit already extended and 
sundry bills moving through the system, the money supply continued to expand. 
In January of 1837 the price of cotton began to decline, right at the height of the 
season. The timing of the fall in prices was particularly troubling given that the tumble 
commenced as cotton was coming to market, consignments and advances often already 
made.  From January to May the price of cotton declined by 18.5 percent in New Orleans. 
By April, cotton prices were 30 percent lower than a year previously, a catastrophic 
decline following a boom period from 1832 to 1837 where cotton prices had consistently 
risen between January and April. Shippers from New Orleans lost 18 percent on cargoes 
to New York and 15 percent on those destined for Liverpool. For many firms involved in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the speculative frenzy and already overextended from bloated advances, the losses were 
unsustainable.165 Financial houses, agents and factors began to fall like dominoes as all 
actors began calling in debts, creating a shortage of money. It is important to note here 
that British capital played such a large role in financing the American economic boom of 
the 1830s, that the mere threat of the withdrawal of funds actually provided a legitimate 
cause for panic in every city and town connected with the global economy.166 In many 
ways, the panic is made comprehensible through this fact alone. But the point is few 
Americans, aside from bankers and savvy players in cotton markets, were thinking about 
the vital role played by British credit in the American economy at the time.  
Why is the panic of 1837 so vitally important to the trade in cotton? What 
happened and what can we learn from it? According to Charles Kindleberger and, by 
extension, Hyman Minsky, bubbles have a general form; they are not unique or 
necessarily historically specific and have common characteristics.167 Bubbles generally 
form in reaction to some type of displacement or shock. This can be a political event, 
bumper harvest, financial success, or an unanticipated change in monetary policies. I !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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would suggest, also, the surprising surge of employable cash into a system, very much 
like what occurred in the United States from 1826 forward as British investors sought to 
effectively employ their capital. This displacement creates a boom, with investment and 
productivity increasing. The boom is fed with an expansion of credit that enlarges the 
total money supply, whether in the form of bank notes, or credit mechanisms. In the 
southern United States banks opened and were capitalized with European funds, cotton 
and, occasionally, slaves. At this point, numerous European firms were eager to enter the 
cotton trade either by granting credits, negotiating exchange or buying cotton outright. 
The eagerness of Anglo-American firms to employ their capital profitably, in conjunction 
with the opening of numerous Southern banks, resulted in a large influx of capital into the 
American South. It is indicative of the sheer volume of money passing through the cotton 
South that two of the most active branches of the Bank of the United States were located 
respectively in New Orleans and Natchez, before 1837.168 The end result was that money 
flowed, credit was widely available and this fueled speculative activity. Kindleberger 
specifically notes that money supply can be increased through an expansion of the 
existing system of banks, the development of new credit instruments and the increase in 
availability of personal credit outside of banks. In the cotton belt, all three occurred and 
drove the inflation of cotton prices.169   
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The expansion of money fuels euphoria and the manic purchasing of certain 
articles, like tech stocks and real estate at the dawn of the twenty-first century, and cotton 
in the 1830s. What is clear is that whatever terms we use to describe these financial 
processes they become enmeshed in the larger movements of capital, and these crises 
have very real consequences that profoundly influence the distribution of wealth and 
resources.170 As economists so often point out, somebody always benefits, the question 
on any given day is who.171 When bubbles form, it looks very easy to make money. It 
almost seems that one cannot lose, because assets keep inflating, rising in price. In the 
1830s, as firms and individual actors saw others making money from purchases of cotton 
and sales they also entered the market. Eventually, the allure of easy money pulled in 
even those who would normally have no such involvement, and a market that might still 
have been governed by some modicum of rationality became manic. One example would 
be Rice Ballard, a former slave trader who moved west, bought some land and entered 
the cotton trade. Ballard had more awareness of the intricacies of the cotton business than 
most but his entry into cotton planting suggests a lack of awareness of global financial 
currents in advance of the panic. Had Ballard been cognizant of the actions of the Bank 
of England and their impact on American financial markets one would assume he would 
have delayed his plantation purchases. In the end, he acted with the herd that was pulled !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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into investment in cotton in a way that has been seen over and over again.172 As more 
people were pulled into the frenzy a larger and larger group sought to profit without 
understanding the mechanisms of the market, or the fundamentals of exchange. 
Obviously this generated chaos, as individuals followed the herd and began to act 
en masse. As the speculative boom grew, interest rates, the velocity of circulation and 
prices continued to rise. Eventually, what some would term smart money moved out as 
insiders cashed in and took their profits. The fact is, for the seasoned trainers and many of 
the bankers with ties to the City of London it was abundantly apparent that money would 
become tighter because of the policies of the Bank of England. The moniker would 
include most Anglo-American financial houses, well aware of the formation of an 
anomaly in the cotton trade and changing sentiments among merchant bankers.  At the 
height of the market, this appeared as hesitation. What is often referred to by traders as 
‘hot money’ moved on. Savvy investors pulled their money out of cotton earlier and 
invested in other ventures, or held their resources in cash.  Meanwhile, newcomers 
bought in as prices hit new highs, giving way to an uneasy period of financial distress as 
some firms and actors begin to contemplate the possibility that they might fail to meet 
their obligations. For many actors in the financial world of early 1837 the dawning 
realization that people were moving away from cotton and prices were beginning to fall 
resulted in the dumping of cotton and discount paper quickly in attempts to get hold of 
cash. This race to get out became a stampede and firms failed on both sides of the 
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Atlantic as everyone called in debts in vain attempts to meet their own liabilities.173  
In May 1837, as the panic reached its apex, meaning in fact that business had 
come to a complete standstill, newspaper editors and elite financiers cast the crisis in 
larger political terms, pointing to the banking wars as the impetus for the crisis. A fair 
number of historians have agreed, perhaps taking their sources too much at face value, 
and considering the panic through the narrow lens of the bank war between Andrew 
Jackson and Nicholas Biddle. In 1967, Peter Temin’s The Jacksonian Economy 
challenged this interpretation, arguing that shifting global specie flows throughout the 
1830s caused the crisis.174 Some have also suggested that cotton and cotton markets 
played a larger role than has been appreciated.175 Given the importance of cotton to the 
American economy, its pivotal role in British textile production, and the amount of 
British capital caught in the financial web spun around its production, shipping and sale it 
is safe to say cotton played some role.  
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Many associates of Anglo-American houses likely would have agreed. The 
Browns in particular had developed more negative views of the cotton business over the 
course of the 1830s and when Alexander Brown passed away in 1834 the four sons met 
and discussed the future direction of their activities. In the decade between 1825 and 
1835 the Browns’ combined capital had grown from $1, 531,000 to $4,957,000.176 The 
brothers were well aware of the fortune they had amassed from operations in cotton but 
were also quite cognizant of the attendant risks and increasing chaos in markets. The 
brothers contemplated the choice before them: to continue in merchant banking, with all 
the vagaries and stresses attendant on an increasingly volatile cotton trade, or to expand 
into other global financial markets.  They all agreed, with varying degrees of enthusiasm 
that ‘…we had better curtail rather than extend operations… we shall confine ourselves 
chiefly to our exchange & commn business keeping that as moderate as we can, 
employment of capital being more an object now than acquisition of further wealth.’177 
This echoed the spirit of N. M Rothschild’s advice to a brewer in London at roughly the 
same period that ‘it requires a great deal of boldness, and a great deal of caution, to make 
a great fortune; and when you have got it, it requires ten times as much wit to keep it.’178 
Speculation in cotton was simply not as enticing when the preservation of wealth was 
given precedence over the potential of high returns. Thus, although cotton might be one 
very compelling way to make a fortune, it was no place to preserve one and after the 
brothers completed a thorough analysis of their business activities and investments, they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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concluded that consignments of cotton were not as lucrative as in the past, and shipping 
was not worthwhile either. They quickly saw that restricting themselves to banking 
would prove the most profitable and least risky path.179 Shortly thereafter, the dry goods 
section of the New York office was sold off to Amory Leeds &co.180 This strategic focus 
on the performance of financial services for foreign trade was prescient, and the Browns 
emerged from the financial panic of 1837 with minimal losses but this was due in part to 
a fortunate two million pound loan negotiated from the Bank of England at the eleventh 
hour.181  
Whatever explanation is employed, whether the panic is attributed to specie 
flows, overextension in cotton markets or the lock up funds because of Jackson’s bank 
war the reality is that in 1837, the financial contraction led to the fall of virtually all the 
key players in the Southern cotton market and the suspension of quite a few larger New 
York firms with involvement in Southern commerce as well. Prices fell and suspensions 
were widespread as it became clear there was simply not enough cash to cover all the 
debt and the Bank of England’s restrictive policies regarding discount paper did play a 
role. Regardless of the cause, the end result was what Minsky termed a state of revulsion, 
which created a panic that fed on itself as all parties raced for the exits. 
In the end, most panics that have had any type of successful resolution have 
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involved the provision of cash, usually through some type of lender of last resort.182 In 
1837, the Bank of England intervened with an emergency loan to the Browns which 
saved the firm and quelled the panic on one side of the Atlantic, but on American shores 
the picture was a different one, with no central bank or effective lender of last resort on 
hand to tame the markets and ease distress.183 The panic left the American economy at a 
standstill, and cotton markets wide open to the few firms still above water. Most of these 
were Anglo-American houses with a detailed understanding of events transpiring in 
London, and the mechanics of discount paper. These firms were the ones best positioned 
to take advantage of the decline in American markets and remain relatively unaffected by 
the credit policies of the Bank of England.  
Capital flows, specie reserves, the monetary policies of the Bank of England and 
the concerns of London bankers all seemed very far away from the land of cotton, the 
reality of life in the South and the rhythms of agricultural life, yet it was these exact 
rhythms that made the provision of credit and the use of discount paper vital to the 
perpetuation of the plantation slavery in the American South. Cotton went to market in 
the winter and only once a year. A consideration of the cycle of the plantation year 
reveals in itself why so many planters were deeply reliant on advances. By looking at a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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calendar of events from Ballard’s Magnolia plantation in 1845 it is readily apparent why 
credit was pivotal to the functioning of the system: 
22!January! Began!plowing!for!corn!5!February! Finished!plowing!for!corn!6!February! Began!plowing!for!cotton!18!February! Began!planting!corn!27!February! Finished!planting!corn!5!March! Finished!plowing!for!cotton!20!March! Began!scraping!corn!26!March! Began!planting!cotton!on!stable!field!3!April!! Finished!scraping!corn!4!April!! Finished!planting!cotton!on!stable!field!16!April! Began!scraping!cotton!18!April! Began!planting!cotton!on!hill!and!Petit!field!19!April! Finished!planting!cotton!on!hill!and!petit!field!1!May! ! Finished!scraping!cotton!26!May! Cotton!began!to!bloom!10!July! Cotton!began!to!open!4!August! Finished!plowing!13!August! Began!picking!184!
 
The cotton picking continued through the fall. Through this cycle slaves needed clothing, 
brogans, bags for cotton and a bit of food. All of this, along with the luxury items that 
made plantation life pleasantly refined for planters, was purchased with credit, usually on 
the following year’s crop. This credit worked its way south from London, and this 
London money was ultimately backed by the Bank of England, so when the bank decided !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
184 Magnolia plantation journal, 1845, vol. 19, folder 438, Ballard Papers, University of North 
Carolina Chapel Hill.  
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an adjustment was necessary areas far removed from the Square Mile felt the pinch, and 
when cotton prices plummeted the Bank of England shared a bit of the financial pain of 
Southern planters. The threat of the withdrawal of funds by the Bank of England and 
increasing caution of Anglo-American houses in 1837 proved the value of foreign 
investment in American markets in the breach.  From New Orleans to New York, 
Liverpool and London, many diverse interests made cotton king, and a common thread of 
concerns that became increasingly pressing during the years of the market revolution tied 
together diverse groups with radically variant agendas.185  The activities of all of these 
participants had repercussions in financial markets and because so many of them were 
using credit in all types of ways, ramifications for the money supply as well. Every draft 
issued, each credit extended was effectively dumping more money into the economy. 
Credit is neither bad nor good in itself. Often credit is precisely what allows markets and 
economies to grow develop and expand, but when credit is securing credit, or one asset is 
being used to secure multiple lines of credit the system becomes unstable. If anyone feels 
edgy and a few players begin to call in debts the entire system crashes, which creates a 
panic as Charles Kindleberger has illustrated, and which is also very apparent in the panic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
185 On the market revolution of the 1830s see Melvyn Stokes and Stephen Conway, The Market 
Revolution in America: Social, Political, and Religious Expressions, 1800-1880  (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1996). especially the introduction. Since this was also the area of 
unprecedented financial failures see also Edward J. Balleisen, Navigating Failure: Bankruptcy 
and Commercial Society in Antebellum America  (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2001); ibid. Brian P. Luskey, On the Make: Clerks and the Quest for Capital in Nineteenth-
Century America  (New York: New York University Press, 2010). Mann, Republic of Debtors. 
and Scott A. Sandage, Born Losers: A History of Failure in America  (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2005). For the culture of capitalism in Britain, see: Margot C. Finn, The 
Character of Credit: Personal Debt in English Culture, 1740-1914  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). On the construction of capitalism, see: Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Insider 
Lending: Banks, Personal Connections, and Economic Development in New England  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
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of 1837.   
In!1836,!Lord!Ashburton!noted!marked!instability!in!financial!markets!and!mentioned!in!a!letter!to!his!former!colleagues!at!Barings!that!‘variations!of!all!stocks!&!their!wild!fluctuations!seem!to!arise!much!from!Nathan’s!death.!In!the!end!the!emancipation!of!the!money!market!will!be!a!benefit,!but!the!sudden!cessation!of!a!despotic!rule!is!apt!to!exhibit!such!symptoms.’186!Unfortunately,!he!overestimated!the!long!reach!of!Nathan!Rothschild’s!influence!in!foreign!exchange,!as!well!as!the!severity!of!the!nascent!difficulties.!The!fluctuations!he!noted!were!but!the!smaller!rumbles!of!the!panic!of!1837!approaching,!a!panic!that!illustrates!like!no!other!the!increasing!integration!of!British!and!American!financial!markets!in!the!nineteenth!century.!!Other!scholars!have!noted,!if!only!in!a!peripheral!fashion,!the!role!played!by!the!downturn!of!the!American!economy!in!the!financial!fallout!in!England,!but!few!have!considered!the!role!played!by!rampant!speculation!in!slaveWproduced!commodities,!most!notably!cotton,!in!the!formation!of!this!panic.!187!! The!panic!of!1837!has!received!much!attention!from!scholars!of!American!as!well!as!British!banking!and!financial!history!but!few!have!placed!the!panic!within!a!larger!Atlantic!context,!considering!the!operations!of!British!finance!in!the!American!South,!specifically!in!cotton.!Firms!failed!in!Britain!and!the!United!States,!resulting!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
186 Baring Brothers, HC I.20.1.2 C. See also David Kynaston, The City of London: A World of its 
Own 1815-1890  (London: Chatto & Windus, 1994). 108.  
 
187 For a discussion of the British market reaction, particularly actions by the Bank of England 
that initially fomented and eventually ameliorated the panic (very similar to arbitrary actions 
taken by the fed in 2008!) see ibid.,.107-31. John Killick briefly hypothesizes on the role of 
cotton speculation in the panic of 1837, Killick, "Cotton Operations."  
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in!a!different!playing!field!in!cotton!operations,!and!sowing!the!seeds!of!a!transformed!economic!order.!The!period!from!1837W45!witnessed!stabilization!of!the!cotton!and!Atlantic!credit!markets!as!well!as!the!trade!in!discount!paper.!This!era!also!saw!many!firms!fold!while!a!few!players!in!the!cotton!markets!solidified!their!standing!and!increased!their!profits.!This!resulted!in!a!radical!decrease!in!the!profits!that!could!be!made!in!the!trade!but!increased!stability!in!the!market!and!in!credit!relationships.!Interestingly!some!firms,!most!notably!the!Browns,!moved!away!from!dealings!in!cotton!at!this!point!and!began!to!focus!exclusively!on!credit!and!trade!in!discount!paper.!At!this!point!the!Rothschilds!began!to!enter!the!market!with!greater!interest!through!the!urgings!of!August!Belmont,!arriving!in!New!York!in!1837,!after!the!collapse!of!Josephs,!their!previous!representatives!in!the!United!States.!!!I!argue!that!the!panic!of!1837!was!precipitated!in!large!measure!by!wanton!speculation! in! inherently! unstable! southern! cotton.!When! cotton! prices! began! to!slide!and!factors!began!to!call!in!debts!banks!far!removed!from!the!scene!began!to!experience!pronounced!crises!of!liquidity,!as!money!that!had!been!easily!lent,!often!on! a! handshake,! was! not! easily! recovered.! Likewise,! as! speculations! in! cotton!soured,! many! agents,! factors! and! wellWknown! houses! folded,! leaving! only! the!strongest! houses! in! a! position! to! weather! the! storm.! In! the! aftermath! only! the!proverbially! strong! survived,! in! a! market! rendered! more! stable! through! the!elimination!of!smaller!wildcat!firms,!and!wide!open!to!those!still!able!to!operate!in!the!Atlantic!trade.!In!the!end,!these!firms!were!able!to!solidify!their!business!across!the! Atlantic! and! reap! the! rewards! of!working! in! a!more! stable! environment!with!
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greater! shares!of! the! trade,!which!allowed! them! to!eventually!diversify! into!other!speculative!ventures,!like!railroads,!or!greater!specialization!in!financial!markets.!!
The panic of 1837 demonstrates the vital importance of British credit had for the 
American economy. It also provided the first intimation that American finance needed to 
change. These changes were put off until the Civil War as cotton prices remained low 
through the 1840s and the American economy remained mired in a period of slow 
growth.  It was at this point that many larger British banks, Barings and Rothschild 
among them, aggressively entered cotton markets learning how to effectively work in 
American markets during their brief engagement with the cotton kingdom. The lessons 
they learned would inform their subsequent financial activities in American markets, 
where they played a different role after the Civil War.  
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Chapter Three: The World the Slaves Made: Anglo-American Finance and the 
Atlantic Cotton Trade 1837-1848 
   
In May of 1837 August Belmont arrived in New York and found the city 
strangely silent and bereft of commercial activity. Amschel von Rothschild, the head of 
the Rothschild Frankfurt house, had sent him to Cuba to investigate the repercussions of 
the first Carlist War for Rothschild interests in the region. Belmont disembarked in 
Manhattan in the midst of one of the largest financial contractions ever to seize the 
United States. As he walked the subdued streets of the city observing the malaise he saw 
only untarnished opportunity. For Belmont, the barren commercial landscape of New 
York offered both business opportunity and a once in a lifetime chance to create himself 
anew in a place where people saw a cultivated wealthy young European with important 
financial connections, allowing him to leave behind his humble beginning as an 
apprentice and poor clerk in the Rothschild Frankfurt house.188  Although many affected 
by the financial turbulence saw no further than the personal ramifications of the financial 
contraction, Belmont had a different, and larger vision.189 What was obvious to the young 
man eager for something more than what he had known as a humble apprentice, clerk and 
eventually secretary, was that he had skills and connections that could be put to good use !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
188 See David Black, The King of Fifth Avenue: The Fortunes of August Belmont  (New York: 
Dial Press, 1981).ch. 3.  
 
189 See Temin, Jacksonian Economy. Killick, "Cotton Operations." and Jessica Lepler, 1837: 
Anatomy of a Panic, unpublished dissertation, 2008. Lepler in particular suggests that in the 
aftermath of the panic people reacted to the contraction in an individual and immediate way, as 
opposed to considering the larger ramifications of the financial contraction or considering a range 
of explanations. It is worth noting that some historians, John Killick in particular, attribute the 
panic to overspeculation in cotton. 
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in a city bereft of commercial activity. 190 Further, in this newfound land of opportunity, 
nobody would know of his modest background and years of scraping by.191 In New 
Orleans, in New York and in commercial entrepots across the South markets were 
inactive. One suspects a description of activity as ‘dull’ would have been a relief. Even 
those that might desire to buy cotton at rock bottom prices were unable to do so. The New 
Orleans Price-Current reported ‘this inactivity may be chiefly attributed, we believe, to 
the utter inability of buyers to raise funds, as the banks are not purchasing either sterling 
or domestic change.’192 With cash at hand Belmont knew this was his moment. 
Against the wishes of his employers Belmont set to work establishing his own 
agency. He rented a small office at 78 Wall Street and wrote to the London and Paris 
Rothschild houses requesting their business for his new firm, August Belmont and 
Company, leaving James de Rothschild to conclude, ‘he is a stupid young man…. Such 
an ass needs to be kept on a short leash.’193 Yet within three years of his arrival, Belmont 
was reputed to be one of the wealthiest men in New York, as well as one of the most 
important bankers in the country, known as ‘the king of the money changers’ because of 
his mastery of arbitrage.194 Belmont’s initial impressions of the potential in American 
business after the panic were sound, and his view of cotton shared by other 
knowledgeable observers of the market at the time. Belmont, and by extension his 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
190 See Woodman, King Cotton. 167 
 
191 See Black, King of Fifth Avenue, chs. 1-3  
 
192 New Orleans Price Current, April 15, 1837.  
 
193 James de Rothschild, Paris, to his nephews, London, May 25, 1837, XI/101/0/8/13, RAL.   
 
194 Black, King of Fifth Avenue. 5, 22 and 39.  
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employers, engaged in what became increasingly common speculative activity in 
agricultural commodities produced with slave labor.  
An!examination!of!Belmont’s!activities!in!cotton!from!1837!forward!provides!one!vantage!point!from!which!to!examine!some!largeWscale!shifts!in!the!cotton!trade!after!the!panic!of!1837.!!The!date!and!circumstances!of!his!arrival!on!the!scene!make!him!an!ideal!guide,!since!Belmont!was!learning!the!ways!of!American!markets!himself,!and!eager!to!lead!both!houses!into!diverse!areas!of!investment.!His!letters!provide!a!great!deal!of!insight!into!both!the!economics!and!politics!of!the!cotton!kingdom.!When!placed!within!the!larger!context!of!the!cotton!business!they!provide!a!type!of!primer!on!navigating!transWregional!economic!activity!in!the!United!States!as!well!as!across!the!Atlantic.!The!irony!is!that!his!misapprehensions!and!mistakes!are!often!more!instructive!than!his!successes.!The!work!he!carried!out!for!the!Rothschild!houses!in!London!and!Paris!demonstrate!how!wealth!and!knowledge!generated!from!what!was!a!brief!and!intensive!engagement!with!cotton!facilitated!later!specializations!in!American!markets!by!firms!that!have!come!to!define!modern!capitalism.!Belmont’s!activities!also!demonstrate!clearly!the!centrality!of!slavery!to!Atlantic!economic!development,!and!the!growth!of!international!banking!and!capitalism!in!general.!!
In the aftermath of the panic, as Belmont began to make himself at home in New 
York, prices for cotton fell even further and the few houses left standing began to operate 
in cotton markets again. The Rothschild houses, along with the Browns and Barings, both 
of whom re-entered the market in spring of 1837, made money through the consignment, 
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sale and outright purchase of these goods. It was, after all, most advantageous to enter the 
market after panics, when money was scarce, prices were low and competition was 
minimal. It was at this juncture, with the Browns handling all the business they could and 
Barings taking a good deal of the rest that Belmont began to discuss investments in 
cotton in earnest with the London and Paris Rothschild houses. He wrote to London that 
the Paris house was considering accepting consignments of cotton during the coming 
season. ‘I think that no more precipitous time could be selected. The low prices of cotton 
and the want of competition will allow those who come early in the market to make their 
own conditions...’ 195 Belmont saw the money to be made in the article but his employers 
had a different view of cotton that considered the interplay between profit and risk. Baron 
James de Rothschild advised his nephews in London that, ‘all the people are speculating 
on cotton which will now be sold at any price and we will have to consider very carefully 
whether we do in fact want to get so deeply involved in the American business.’196 The 
Rothschild houses were also not inclined toward the consignment business. In October of 
1837 the firm had been approached by factors in New Orleans and Liverpool seeking 
advances on cotton and replied flatly that advances and consignments were presently 
outside the purview of their operations.197  In spite of Belmont’s repeated efforts to 
explain the process and assuage their fears of risk, they most often preferred to purchase 
cotton outright.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
195 August Belmont, New York, to N.  M. Rothschild & Sons, London, September 12, 1839, 
XI/62/0C/2/35, RAL. 
 
196 James de Rothschild, Paris, to his nephews, London, September 15, 1839, XI/101/2/4/63, RAL.   
 
197 N M Rothschild & Sons, London to C. G. Allhussen Esq, New Orleans, October 3, 1837, 
II/10/1, RAL. 
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After the panic of 1837 many of the larger Anglo-American houses, nevertheless, 
did see the appeal of purchasing cotton when prices had bottomed. The appeal of this was 
not lost on bankers closer to Louisiana, either, and Nicholas Biddle, the former director 
of the second Bank of the United States used his newly created post at the United States 
Bank of Pennsylvania to decisively intervene in cotton markets from 1837-9, much to the 
chagrin of his European associates. Some felt that in his interventions Biddle ‘corrupted’ 
state banks and, by extension, the market through encouraging this type of speculative 
activity. Biddle had several reasons for engaging in this activity and profit was actually 
not one of them. For the United States Bank of Pennsylvania cotton sales provided 
necessary foreign exchange to replace that formerly received from federal fiscal 
operations and Southern branch operations.198 These foreign bills were needed to meet 
the bank’s debts in Europe. This is not to deny that some people did not make money, 
including Biddle’s son and many of Biddle’s associates.199 These interventions also 
profited many in Louisiana and throughout the South. Eventually, Biddle’s scheme failed 
when his machinations could no longer influence the price of cotton in the face of 
overwhelming market pressures.  
Nevertheless, Biddle’s activities set a precedent for other American banks in 
Louisiana. These banks had also engaged in the speculative purchase of cotton after the 
panic.  A committee of the Louisiana state legislature learned in 1840 that six out of 
seventeen banks that reported on the matter had purchased over $1.3 million of cotton on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
198 For more on Biddle’s cotton manipulations see Hidy, House of Baring., 240-2; Hammond, 
Banks and Politics., 468-72;  Temin, Jacksonian Economy., 150 and Green, Louisiana Banking., 
93-7. 
 
199  Nicholas Biddle to Edward C. Biddle, October 1, 1838, Biddle Papers, Library of Congress,. 
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their own account for sale in Liverpool or Le Havre. Their nominal objectives were to 
recover debts owed by banks in others states. Since these banks could only pay in local 
banknotes, the Louisiana banks used these local notes to purchase cotton, which they 
could then sell to meet their obligations in England and the rest of Europe. The banks 
claimed this was one way to work around a breakdown of domestic and foreign exchange 
that allowed them to meet their obligations, and make a profit while doing so. Leland 
Jenks suggested that ‘the apparent success of Biddle’s undertaking was corrupting the 
mores of every American state. Following the example of the Bank of the United States, 
each commonwealth in turn sought to support the cotton market by chartering new banks 
and selling fresh issues of stock.’200 It is difficult to ignore the speculative character of 
these transactions or the fact that in essence these banks were buying prodigious amounts 
of cotton in order to inflate cotton prices. Many Anglo-American houses, including 
Barings, impugned this behavior and gross manipulation of the markets. With the panic 
of 1839 the bottom fell out again, and many of these firms then lost money. 
Given price manipulations, questionable banking practices and the ramifications 
of a few bad loans related to cotton, the Rothschild houses had understandable concerns 
about the cotton trade. After the panic of 1837 the Browns ended up the reluctant owners 
of a series of plantations across the cotton belt, which they were compelled to run, 
resentfully but profitably, for years before they could resolve the unwelcome ‘lock-up’ of 
funds. Barings ended up running sugar plantations in the Caribbean and American South.  
It was not uncommon for Anglo-American houses to find themselves on the wrong end of 
a protested bill in return for their lack of foresight. Too often these firms found !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
200  Jenks, Migration of British Capital., 93.  
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themselves the reluctant owners of plantations they were unable to sell when credits and 
consignments extended to planters went unpaid. Both the Paris and London Rothschild 
houses assiduously avoided using slaves or plantations to securitize debts, but on at least 
two occasions found themselves chasing payment in money and becoming entangled with 
slaves. In the first instance, in 1833, Nathan!Mayer!Rothschild!and!James!de!Rothschild!were!counterWclaimants!as!mortgagees!on!compensation!due!under!the!slave!compensation!process!initiated!after!the!abolition!act!of!1833.!They!pursued!the!compensation!due!for!88!slaves!on!an!estate!in!Antigua,!for!which!Charles!Chatfield,!the!trustee!of!Nathan’s!executors!was!awarded!£1,570!18s!after!his!death.!!The!two!houses!pursued!this!conveyance!as!counterWclaimants!on!a!claim!filed!initially!by!Robert!Hyndman!for!158!slaves!on!the!Matthews!and!Constitution!Hills!estates!in!Antigua.!To!clarify,!this!was!a!counterWclaim!filed!against!a!claim!filed!by!a!defaulting!debtor,!Hyndman.!As!a!means!of!seeking!compensation!on!a!debt!he!failed!to!pay,!the!two!houses!filed!a!counterWclaim!against!his!claim!for!funds!on!a!debt!he!was!owed.!The!houses!in!essence,!were!pursuing!payment!on!a!bad!debt.!They!went!after!an!award!of!money!that!happened!to!be!compensation!for!slaves.!Thus!the!houses!were!twice!removed!from!owning!or!securing!debts!with!enslaved!peoples.!201!
In 1841 the Paris house of Rothschild narrowly avoided a similar entanglement !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
201 To suggest from the information above that the Rothschilds were in fact slave owners is a 
stretch. Likewise, to suggest that the houses securitized mortgages with slaves is inaccurate. For 
more on the filing and compensation received under the Abolition Act see the forthcoming work 
on slave compensation by Nicholas Draper, et. al. See also T71/1/877, The National Archives, 
Kew and Nicholas Draper, The Price of Emancipation: Slave-ownership, Compensation and 
British Society at the End of Slavery  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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when John Forsyth, then serving as Secretary of State, passed away unexpectedly in 
Washington, DC.  They had surmised he would likely be a future President of the United 
States and generous lines of credit had been forthcoming to secure his good will.202  One 
of the Rothschild business policies was the cultivation of ‘friends in high places.’ As 
Salomon had mentioned to Nathan Mayer Rothschild in 1815 ‘you know, dear Nathan, 
what father used to say about sticking to a man in government.’203 And their father had 
been forthright about how this should be done: ‘our father taught us that if a high-placed 
person enters into a partnership with a Jew, he belongs to the Jew.’204 So James de 
Rothschild extended to him every financial courtesy on the basis of his prominence, 
political standing and future promise. Forsyth proved to be very amenable to the 
arrangement. He also happened to be a cotton planter, and made use of frequent 
advances. In return, he assured that, among other things, the Rothschilds retained their 
position as bankers to the United States in Europe. When he passed away suddenly in 
Washington, DC in 1841 he left a large amount of unsecured debt in his wake, including 
his debt to the Paris house. He was, incidentally, succeeded in his post by Daniel 
Webster, who promptly notified the Rothschilds of a change in policy and awarded the 
prestigious post, once again, to Barings.205  
In settling his accounts his son found the estate unable to offer immediate !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
202 August Belmont, New York to N. M. Rothschild & Sons, London, April 27, 1842, XI/62/2A, 
RAL. 
 
203 Salomon von Rothschild, Paris, to Nathan Rothschild, London 21 October 21, 1815, 
XI/109/2/2/149, RAL. 
 
204 Quoted in Ferguson, House of Rothschild. p.25 
 
205 See Hidy, House of Baring., 351. 
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remuneration in cash and instead suggested the Paris house accept the plantation and 50 
slaves as payment at what he suggested was a ‘very favorable valuation’ of the 
property.206 This was refused out of hand, the firm opting to wait, begrudgingly, until 
1850 for payment of the debt in full.207  Belmont brokered this settlement, working out an 
agreement on repayment with Forsyth’s son. On the one occasion when the Rothschilds 
might have actually ended up holding chattel property they opted to wait patiently for 
payment, losing access to their capital for nine years, but keeping their hands (somewhat) 
clean.208  
To be fair, although these stances may have had some abolitionist sentiment 
behind them, after all N. M. Rothschild did provide the loan of funds vital to the slave 
indemnity act that enabled abolition in the West Indies, many of these financiers simply 
did not believe chattel slavery was a particularly wise or secure investment. This had 
nothing to do with ethics.  They saw an unacceptable amount of risk in these types of 
activities, and that was in large measure something well-established houses sought to 
avoid. Often greater risk yields higher profits but once one has a fortune, the first concern 
is wealth preservation. As Nathan Mayer Rothschild noted “it requires a great deal of 
boldness, and a great deal of caution, to make a great fortune; and when you have got it, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
206 John Forsyth to August Belmont, New York, May 31, 1842, XI/62/2A, RAL. Probably the 
initial advances were made because of Forsyth’s prominence in American politics, and it seems 
reasonably clear that the mortgage was not secured with either land or chattels. The initial 
mortgage was issued from the Paris house.   
 
207 The offer from John Forsyth Jr. to settle includes 60,000 acres and fifty slaves. See August 
Belmont, New York, to N. M. Rothschild & Sons, London, May 31, 1842, XI/62/2A/86, RAL. 
On the refusal of real property for the settlement of the debt, see August Belmont, New York, to 
N. M. Rothschild & Sons, London,  XI/62/2A/124, RAL. The remaining $7,457.68 due was 
received by August Belmont on May 13,1850, August Belmont, New York, to N. M. Rothschild 
& Sons, London, May 13, 1850, XI/62/4B, RAL. 
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it requires ten times as much wit to keep it.”209   At heart, these men were investors, keen 
to build and eventually preserve fortunes first. The Browns state in letters discussing the 
running of plantations that they resent the lock-up of funds. Even though the plantations 
were run at a profit they saw all too well they could make more money with less capital 
outlay, and much less risk, elsewhere.  
By the close of 1839, in spite of their success, the Browns had become convinced, 
understandably, that the cotton consignment business was too risky, as they continued to 
run their cotton plantations and look for a way to sell them. They still consigned cotton, 
but the rules they adopted and the advances offered were not palatable to planters and did 
not draw in or generate business. Instead the firm focused on exchange negotiations, a 
move that became even more attractive after the collapse of the Bank of the United 
States, which had formerly sought to control this area.210 In this capacity, the Browns 
provided Northern and British merchants in the South with ready cash to purchase cotton 
at their discretion. By 1840 the Browns also controlled the letter of credit business. Thus, 
although they still made money from the cotton trade they were no longer actively 
trading.211 The Browns re-directed the flow of credit and foreign exchange to the South 
and eastward, stepping into a void left by the demise of the second Bank of the United 
States, and engineering the flows of capital to their own advantage. The directions 
followed by paper and credit coincided with the movement of cotton to the North and on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
209Buxton and Buxton, Memoirs.293. 
210 On Biddle’s attempts to dominate this area through the New Orleans branch of the Bank of the 
United States see Green, Louisiana Banking., ch 3. Biddle’s control in this area was reduced in 
1836 and completely lost after the panic of 1837.  
211 Perkins, Financing Anglo-American Trade., 124.  
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to European shores.212  The Browns controlled this trade in New Orleans. Additionally, 
they were the largest provider of foreign exchange in the United States. It is not 
surprising that one historian would state, ‘they were thus probably the principal financial 
intermediary of short-term funds between the South and the outside world at this time.’213 
From the 1840s forward the Browns dominated this trade, moving out of cotton and 
firmly into the business of finance.  
At this juncture, Barings began to purchase increasing amounts of cotton, and 
from 1839-41 they were the largest receivers of cotton in Liverpool.214  From this point 
through the 1850s they diverted the majority of their funds in American markets into 
cotton. Most of the cotton they had bought on their own account because they considered 
the advances sought by planters to be too high. Moving into the 1840 season they were 
convinced that the crisis of 1839, by knocking out much of the competition, would force 
planters to accept smaller advances.  In this context the firm named Stetson & Avery its 
New Orleans agent. By 1842 the house of Baring perceived American markets to be open 
to them, especially cotton markets. At this point, they cleaned house, cleared old accounts 
and expanded their operations in cotton. They set in place a program to ensure receipt of 
substantial volumes of cotton in Liverpool for the coming season, mollified the packet 
owners and began to conduct a larger proportion of business with Grinnel, Minturn & Co.  
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Nevertheless, the firm very consciously chose to avoid specialization, either in 
cotton, securities or a region. Bates felt that ‘there is something apparently in this but not 
in reality.’215 He noted that all of the larger firms were using brokers anyway, and 
believed that his firm sold all of the commodities they dealt in, including sugar, coffee, 
tea, tallow, cotton and indigo more efficiently than any of their specialized competitors. 
The firm continued to deal in a wide range of items, worked as ship owners and even 
went into iron manufacture, secretly controlling the Weardale iron company, makers of 
pig and bar iron.216 They had every intention of remaining generalists, merchant bankers, 
in spite of their drift towards the marketing of American loans in European markets. 
Through 1848 Barings took the lead in cotton imports to Liverpool. 
Correspondingly they ceded the exchange business to the Browns, noting that, like 
Belmont, they simply could not compete.  They too, in large measure had been chasing 
the Browns. After Brown Brothers moved away from cotton, Barings stepped into the 
gap and in most years through the 1840s were happy to purchase on their own account 
and avoid the potential complications and administrative overhead that came with 
consignments. Planters’ frequent demands for higher advances and insistence on limits on 
sales in Liverpool also made purchasing cotton outright much more attractive. They 
substantially reduced the capital they had reserved for that sphere of business and they 
also moved out of American securities. This shift and the liquidity it generated allowed 
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them to decisively pursue the marketing of American loans in Europe, which they did 
with increasing frequency after 1848. 217 
On the other side of the fence were men like Rice Ballard, a Virginia slave trader 
turned planter. Ballard was typical of many of the planters that would have worked with 
any of these firms directly, or through a factor or agent in New Orleans or Mobile. He is 
also one example of a man lured by the high prices of cotton into the trade. The 
difference is he had enough capital to buy in as a planter, as opposed to a broker. This 
makes Ballard something of an exceptional figure, given that most slave traders did not 
accrue enough capital to move from trading to planting cotton, and it suggests he was a 
good businessman. Nevertheless, it seems that Ballard was one of the many ‘led out of 
their sober senses’ because, at the least, he should have known that buying a plantation in 
1837 was not the best idea. Ballard had worked with Benjamin Story in New Orleans and 
corresponded with him occasionally. Story generally gave him good advice and provided 
insight in terms of international influences on American cotton markets. Ballard also had 
formed a lucrative trading partnership with Franklin and Armfield, two successful slave 
traders in the 1830s and was fairly well connected to international news that might affect 
slave and cotton prices. He embarked on cotton planting at roughly the same time 
Belmont established his agency in New York. Although their paths never seem to have 
crossed Ballard is representative of the planters that Belmont would have corresponded 
with directly or through the Rothschild agent in New Orleans, J. N. Hanau, or later, 
Timothy Farish, Belmont’s correspondent and agent in the 1850s.  
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 Ballard’s activities are of interest because he entered into the cotton business 
contemporaneously with Belmont, but as a planter.  He had a keen awareness of the value 
of cotton. He would have realized that the value of slaves was pegged to the price of the 
commodity and watched as slave prices soared along with cotton through the 1830s. He 
had a thorough understanding of the vital importance of both enslaved people and the 
commodities they harvested in the Deep South, yet seemingly lacked an understanding of 
the value of information and intelligence regarding international events and markets 
when trading cotton, although, obviously, this would have affected the slave trade as 
well. By the time he became involved with cotton he seemed cognizant of how his 
movement into the world of planting imbricated him within an international web of trade 
and finance. When he purchased his first plantations immediately before the panic of 
1837, cotton was booming, but there were intimations of trouble ahead.  At the time of 
his first harvest he was undoubtedly aware that he should have listened a bit more closely 
to Benjamin Story’s advice.  Nevertheless, like many Southerners he developed a global 
perspective, on business, slavery and the political economy of the cotton South. The 
problem was this view was somewhat flawed. Like his contemporaries, he was fairly 
certain cotton and slave prices would bounce back and rise much higher in subsequent 
years, and the 1850s did not disappoint.  Nevertheless, this unquestionable belief in 
profit, rising prices and infinite growth proved to be misplaced.   
Ballard’s shift from slave trading to cotton planting also increased his status and 
prestige in the antebellum South.218 It marked a move in his life towards increased 
stability. What Ballard took from his slave-trading days was a keen awareness of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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importance of slaves to the agricultural system of the cotton belt. It was no coincidence 
that the price of a slave was pegged to the price of cotton, and as cotton prices soared 
slave prices rose as well. Beyond the issue of the status of slaves as a speculative 
investment in their own right, or as collateral for loans and mortgages, slaves planted and 
picked the cotton, regardless of the price in New York or Liverpool, and in spite of 
whether their own value as chattels rose or fell.   
The most important new business relationships Ballard had to establish were with 
those who would sell his cotton in the competitive global market. Albert G. Nalle, who 
initially was associated with the firm of William R. Glover & Co. of New Orleans, 
became his main commission merchant and factor. Nalle later left his partnership with 
Glover and became a principal member of Dupuy, Tate & Nalle. He later embarked on 
another partnership with William Cox to form Nalle & Cox in 1844. At this point, 
Ballard would have had his choice of factors in New Orleans, and could have chosen also 
to sell his cotton to J. N. Hanau, an agent of the Rothschilds, or to Benjamin Story, or to 
Edmund Forstall who purchased cotton on Barings’ account. Many large planters dealt 
with several factors at one time, and Ballard was no exception. He worked with a factor 
in Louisville, Kentucky for his supply of pork and other plantation goods, but most of his 
transactions went through Nalle & Cox.219 Like most factors Nalle & Cox made every 
arrangement to market the crop at the best price obtainable.  
The lingering effects of the panic of 1837 pushed cotton prices downward and 
financial intermediaries were understandably wary of taking on high risks, especially in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the form of high advances on crops in the field. Ballard’s plantations were producing 
cotton as early as 1838, and in the following year another panic hit the region. In 1839, 
the New York price for ‘middling’ upland cotton was 8.92 cents, more than a 33 percent 
decline from the 13.36 cents in 1838. The price at Liverpool declined from 7.19 pence to 
5.42 pence. The 1841-2 season was even worse with 7.85 cents in New York and 4.86 
pence in Liverpool, which caused Ballard’s factors to report ‘a general panic’ among the 
houses in New Orleans, that ‘there seems to be great distrust and want of confidence on 
all sides, failures are taking place daily and before the season closes it is predicted that 
there will be general bankruptcy, every house in the city is more or less suspected.’220 
Dupuy, Tate & Nalle wrote in January 1842, that ‘times look gloomy in the extreme, and 
some say worse than they were at the corresponding period in 1837.’ After examining 
samples of their cotton, they judged that some had ‘undergone some process which has 
coloured it too highly, almost amounting to stain,’ in which the brokers judged it was the 
result of ‘the heat in the gin house, and the smell of it goes somewhat to confirm the 
opinion.’221  They knew this cotton would fetch even less in Liverpool, if it sold at all. 
The 1840s were not the best years for cotton planting, or cotton generally, but the 
corresponding jump in Ballard’s status might have offered some small compensation.  
Under such circumstances, Dupuy, Tate & Nalle advised Ballard to use up the 
credit Ballard had on their account since there was ‘terrible confusion among the banks 
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and we should not be surprised to see some of our money going at 50 cents in the dollar 
in less than 60 days.’ Ballard’s factors kept his money on deposit in a bank with a good 
reputation, but they felt quite uneasy about the future of the banks in the city generally. 
Eventually, in May of the same year, they informed Ballard that Bank of Louisiana notes 
were available, but ‘canal, commercial, citizens, Carrolton, and consolidated are 
somewhat suspected,’ and reminded him to exercise caution. Their predictions proved 
sound when in the next month ‘all our banks have suspended specie payments except the 
Bank of Louisiana, Union Bank, Mechanics and Traders and Carrolton.’222 
As we have seen, agents and factors informed their respective clients of market 
conditions, advising on price trends in Europe, and America as well as important political 
developments concerning wars and conflicts that might impact the market. During the 
1844 season cotton prices hit bottom at 5.63 cents in New York and 3.92 pence at 
Liverpool. Nevertheless, Ballard expanded production. The season started with demand 
in ‘qualities above ‘middling’ for some scattered orders for the French and Spanish 
markets,’ and for the large bulk of the stock of low quality cotton, purchasers had a ‘wide 
field for their operations and demand constant concession.’ Ballard’s factors, by this time 
Nalle & Cox, suggested that overproduction had contributed to the depression, since the 
English market ‘having a supply fully sufficient for 30 weeks consumption, are sending 
out their orders at extremely low limits.’223 Their news sources were international in 
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scope, reflecting the global nature of the cotton market. Belmont had reached similar 
conclusions but with different sources.  
With the entry of Texas to the Union as a slave state in 1845 slave prices jumped 
an average of 150 percent between annexation and the Civil War. The price of cotton 
began to revive as well. Looking quite attractive by 1848. The Alsops of Virginia 
reported to Rice Ballard that in January 1847 the price of male slaves in Richmond 
ranged from $600 to $700 and were selling well, because the ‘rise in cotton, together with 
Texas, has produced this change in the price of negroes.’224 The rise in slave prices was 
tied to increased demand and an increase in price for cotton as the South slowly came out 
of a lengthy depression at the end of the 1840s. The annexation of Texas became a key 
moment that seemed to prove that European commercial interests and the abolitionist 
movement were not sufficient to alter the established economic structure of the American 
South.  The addition of another slave state resulted in a sharp increase in the velocity of 
the domestic slave trade and a rise in slave prices, which corresponded with an increase 
in the price of cotton.225 It seemed that perhaps cotton was still a vital commodity, and 
planters still had a surfeit of political sway.  
At this juncture many planters, like Ballard, were also concerned with the political !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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economy of the cotton South. Planters began to hold conventions that focused on 
establishing direct trade relationships with England and other European consumers of 
cotton, thus deconstructing the triangular trade and cutting New York out of the picture. 
This became an issue of increasing import to Southerners after the panic of 1837. Direct 
trade with Europe, bypassing the middlemen in the North, would greatly decrease the 
costs associated with running cotton, or cotton samples, through the city.226 Delegates at 
the conventions claimed that this ‘voluntary tribute’ to the North drained $10,000,000 or 
more profit annually from the South, which in the long run depleted capital for internal 
improvements and investing in manufacturing industries.227 Southerners also believed 
there was a lack of sufficient credit provided by Southern financial institutions. At one 
convention, delegates suggested that Southern banks form European alliances more 
directly and encouraged the development of agencies in European cities to facilitate 
direct trade. With the damage from the panic, Southerners saw a perfect opportunity to 
attract European capital directly to the South that would contribute to the development of 
larger and more sophisticated financial institutions. Southern port cities such as New 
Orleans, Mobile, and Charleston, in their view, had the capability to function in a similar 
capacity as port cities in the North, and for a limited time, their efforts seemed successful. 
Alexander Brown and Sons had Benjamin Story as their representative in New Orleans, 
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and in 1842 the Rothschilds sent J. N. Hanau to New Orleans to represent their interests 
and purchase cotton, tobacco and sugar on their account.228 Southern banks also attracted 
European capital, but the banking system Southerners desired was unrealistic: credit has 
limits. 
Almost as quickly as these agents had arrived it seems many of these firms were 
beginning to move away from cotton, and many planters were eager to follow them out of 
the South and into wider global networks of trade.  Cotton planters realized that 
dependency on the North and nascent conflicts might be most easily remedied by looking 
beyond the borders of the nation state. With this point in mind Southern planters and 
businessmen held fast to their free trade principles with some representatives arguing ‘the 
true American policy is to encourage the purchase of our cotton, rice and tobacco, on the 
continent of Europe…. And if possible, open the European market to the same.’229 In 
making this case lower South Democrats gave prominence to recent global developments 
they believed would benefit commercial agricultural and manufacturing interests across 
the union. Trade with France had increased since 1833 but this would only continue if 
free trade prevailed and the United States was able to follow European expansion into 
Asian and African markets. They thought they would be able to accomplish this by 
essentially riding in on Britain’s coat tails. This seemed possible if direct trade with 
Britain continued. Of course, this all redounded to the good for the lower South in 
particular since they supplied the majority of the cotton Britain consumed in the 
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production of textiles for global export. The cotton South, in essence, would reap the 
benefits of England’s imperial and commercial expansion, and Southern democrats saw 
this as precisely the time to seek to expand markets and deepen trade with England, and 
Europe more generally. They felt protective measures at this juncture would be 
particularly debilitating for the North as well as the South.  
The financial collapse of 1839 following hard on the devastating panic two years 
previously destroyed other financial relationships with Southern banks and forced the 
Browns and other houses to establish special agencies in New Orleans. The primary task 
of these firms was the negotiation of sterling exchange for Liverpool cotton buyers. At 
this juncture, the Browns saw cotton as simply too volatile and had discovered other 
elements of finance much more to their preference. They instead entered exchange 
negotiations, a move that looked even more attractive after the collapse of the bank of the 
United States, which formerly dominated that market. Basically, the Browns provided 
British merchants and Southern planters with ready access to sterling whenever they 
needed it. ‘There was thus a huge flow of domestic and foreign exchange southward and 
eastward matching the flow of cotton to the North and Europe.’230 The Browns, at this 
juncture, controlled a large proportion of this trade in New Orleans. They were probably 
the principal financial intermediary of short-term funds between the South and the 
outside world at this time, moderating capital flows throughout the United States.  
Naturally, they viewed this as preferable to being at the mercy of the vagaries of the 
cotton market. In directing bills of exchange across the Atlantic they managed to profit 
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from the cotton trade whether prices rose or fell; they profited from the transactions 
without being involved with cotton at all.  
By 1840, Southern agriculture was in the midst of yet another deep recession and 
prices were down for every commodity, although grain production was able to revive by 
the latter half of the decade owing partially to the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 and a 
series of poor harvests in Britain.  Cotton, however, did not fully recover until the end of 
the decade. In the early 1840s, critics warned of cotton overproduction and advised 
planters to focus their attention more on investing in the manufacturing sector. Not only 
were Southerners aware now of the speculative, unstable nature of the cotton market, but 
they were also hearing news of potential foreign competition from India and Brazil.231 
Led by cotton planters and manufacturers in South Carolina, many Southerners began to 
advocate for the need to diversify Southern industry, beginning with encouraging the 
development of cotton factories. Ideally, this would combat the overproduction problem 
not only by turning out final products that would yield higher profit, but also by 
strengthening the region through the development of industry. Diversification, in their 
view, would work to lessen dependency on the North by producing goods within the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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region. 
At this point Barings supplanted the Brown Brothers as the leading recipients of 
cotton during the 1840s. Over half of their imports to Liverpool were composed of cotton 
purchased on their own account. From 1842-8 they sought to maintain some balance 
between purchases and consignments with the ratio being determined in the end by 
market conditions. In the 1850s the firm continued to evince a preference for purchases 
of cotton instead of offering advances on the article.232 It is not that Baring Brothers 
perceived any less risk in holding the article, or had necessarily gained greater confidence 
in the market. Rather, because of the demand for increasingly large advances the outright 
purchase of cotton became more attractive. The move towards outright purchases was 
therefore a smart one.  Nevertheless, this shift by most firms towards outright purchases 
of cotton has been suggested as one explanation for the Browns’ abandonment of cotton 
transactions.233 
Belmont was an astute observer of all of this activity, and was well aware of the 
movements of commodities, discount paper and specie. Like other merchants, agents and 
factors, he read the New Orleans Prices- Current and other circulars, carried on regular 
correspondence with ‘friends’ across the United States and kept his finger on the pulse of 
American as well as international political events. Nevertheless he did not see what other 
brokers and larger houses, particularly Barings, had ascertained: buying cotton outright in 
this type of climate was actually prudent. Theoretically, extending credit to the planter !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and letting him carry the risk of fluctuation in market prices in different ports made the 
most sense, but with planters demanding exorbitant advances in a downward market the 
outright purchase of cotton gave these firms more latitude for action in exchange for a 
negligible increase in risk. Yet Belmont insisted, ‘it would be perfectly safe & you might 
do some very good & profitable business. I recommend these suggestions … as by the 
general distrust a good many houses in that line are altogether thrown out & your house 
would have a beautiful chance.’234 Belmont stated that as long as the cotton was sold 
before the drafts were due there was no risk, but that was simply not true. There was no 
risk unless the amount of the advance exceeded the value of the cotton, which was 
exactly what happened in the winter of 1837, and again in 1839.  Belmont went further 
and insisted he could pull in many profitable consignments for his employers, if only they 
would ease their objections and fall in with what he presented as standard practice: 
‘consignments of cotton are also very safe with the present cheap rates, but …you must, 
as I had the honor to observe to you on former occasions, give me more latitude for the 
amount you authorize me to advance. With an advance of ¾ of the invoice I cannot 
compete with Brown, Tilden & others …who advance 7/8.’235  Belmont was obviously 
eager to enter into this trade, so eager that he misrepresented the policies of these long-
established houses and presented risky activity as sound.  As discussed earlier, even with 
cotton dropping as low as it did in 1837, the Browns never advanced 7/8 of an invoice. 
Rather, they purchased cotton on their own account and held it in Liverpool until prices 
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rose. Belmont saw that money could be made on consignments, and overplayed his hand. 
Like many of the Americans he criticizes as being overly confident and reckless, he 
minimized the risk of large advances and the speculative nature of the cotton trade 
generally, apparently sharing that same ‘… speculative & impressionable character of the 
Americans … they always push under the apprehension of short cotton crop prices much 
beyond what the facts warrant & on the other hand depress them more than necessary in 
anticipation of a large yield.’236  
In 1848 he again raised the issue of consignments, claiming that the Browns had 
gained the upper hand because of the reluctance of both houses to offer higher advances.  
…consignments …offer …a safe & profitable business. Last season after 
the commercial disasters of England & the French revolution had put aside 
almost all competition Brown Brothers & co agency in New Orleans had 
the whole field to itself & made enormous profits in the way of advances 
on cotton & exchange, by advancing a moderate amount on the cotton 
charging the full commission & taking the bills of the consigning parties 
on their Liverpool house at 5 to 6% below what they could draw 
themselves from New Orleans or New York, thereby realizing from 8 to 
10% out of one of the safest operations that can be entered into which 
don’t require any actual outlay of capital.237 
 
Contrary to Belmont’s claims, records show that the Browns had already moved 
decisively away from consignments at this juncture.  They consigned cotton 
intermittently to Liverpool until 1845. After that point, they were effectively no longer 
involved in the article at all, opting instead to focus on letters of credit, currency 
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exchange and the operation of the Collins packet lines. In 1845 the Liverpool branch’s 
commission revenues on cotton consignments totaled $53,000. By 1852 these revenues 
had dropped to around $5,000, a reduction of 90 percent.  Other firms in the industry 
adopted their system of making consignments during the 1840s and took up a good deal 
of the consignment business the Browns left behind. Through their operations in cotton, 
both purchasing and making consignments, the Browns developed an expertise in the 
handling of letters of credit and bills of exchange, a business they came to dominate after 
1845 as they had the consignment business earlier. For this house, their involvement in a 
commodity produced for a commercial market with slave labor in the antebellum South 
enabled their transition into a business focused exclusively on banking and finance.  
Belmont was keen to follow their lead and work with bills of exchange as well but 
when he attempted to do so in the 1840s he found himself, yet again, shut out of the 
market. He was never able to compete effectively for Southern paper.  As early as 1843 
he complained that, ‘the agents of Brown & some others buy all what they can lay hands 
on.’238 In 1845 the London house authorized Belmont to operate in bills of exchange, but 
he found the market unattractive. ‘As regards direct arbitrages between London + here I 
have always a watchful eye upon them…unfortunately the high rates of all continental 
exchanges here & the sudden decline of £ precludes…every chance of doing anything in 
that line to advantage.’239 The fact that the Browns undercut and undersold him at every 
turn did not help matters. Even though one of Belmont’s strengths was in fact arbitrage, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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he was able to do little business in bills of exchange around cotton. By 1859 he lamented, 
‘…Brown bros who buy up all the cotton + produce bills all over the south having their 
agents in every shipping port …monopolize the market as they can sell 1/8 - 3/6 percent 
below me.’240 Given that Belmont and, by extension, the Rothschild houses were unable 
to effectively control operations in various areas tangential to the cotton trade, and more 
often than not felt frustrated by what trade they could get, it is not surprising that they 
made an exit from these markets after 1848, especially given all the perils of activity in 
the commodity.  
In!retrospect,!it!is!clear!that!the!advice!Belmont!proffered!on!cotton!investments!was!often,!but!not!always,!sound.!His!letters!display!a!thorough!consideration!of!the!complex!influences!at!play!in!determining!supply,!demand!and!pricing!and!an!astute!grasp!of!the!interplay!of!larger!regional!and!geographic!interests.!Belmont!often!considered!commodity!sales,!the!abundance!or!scarcity!of!money,!and!political!events!when!determining!what!investments!were!most!likely!to!yield!‘handsome!profits’!and!was!quick!to!scold!when!his!advice!was!not!followed!and!profit!forfeited!as!a!result.!He!also!anticipated!the!effects!that!sales,!or!lack!thereof,!would!have!in!other!markets.!‘The!effect!of!the!heavy!transactions!in!cotton!at!the!southern!markets!is!beginning!to!be!felt!upon!exchanges!&!I!think!that!henceforth!the!export!of!specie!to!Europe!will!be!on!a!small!scale!until!next!spring.’241!He!went!on!to!note!that!exchange!had!already!dropped!in!New!Orleans!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
240 August Belmont, New York to N M Rothschild & Sons, London, April 19,1859, XI/62/8, 
RAL. 
 
241 August Belmont, New York to N M Rothschild & Sons, London, October 12, 1852, XI/62/5, 
RAL. 
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and!that,!in!this!instance,!the!London!house!lost!out!on!a!handsome!profit!by!not!giving!him!permission!to!act.!Even!Betty!de!Rothschild!begrudgingly!acknowledged!Belmont’s!detailed!understanding!of!the!American!markets,!stating!that,!‘he!knows!insideWout!all!the!country’s!resources;!he!holds!the!key!to!all!the!wheeling!and!dealing!in!the!commercial!world!and!he!knows!which!sources!to!tap,!which!are!the!means!of!success,!which!are!also!the!pitfalls!that!must!be!avoided.’242!Much!of!this!knowledge!was!hard!earned,!the!result!of!years!of!hard!work!and!time!invested!in!the!cultivation!of!business!relationships!in!the!North!and!South.!!
Belmont was compelled to master quickly many of the difficulties attendant on 
trade in cotton, and by extension, stocks, bonds and discount paper. Planters were often 
cash hungry and capable of all types of crafty tricks in order to increase their profits, 
resulting in the need to evaluate critically all reports from the South. Since Southern 
planters were often deeply in debt they looked to create opportunities to bolster prices 
when the fruits of their slaves’ labor were sent to market. Their chronic indebtedness, like 
their machinations to increase the price per pound paid on cotton was connected to the 
rhythms of the plantings and harvests.243 The rhythm of the year made advances helpful, 
but as has been noted, credit also played a vital role because of the nature of plantation 
life. Planters frequently spent a good deal of their money on the relentless quest for more 
slaves and land to grow more commodities.244 Thus the wisest of agents and cotton !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
242 Betty de Rothschild, Paris to Alphonse de Rothschild, March 7,1849, 000/930 58/1/222, RAL. 
 
243 See excerpts from the journal of Leven Covington in ‘The Routine of The Cotton Year,’ 
Bruchey, Cotton. 176-182. 
 
244 See Woodman, King Cotton; ibid.also Johnson, Soul by Soul. 
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merchants learned when a healthy dose of scepticism was warranted, developing an 
intimate sense of weather, borrowing and sale patterns throughout the cotton belt. 
Additionally, like Belmont, they cultivated information networks across the region, often 
receiving daily reports from correspondents.  In years when there was an expectation of a 
large crop, knowledge of which pushed prices downward, planters would sometimes 
spread rumors of frost striking the plants, of worms or bolls reducing yields. Often, they 
would hold back the cotton in hopes of diminishing expectations of the yield and driving 
up the price, in spite of the advice of factors to send cotton to market as quickly as 
possible.  Invariably Belmont would pass on the reports of these erratic and spontaneous 
outbreaks of frigid weather, infestations and early frosts, noting when he had ‘not much 
belief’ in the veracity of the accounts.245 
One of the questions easily raised at this juncture is why did none of these houses 
or anyone involved in the cotton trade in this period band together to form an exchange, 
and a futures market in the article? The Chicago Board of Trade was established in 1848 
and although initially offering forward contracts, moved to futures contracts in the 1860s. 
The timing and the financial expansion that accompanied the establishment of the board 
certainly make the question relevant. The opening of a formal exchange would have 
stabilized trade, increased profits and opened up more stable as well as lucrative 
speculative possibilities, including trading in futures. Riskier and less salubrious !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
245 Belmont’s letter to N. M. Rothschild & Sons, May 6, 1851, XI/62/6, RAL is one example: 
‘There has been some news in our cotton market and prices have gone up about 3/8 ct from the 
lowest point, in consequence of advices from the south of a killing frost in some parts of Alabama 
& Tennessee in which I have not much belief….there has been so much cotton planted that we 
have every prospect for a large crop & this with the now established fact that the present crop 
cannot fall short of 2300m bales must keep prices down.’ 
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possibilities would have been created as well, including the potential to corner the 
market.246 As has been seen repeatedly in the past, forward and futures contracts would 
have likely brought stability to cotton markets, allowed planters to receive a guaranteed 
price for their crop, and given merchants and manufacturers the ability to gauge present 
and future costs. In the case of cotton, a futures market would have brought a new level 
of stability to credit relationships. Obviously, this would have introduced large-scale 
changes to operation in the South, New York and Liverpool but the establishment of a 
board would have eliminated a great deal of volatility and radically reduced risk.  Given 
that a relatively accepted grading system in cotton had been in place since the 1820s and 
advances were common, it seems a more formal futures market would and could have 
developed earlier either in New Orleans or New York.247 Advances certainly protected 
the creditor, and did nothing to stabilize prices, or interfere with market set prices. Had an 
exchange been established it is quite likely these larger houses would have continued to 
bet on cotton.  
Given developments in Chicago what might have been seen initially in an 
exchange in New Orleans or New York would have been forward contracts. To be clear: 
an advance is credit extended cotton before it was sent to market, or often, even !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
246 On corners in grain see William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West  
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1991)., 97-148. 
 
247 A system of grading was established in Liverpool in the 1820s see Liverpool Shipping… On 
the preference of British merchants for purchases made on the basis of samples see ibid., 97-148 
as well as the extensive discussion in his endnotes on page 418. On the development of futures 
markets see also, Jeffrey Williams, The Economic Function of Futures Markets  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986); Jeffrey Williams, "The Origins of Futures Markets," 
Agricultural History 56(1982). and Henry Crosby Emery, Speculation on the Stock and Produce 
Exchanges of the United States, Studies in history, economics, and public law, v 7, no 2 (New 
York: AMS Press, 1968). 
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harvested. In essence the cotton served as collateral for the loan. Often the bill of lading 
would remain in the hands of the creditor until the cotton was sold and the advance paid 
off. A forward contract is an agreement to sell an asset at a pre-agreed future time for a 
specified price. A forward contract is usually made to meet a customer’s need - it is a 
contract in the sense of being an agreement between two individuals. With a forward 
contract there is no margin or money exchanged in advance. A futures contract is an 
agreement to buy or sell a certain good at a certain date in the future at a specified price 
that is traded on an exchange or in a market; such futures contracts can be traded 
speculatively. Because futures contracts are traded on an exchange and impersonal they 
are also highly liquid. In essence the contract itself becomes the good – another level of 
abstraction, and in the actual trade in the commodity becomes secondary, at least until it 
is time to honor the contract.  In the nineteenth century many viewed futures trading as a 
whole to be a legislated form of gambling.248 The prevalence of various attempts to 
corner markets only contributed to the disreputable view of exchange markets.  
William Cronon has suggested, in his examination of the evolution of the futures 
market in grain, that the system of grading wheat paved the way for the development of 
the exchange and trade in grain futures, the classification of grain into various grades 
allowing for an abstraction away from specific bags of wheat to a view of grains as being 
interchangeable – instead of thinking in terms of bushels of wheat, merchants were 
encouraged to think in terms of weight. The shift from volume to weight encouraged a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
248 See Ann Fabian, Card Sharps, Dream Books, and Bucket Shops: Gambling in 19th-century 
America  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
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view of a flow of commodities.249 Of course, one of the obvious problems here is that, 
even with grading, a bale of cotton did not often equal any other bale of cotton. First, 
cotton bales varied in weight, generally totaling between 400-500 lbs per bale. And 
second, these bales could be packed inconsistently, with higher grade cotton packed 
around a lower grade or stained material on the inside. In the end, cotton was not as fluid 
as grain, and because of this was more difficult to combine into one larger mass of a 
standard good. Nevertheless it could be bought and sold in accordance with similar 
market dictates. One of the other factors that worked against the development of futures 
exchange was the British preference for sampling, which delayed the use of grain 
elevators in New York and stalled futures trading in wheat in the Empire City until the 
1870s. The fact is the British preferred sampling to a grading system that treated 
commodities in more general, or abstract terms; this inhibited the flow of goods.  Thus it 
seems partially attributable to the system in place and the Atlantic trade in cotton that a 
futures market was not established earlier.250  
Ultimately though, it may have been factors, and the planters themselves that 
objected to an exchange. Exchange markets are more difficult to fool with random reports 
of frosts and infestations. Planters, aside from receiving many services from factors, were 
able to obtain multiple advances and ask for additional credit and a polling over of their 
accounts. In a more formalized market, these types of accommodations would have been 
very difficult to come by. More importantly, forward and futures contracts would have 
eliminated the consignment business entirely and much of the work of factors as well. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
249 See Cronon, Nature's Metropolis. 118-47. 
 
250 See Albion and Pope, New York Port.  
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Factors had a pronounced interest in maintaining the older system; they derived power, 
profit and prestige from their positions. With forward contracts, and even more so with 
futures contracts the work factors performed in selling the crop and obtaining the best 
price would have rapidly become irrelevant.  
Interestingly, futures contracts and eventually the New York Cotton exchange 
developed quickly after the Civil War with the consolidation of national markets in the 
United States. Kenneth Lipartito argues exactly this point, suggesting that the New York 
exchange developed out of a need to bring greater stability to cotton trading in the 
aftermath of the collapse of the factorage system. Once factors were out of the picture an 
exchange developed quickly. He highlights that that the futures market and the exchange 
did function as tools for organizing and rationalizing cotton markets, much as the grain 
exchange in Chicago did with wheat, and at roughly the same time. It seems apparent that 
the explicit use of futures contracts was possible only after the Civil War, even though an 
exchange for cotton would likely have created much greater economic stability in the 
antebellum United States and calmed markets and financial operations across the Atlantic 
world. An established exchange might also have prevented the exit of larger Anglo-
American houses from the trade in cotton in the 1840s and 1850s. That being said, when 
the exchange was established in the 1870s it contributed to depressed economic growth 
and a distortion in cotton prices that inadequately reflected market conditions. This would 
have created certain chaos in the Atlantic markets of the antebellum period, although few 
would have anticipated wild price fluctuations in advance of creating an exchange, or 
development of a futures market. In the end this type of exchange was seemingly 
impossible to organize prior to the Civil War. The required centralization of economic 
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and political power and collapse of the factorage system would only occur during the 
years of fighting as the Union developed a much more cohesive financial system.251 Had 
it been otherwise the story of King Cotton, and the South might have been radically 
different. As it happened, cotton was losing its allure, even as prices began to rise once 
again. 
Part of their reluctance to move further into the trade was volatility, and this 
volatility was attributable to the lack of any party ever controlling a decisive share of the 
market (exactly the situation an exchange would address through establishing grades and 
regulating the trade).   From 1839-48 the Rothschild London house purchased, on 
average, in excess of 3,000 bales per year. The Paris house purchased much more. From 
1837-48 many larger Anglo-American houses initially became even more thoroughly 
involved in operations in cotton, and they all increased their capital through transactions 
in the article. The California gold rush, commencing in 1848 drew the attention of the 
Rothschild houses, and they established an agency in San Francisco in 1849. They 
continued to purchase cotton but focused more heavily on the purchase of gold bars and 
bullion from 1848 forward. As we have seen, Barings became more active in cotton in 
the 1840s because of the lack of competition, but they purchased cotton on their own 
account and eventually withdrew from the trade later in the 1850s. As has been noted, all 
three firms had backed away from consignments, and by extension, from the political 
concerns of Southern planters. Smaller firms, agents and speculators filled the void they 
left. They had moved on to other opportunities, but the planters had not followed suit, 
although they perceived some need to do things differently. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
251 See Chandler, Visible Hand. 
!146!
In sum, for many Anglo-American firms, their operations in cotton gave them 
knowledge of markets, connections and capital that provided the base for their further 
development and expansion. As has been noted, the Browns transferred the knowledge 
and capital they gained through sales and consignments of cotton into Atlantic exchange 
and credit operations after 1845. Barings in spite of their explicit desire to remain 
generalists became increasingly involved in the marketing of American loans on 
European markets. Their experience in cotton and property banks allowed them to 
determine the relative strength of banks throughout the country. Each firm chose a 
different area of expertise. This was determined by the presence of other firms in the 
market, the unique expertise they gained in their American operations and in what cities 
they had placed agents or opened offices.  
!!!
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Chapter Four: Lessons Learned, and Not Learned, From Cotton: 1848-1861 !
Against a background of increasing sectionalist strife Anglo-American financiers 
moved away from cotton as slaveholding states experienced a deepening rift with their 
free labor contemporaries. By 1848 larger commercial houses had begun to diversify into 
other financial activities, and political parties in the United States seemed increasingly to 
split along regional lines. Some historians have suggested that this rift, or clash of 
disparate economic systems, was what led to the Civil War. This line of thought can be 
traced from Charles and Mary Beard down through the writings of Eugene Genovese and 
eventually through John Ashcroft’s Political Economy of the Antebellum Republic.252 
These arguments have a certain appeal but do not explain how the larger American 
economic system continued to function for so long, and at increasing levels of 
sophistication. Nor do they account for the role finance played in fomenting economic 
discord, as has been demonstrated in the previous chapters.  The fact is slaveholding and 
free labor states worked together to form a larger economic system which functioned well 
and allowed the United States to raise enough surplus capital to fund industrialization and 
give rise to self-sustaining economic growth.253 The credit cotton brought in through !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
252 Charles A. Beard and Mary Ritter Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, One volume ed. 
(New York: Macmillan, 1930). and Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the 
Constitution of the United States  (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1913). Eugene D. 
Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made: Two Essays in Interpretation  (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1969). Genovese, Political Economy of Slavery.,and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese 
and Eugene D. Genovese, Fruits of Merchant Capital: Slavery and Bourgeois Property in the 
Rise and Expansion of Capitalism  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).,John Ashworth, 
Slavery, Capitalism and Politics in the Antebellum Republic, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). Interestingly, George Fitzhugh suggested a similar interpretation of the 
sectional conflict in the 1850s in George Fitzhugh, Sociology for the South; Or, the Failure of 
Free Society  (Richmond: A. Morris, 1854). 
 
253 See North, The Economic Growth of the United States. 
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consignment and outright advances bolstered the economy, stimulating growth. In turn, 
the prominence of cotton as an export article contributed greatly to expansion of the 
American economy through the attraction of foreign capital.  Many histories all too often 
isolate the South and, as we have seen, the South was very much a part of a larger 
Atlantic, and indeed, global economy.254 At the time, cotton planters were concerned with 
free trade, tariffs and, really, the expansion of slavery. They were also preoccupied with 
the workings of international credit and financial markets in ways that their 
manufacturing cousins in the North were not. Their correspondents in the North were 
attentive to the concerns of Southern planters insofar as they affected their political 
decisions and their interactions with slaveholders. To suggest that capitalism and slavery 
were two antithetical forces tearing apart the union ignores the economic and social 
realities of the era. 
 Indeed, much of the Atlantic world was deeply concerned with the fate of slavery 
as an institution, but they were attentive to trade policies and navigations acts as well. 
Their engagement with all of these issues was at heart a concern with prices, exchange 
and the supplies of raw cotton available at any given time.  American manufacturers 
desired to protect native industry and manufacturing concerns from being undercut by 
European goods and workers in the Northeast were increasingly preoccupied with free 
labor ideology.255  Slavery in some ways was a secondary issue in light of what seemed 
to be more pressing matters at the time. And the fact is the institution of slavery might 
have continued had it not been for a lack of resolution on many of these other points, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
254 See Fogel and Engerman, Time on the Cross. Majewski, House Dividing._and Majewski, 
Modernizing a Slave Economy. 
 
255 On free labor ideology see Foner, Free Soil. 
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which drew slavery into the discussions and debates, sometimes indirectly. Without these 
disagreements, or had some resolution been found, the larger integrated American 
economic and financial system might have continued to function, peacefully, profitably 
and as difficult as it might be to conceive of now, for a much longer period of time. The 
fact that many Anglo-American houses had moved away from the trade in cotton and that 
the South was being superseded by the production of goods from the western states made 
all of these other matters more pressing for Southern planters as they experienced a 
diminution of political power and felt increasingly marginalized within the Union. In fact, 
the movement away from cotton, in conjunction with the opening of land and markets in 
the west exerted more pressure on Southern states to secede than many of the direct 
threats to the peculiar institution. 
  Over the course of the 1850s debates around slavery, free trade and tariffs 
intensified both within the United States and across the Atlantic. Increasingly, the cotton 
South seemed eager to free itself from a tangled web of prohibitive national policies and 
hoped to strengthen international trade and financial relationships. The annexation of 
Texas, the Compromise of 1850, refusal on the part of states in the Northeast to honor the 
fugitive slave law and the raid at Harper’s Ferry contributed to a growing sense of 
alienation. This was not imagined: the South was becoming increasingly marginalized, 
lacking the political capital once commanded by cotton. In times past, Southern planters 
or politicians might have leaned on their New York or London correspondents to press a 
point but after 1848 and into the 1850s the power of King Cotton was clearly weakened, 
even though the South was producing and selling more than ever before. What had 
changed? Financiers had moved on to other ventures and threats from the South around 
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cotton did not carry the weight they once did with gold pouring in from California, 
produce arriving from the western states and the interlinking of regional economies 
through railroads and canals.256 Nevertheless, production, and the prices commanded by 
cotton through the 1850s, were impressive. By way of comparison, production in South 
Carolina cotton increased 17.5 percent, while in Georgia it increased 56.5 percent.   In 
Alabama production basically doubled, in Mississippi it more than doubled and in the 
same period in Louisiana it tripled. In this context, prices rose to levels not seen since the 
panic of 1837, but with much greater production. Moving into the Civil War, cotton 
remained the primary export of the nation. It was still incredibly important to the 
American and British economies. The point is it had diminished in importance to many 
New York merchants and Anglo-American financiers; it was no longer vital to an 
Atlantic financial community. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
256 On the increasing interconnectivity of the west with New York see Cronon, Nature's 
metropolis which illustrates the importance of Chicago as a gateway to the west, and really, to the 
east as well. Cronon highlights the importance of the railway in linking these distant economies 
and how the economic needs of New York contributed to the shaping of the west. Philip Foner 
captures very well how this social and economic shift decreased the political and social capital of 
the cotton South in terms of relationships between politicians merchants and planters, see Philip 
Sheldon Foner, Business and Slavery: The New York Merchants and the Irrepressible Conflict  
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941). See also Sven Beckert, The Monied 
Metropolis: New York City and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850-1896  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).  
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Table 3: Cotton production by individual states (in millions of pounds), percentage and 
relative rank 1821-1859 
Bruchey, Cotton and the Growth of the American Economy. 18-20 
 
Throughout the 1850s debates over slavery, free trade and tariffs continued to 
rage and grew increasingly impassioned. Cotton planters felt increasingly isolated but 
still believed they had great importance nationally through the production of cotton and 
the revenue generated from sales. On the basis of production and prices this viewpoint is 
understandable. Also, since cotton was still the most important export of the United 
States this was arguably true. It would have seemed that Southern cotton was still of 
immense importance to England as well since imports rose to their highest levels of the 
antebellum period. Nevertheless Northern anger and frustration over the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, the Lecompton Constitution and the Dred Scott decision left some feeling 
the country had become the toy of a heavy handed slave power that dictated national 
policy and commanded more political power than was equitable, both on the basis of the 
Table 5.2  Cotton Production by Individual States (in millions of pounds), Percentage, and 
Relative Rank, 1821- 1859  
 
State 1821 1826 1833 1834 1839 1849 1859  
South 
Carolina 
50.0 
28.2% 
(1) 
70.0 
21.2% 
(2) 
73.0 
16.7% 
(2) 
65.5 
14.3% 
(4) 
61.7 
7.8% 
(5) 
120.0 
12.2% 
(4) 
141.0 
6.9% 
(7) 
Georgia 
 
45.0 
25.4% 
(2) 
75.0 
22.7% 
(1) 
88.0 
20.0% 
(1) 
75.0 
16.4% 
(3) 
163.4 
20.7% 
(2) 
199.6 
20.2% 
(2) 
312.3 
15.4% 
(3) 
Alabama 
 
20.0 
11.3% 
(3) 
45.0 
13.6% 
(3) 
65.0 
14.8% 
(4) 
85.0 
18.6% 
(1)  
117.1 
14.8% 
(4) 
225.8 
22.9% 
(1) 
440.5 
21.7% 
(2) 
Mississippi  
 
10.0 
5.7% 
(5) 
20.0 
6.0% 
(6) 
70.0 
15.9% 
(3) 
85.0 
18.6% 
(1) 
193.2 
24.3% 
(1) 
194.0 
19.7% 
(3) 
535.1 
26.4% 
(1) 
Louisiana  
 
10.0 
5.7% 
(5) 
38.0 
11.5% 
(4) 
55.0 
12.5% 
(5) 
62.0 
13.5% 
(5) 
153.9 
19.5% 
(3) 
71.5 
7.2% 
(6) 
311.0 
15.4% 
(4) 
Source) Bruchey, Cotton and the Growth of the American Economy, 18-20 
 
    Although Natchez and other cities such as Vicksburg and Columbus developed into market 
towns, their population remained low, and in Mississippi, only Natchez surpassed 5,000 
inhabitants during the antebellum era. Cities in Mississippi never grew out of the shadow of 
the dominating influence of the commercial city of New Orleans, despite the fact that the city 
was founded later than Natchez. Commission merchants from all trading parties gathered in 
New Orleans and lucrative businesses flourished. Flatboats and keelboats up to the 1820s, 
and steamboats thereafter provided easy access to the Crescent City from upper Mississippi, 
which led necessary financial and business activities to center there, and not beyond.14  
The founding of Louisiana in particular shoul  be consid red in the context f imperial 
co petition amo g France, Great Britain and S ain. These nations strived to main ain their 
imperial power and territorial security often by maneuvering the surrounding Indian nations 
                                                  
14 For details on the development of the cities in Mississippi, see Moore, Ibid.,204-31. 
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economic power of cotton as well as the three-fifths compromise. Yes, cotton did 
generate revenue and it was still the primary export but gold, grain and commodities from 
the West were becoming increasingly important as well.  
The mutual jealousies, recriminations and regional sentiments of ill will grew and 
the South became increasingly convinced of the rapacity of the North, seeing Northerners 
as taking an unfair amount of profit from the cotton trade and ignoring the many political 
advantages that had been conferred upon cotton planting interests over decades. Part of 
the problem, of course, was that many of these victories had sown the seeds of later 
discontent and sectional conflict around issues like slavery, the fate of western lands and, 
vitally, the location of a transcontinental railroad that would provide a national link and a 
valuable bit of infrastructure the South realized they desperately needed. In a part of the 
country bereft of much development the issue of the railroad took on increasing 
importance. In this way, one project that could have served as a basis for rapprochement 
between the two regions and their disparate interests became yet another divisive irritant. 
Southern slaveholders increasingly looked to a world beyond American borders for 
solutions. They aggressively sought ways to increase their trade in international markets 
and correspondingly stridently sought to benefit from any legislation passed on the 
federal level. They worked assiduously to ensure that their interests in the open and 
unsettled West were protected, seeing a chance to claim a greater stake in the American 
political and economic landscape as a way to ensure the legacy of slavery. This was not 
an issue of mere paternalism: slavery was big business and the price of slaves had shot up 
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in the 1850s, to the point that many planters, for complex reasons, also advocated the re-
opening of the African trade.257  
When the Kansas-Nebraska Act was ratified and the Missouri Compromise 
repealed, the former territories of the Louisiana Purchase were opened to slavery. The 
measure was widely perceived as another major victory for pro-slavery interests. Stephen 
Douglas, the chief author of the legislation, viewed it as necessary to encourage the 
settling of the plains and allow for the construction of a transcontinental railroad that 
would unite the Pacific, the Plains and the Northeast. Contrary to expectations, the issue 
of the railroad and of popular sovereignty resulted in the release of yet more rancor and 
fury as North and South locked into increasingly ossified and acrimonious positions. In 
the end Southern cotton planters saw themselves as being victimized time and again, 
estranged from Western farmers, the working class men of the North and Northern 
manufacturers as well. Their hopes for, and orientation towards, increased international 
trade resulted in passionate and intense opposition to tariffs of any kind that inevitably 
irritated Northern manufacturers. In the same way, Southern opposition to the Navigation 
Acts authored by their own John Forsyth drove a wedge between Northern merchants and 
Southern planters. In this way, two potential alliances were lost. Arguments around the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act and strategic disagreements around homesteading throughout the 
Midwest created more divisiveness. Although a regional identity based in alienation and 
resentment towards Northern interests was indeed forming, secession was not in any way 
inevitable at this juncture.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
257 On the re-opening of the African trade and an increasingly extra-national orientation for 
Southern cotton planters see Johnson, River of Dark Dreams. 
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To understand the politics of Southern resistance to these two Acts it is vital to 
view the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the Homesteading Act within the context of one 
another. On the face of it, the Kansas-Nebraska Act seemed like an unalloyed victory for 
the South. Allowing slavery to be decided by individual states potentially permitted the 
expansion of slavery into the western territories, and made potential homesteaders into 
potential slaveholders and constituents of the cotton South as well. The problem, it 
seems, was that the lots were too small to be conducive to the development of plantation 
slavery.258 These were parcels for small yeoman farmers to make a stake. In a coldly 
calculating way Southern cotton planters saw that homesteading would not support their 
own strategic interests. In a vote on homesteading policy in 1854 all the representatives 
from South Carolina and Georgia, two states deeply involved in cotton production, 
opposed the homesteading policy. They did so in 1852 as well. By 1859, all but one 
Southern democrat opposed the measure, a bill that would ensure the settlement of 
Northern yeoman and immigrants. It is very clear that their opposition was based on the 
fact that these constituencies would not create pro-slavery institutions, or states. Their 
patterns of settlement could not possibly revolve around plantation agriculture, cotton or 
slavery given the way parcels of land had been allotted. With lots parceled out in 160-
acre increments these areas would be settled by small-scale farmers. The Republican 
Party likely saw this, as well as how homesteading supported free labor ideology. In 
1860, every Southern democrat opposed the measure, and every Republican supported it. 
Votes around this issue demonstrate clearly the nature of the schism, and the 
development of distinct regional identities that came into conflict over issues seemingly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
258 See Schoen, Fragile Fabric of Union. On lot size and the importance of land sales to the 
expansion of slavery see Johnson, River of Dark Dreams.ch. 3.  
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unrelated to slavery, cotton or trade. In the process political parties were torn asunder 
along regional lines, subverting national party identification in favor of regional 
affiliation. What Southern cotton planters saw in the end was that because of the nature of 
the type of settlement being encouraged slavery would not spread by popular mandate – 
the vote wasn’t truly open. On top of that because of the population imbalances in the 
South (lots of slaves, and few planters) the Northern states were growing much more 
quickly, and moving more people into unsettled areas. The South was at a stalemate. 
Against this backdrop of national tensions and acrimonious national engagement, 
cotton prices began to increase once more after 1848, reaching levels last seen before the 
crash of 1837, and these prices held, even through the panic of 1857.259 Demand for 
cotton accelerated and with the exception of the 1855 and 1856 seasons, the South simply 
could not keep up through the remainder of the antebellum period. Additionally, the 
United States had maintained its market share and continued to supply 80-85 percent of 
the raw cotton used in Britain’s textile manufacturing. At this juncture an increase in 
textile manufacturing in Germany and France put increased pressure on the available 
American supply.260 In turn, this motivated Southern planters to find more land to 
cultivate, and to buy more slaves in order to plant more cotton – the familiar refrain of the 
nineteenth-century South. The irony was that while embroiled in so much conflict within 
the Union, outside of the United States the cotton South had never been doing better, and 
planter optimism rose along with cotton prices. The British embrace of free trade 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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260 See Albion and Pope, New York Port., Appendix viii. 80 shiploads of US cotton left Southern 
ports for France in by 1860. 
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combined with a boom in production, prices and demand encouraged planter hopes of 
opening direct trade with British and European merchant bankers and ports in the lower 
South. These planters hoped for a break in what John Forsyth labeled the ‘chain of 
commercial thralldom; that tied the South to New York.261 Southern planters tied the 
potential inherent in the development of these transatlantic relationships to regional 
growth and the development of infrastructure throughout the cotton belt. Direct, and truly 
free trade, it was believed, would provide enough capital to develop Southern industrial 
resources.262  
!
Figure 3: Cotton prices in New York (cents) per pound !
Bruchey, Cotton and American Economic Growth, 15.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
261 DeBow’s Review XVII 593-599. See also Schoen, "Fragile Fabric (Ph.D. thesis).", 311. This 
chain was also noted by later historians, like Albion, who tied it to economic necessity, 
highlighting New York’s role as a nineteenth-century financial center. This is a point that is 
reinforced in Foner, Business & Slavery.as well.  
 
262 See W. W. Boyce “Direct Taxation and Free Trade” DeBow’s Review 25:1 (July 1858), p 23.  
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all sides, failures are taking place daily and before the season closes it is predicted that there 
will be general bankruptcy, every hous  in the city is more or less suspected.”51 Dupuy, Tate 
& Nalle received 50 bales of cotton from Philip Burris’s Brushy Bayou plantation in January 
1842, but wrote that “times look gloomy in the extreme, and some say worse than they were 
at the corresponding period in 1837.” After examining samples of their cotton, they judged 
that some had “undergone some process which has coloured it too highly, almost amounting 
to stain,” in which the brokers judged it was the result of “the heat in the gin house, and the 
smell of it goes somewhat to confirm the opinion.”52  
Under such circumstances, Dupuy, Tate & Nalle advised Ballard to use up the credit 
Ballard had on their account since there was “terrible confusion among the banks and we 
                                                  
51 Dupuy, Tate and Nalle to Ballard, 12 February 1842, folder 46, Ballard Papers.  
 
52 Dupuy, Tate and Nalle to Ballard, 26 January 1842, folder 44, Ballard Papers.   
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Figure 4: Cotton prices at Liverpool, 1800-1859, pence per pound 
 
Bruchey, Cotton and American Economic Growth, 15. 
 
Of course, international events likely played a role in this efflorescence as well. 
The revolutionary fervor of 1848 made the United States attractive once again to 
European merchants and bankers, many of whom invested in banks throughout the 
American South seeing American investment as a safe haven, protected from the social 
upheaval of Europe. The growth of cotton and the expansion of slavery and cotton 
planting in the United States is in fact an Atlantic and global story and part of that has to 
do with capital flows and the perceived stability of investment. Often when there was 
financial expansion in the South, foreign capital was present as well. For example, in 
1853 foreign investors provided 2.5 percent of the capitalization of banks nationally 
across the United States. However, in Alabama, foreign investment accounted for 27.3 
percent of capitalization, and in Louisiana 27.9 percent of bank capitalization came from 
pushed cotton prices downward and financial intermediaries were wary of taking on high 
risks as they did earlier. In addition to the notion that much of southern cotton wealth was 
absorbed by northern merchants and shipping interests, abolition and free soil principles were 
making headway into the national scene, which southerners felt increasingly threatened about 
because of their aggression. Some merchant houses were deeply affected by the declining 
prices (fig.5.2, 5.3). Ballard’s plantations were producing cotton as early as 1838, and in the 
following year another panic hit the region. In 1839, the New York price for “middling” 
upland cotton was 8.92 cents, more than a 33% decline from the 13.36 cents in 1838. The 
price at Liverpool declined from 7.19 pence to 5.42 pence. The 1841-42 season was even 
worse with 7.85 cents in New York and 4.86 pence in Liverpool, which caused Ballard’s 
factors to report “a general panic” among the houses in New Orleans, that “there seems to be 
great distrust and want of confidence on  
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foreign sources, most notably the Barings investment in planter banks, and the Rothschild 
controlling interest in the New Orleans canal bank.263 These investments were a legacy of 
the political instability of 1848. As in the period from 1826 forward, European investors 
were happy to productively deploy their capital in the American South, but sought more 
guarantees of security than in the 1820s. These houses saw banks as a more solid form of 
investment than so many of the state municipal bonds that were forfeit in 1841.  The 
fortunes of the lower South leaned heavily on foreign capital, a point that became 
painfully obvious with the outbreak of the Civil War but that was evident even much 
earlier.  
At this point, many larger Anglo-American financiers were wrapping up their 
departure from the cotton trade. As mentioned previously, by this point the Browns had 
already moved decisively away from consignments, opting instead to focus on letters of 
credit, currency exchange and the operation of the Collins steamship lines. In 1845, the 
Liverpool branch’s commission revenues on cotton consignments totaled $53,000. By 
1852 these revenues had dropped to around $5,000, a reduction of over 90 percent.  Other 
firms in the industry adopted the Browns’ system of making consignments during the 
1840s and took up a good deal of the consignment business they left behind. Through 
their operations in cotton, both purchasing and making consignments they developed an 
expertise in the handling of letters of credit and bills of exchange, a business they came to 
dominate after 1845 as they had the consignment business earlier. With the Browns, their 
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263 See table 3 “report of the Secretary of the Treasury in Answer to a Resolution of the Senate 
Calling for the Amount of American securities held in Europe and other Foreign Countries, on the 
30 June 1853” reproduced in Mira Wilkins, The History of Foreign Investment in the United 
States to 1914  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).  See also P. L. Cottrell, British 
Overseas Investment in the Nineteenth Century  (London: Macmillan, 1975)., 19-25. 
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involvement in a commodity produced for a commercial market with slave labor in the 
antebellum South enabled their transition into a business focused exclusively on banking 
and finance that ranged far away from slavery and the concerns of cotton planters by the 
close of the antebellum era.  
By 1850, fifteen years after the Browns’ decisive shift into financial services, they 
controlled nearly 50 percent of the letters of credit market, which in turn constituted more 
than a third of America’s foreign exchange.264 In concrete terms, this meant that they 
were responsible for $25,500,000 of a trade totaling $344,586,000, or about eight percent 
(although some estimates place their influence even higher, at around ten percent).265 
Their closest competitor, Barings, did less than half that business.266  The combined 
influence of the two firms was so powerful though that the Browns felt confident that, 
‘[w]hatever we & the Barings think proper for the American trade, we can force the 
thing.’267 At the same time, the Browns’ revenue from cotton commissions had dropped 
from sixty thousand dollars a year in 1835 to just under twenty thousand in 1850.268 But 
the fact is, they did not miss it.  
All this being said, the Rothschild congeries of houses also profited from their 
involvement with cotton both in terms of lessons learned and profits earned. Although 
they never came close to controlling the trade in cotton or discount paper, Belmont and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
264 Perkins, Financing Anglo-American Trade., 114-6. 
 
265 North, Economic growth. table C-VIII. 
 
266 Hidy, House of Baring., 469. 
 
267 Brown Brothers & Company New York to T. Curtis, February 3, 1858, NYHS. 
 
268 Brown Shipley & Company to Brown Bros. & Co. , Sept 25, 1851, NYHS. 
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both houses also engaged in lucrative arbitrage transactions.269  Most vitally, they made 
good use of the knowledge and skills they gained in the American South to decisively 
enter the trade in gold in California. From their experience in Southern markets and years 
spent chasing the Browns, Belmont and the Rothschilds realized there was a distinct 
advantage in establishing a strong and decisive presence in regional markets early, 
running both shipping and much of their bill discounting through New York and then on 
to London and Paris. The firm found that having trusted and exclusive agents in both 
locations conferred an additional advantage. Given the volatility of Southern markets and 
the shift in political winds, avoiding involvement with plantation slavery looked 
increasingly attractive as well. They also aggressively employed a policy of vertical 
integration, controlling as many factors in the gold business as was feasible.  Another 
lesson learned from cotton, conferring much greater control over every element of the 
process.270 A brief examination of their operations in gold demonstrates how they applied 
their knowledge of American markets to better effect in California. 
The Rothschilds established an agency in San Francisco in August 1849 under the 
direction of their cousin, Benjamin Davidson. Davidson had traveled to California from 
St. Petersburg to oversee the operation of this new agency and explore the emergent 
business possibilities in California.  In one of his initial letters Davidson described the 
great profits to be made both in the purchase of gold and gold dust as well as in the 
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269 As John Killick has noted, no firm ever controlled more than 15 percent of this trade. See 
Killick, “The Cotton Operations of Alexander Brown and Sons.” 
 
270 On the idea of vertical integration see Chandler, Visible Hand. 
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discounting of bills.271  Although much of this was new to Davidson, the Rothschild 
houses recognized a familiar tune. Against their wishes Davidson purchased a building 
and a lot of property in the city shortly after his arrival (the discordant notes had a 
familiar sting as well). Nevertheless he was given a line of credit by the London house 
and was also authorized to draw on Belmont when necessary. He worked with him to 
coordinate the shipping of gold and discounting of bills from San Francisco to New York 
and then on to London.  
Davidson’s agency was one of the few well-capitalized firms in California, 
leaving him well positioned to operate decisively. He developed a reputation for paying 
cash and always having enough money to hand to complete purchases of gold.  
Additionally, his coordination with Belmont gave him access to news and information 
from New York and Washington DC. This system worked well for both houses and 
allowed them to import more gold than any other European house in this period, as 
Belmont noted: ‘ever since the Calif gold has been discovered I have myself alone from 
year to year shipped more than one half the gold exported to Europe, that is to say my 
shipments amounted to little more every year than those of all the other houses combined. 
…as a mere matter of arbitrage there is not a house in England connected with the 
American trade who here for the last eight years received one fifth of the gold which I 
shipped to you, not including my shipments to your Paris house.’ 272 The Rothschilds 
may not have been able to wrap up the trade in cotton, but they handily controlled the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
271 Benjamin Davidson, San Francisco, to N. M. Rothschild & Sons, London, September 12, 
1849, XI/38/81, RAL. 
 
272 August Belmont, New York, to N. M. Rothschild & Sons, London, November 20, 1857, 
XI/62/7A, RAL. 
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flow of gold out of California. The strategic advantage they had from their monopoly 
over Spanish quicksilver made extensive involvement with gold that much more 
appealing. 
For over three hundred years the mines of Almadén in Spain had played a vital if 
indirect role in the European economy. Mercury, or quicksilver, was used to extract 
metals from gold and silver ore and had been used in various mining processes. 
Traditionally the mines of Almadén had been leased to various banks, most famously, the 
Fuggers.273 In 1834 Lionel de Rothschild, Nathan’s son, was sent to Madrid to receive 
payment on a loan, and bid for the lease while he was there. He outbid four rivals and 
secured the mines.274 This placed the Rothschilds in a very advantageous position both 
with the Spanish monarchy and within the business community. The importance of this 
lease increased in 1849, with the discovery of gold in California.  Mercury had also been 
used to refine gold and proved to be especially useful in variations on hydraulic mining 
of gold and silver, which became increasingly common in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. The mercury helped the gold or silver flow through the water and 
gravel mixture which allowed the precious metal to be extracted more quickly, as well as 
efficiently since the gold or silver would also form an amalgam with the mercury thereby 
increasing recovery rates of smaller amounts of flakes.275 Incredibly, the Almadén mines 
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274 This is discussed in the context of Rothschild international interests in Ferguson, "The Family 
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275 The fact that an estimated 45,000 metric tones of mercury were used California for placer 
mining have never been recovered is testament to the profitability of this trade as well as the 
environmental devastation that often followed in the wake of mining operations in the nineteenth 
!163!
account for the largest quantity of liquid mercury produced in the world. Over the past 
2,000 years over 250,000 tons of liquid mercury have been pulled from the earth at the 
site. Rothschild administration of these mines gave the family a virtual monopoly on 
mercury production and they sold flasks of quicksilver to a global market throughout the 
nineteenth century. When the New Almadén mercury deposit was discovered in 
California the Rothschilds gave serious consideration to buying the site and building the 
mine but in the end backed away from the opportunity. As it was, a mine that was 
established there in the late 1850s provided much of the mercury used in the placer 
mining processes that became prevalent at the same time. Had the family gained control 
of this mine in addition to the one in Spain they would have dominated the trade in 
mercury globally as well as gold production in California. Interest in this mine and gold 
production presented a decisive shift away from other American interests and resulted in 
a rebalancing of priorities and people working for the respective houses in the United 
States.  
In 1849 Alphonse de Rothschild, the son of James, visited the United States, 
traveling to New York and Louisiana. It is abundantly clear from Betty de Rothschild’s 
letters to her son during his sojourn that the establishment of an American house in New 
York was a topic of discussion between Alphonse, his parents and the London house. At 
various points she suggests the entire family might leave the strife of Europe behind for a 
new life in the New World.  She mentions various schemes, claiming at one point, ‘I 
would not want to abandon the plan to see one of you established in America for anything 
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century. See C. N. Alpers et al., "Mercury Contamination From Historical Gold Mining in 
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in the world, and deliver this great future from the stupidity and greed of an agent.’276 
Betty proved herself particularly aware of Belmont’s status in American society and his 
value to the firm, even though she considered him untrustworthy and incorrigible.277 The 
younger Rothschild sacked J. N. Hanau, their New Orleans broker, during his sojourn in 
the South. Belmont narrowly averted a similar fate, although he himself feared he would 
lose all that he had built for himself in the United States.278  Belmont was fortunate - his 
social status and political capital made him difficult to remove, a point begrudgingly 
noted by Betty de Rothschild at the time: ‘B. has created for himself a strong and 
independent position,’ she noted, discussing his status in New York, and power in the 
Democratic party, concluding, ‘all that makes him an important man these days.’279 At 
this juncture, the Rothschilds realized they had a unique opportunity in America, one 
certainly as precious as the one Belmont spied for himself in 1837. They also surmised 
that, at least for the time being, their fortunes were entwined with his. The gold rush in 
California offered the potential of immediate profit for those positioned to act. After 
years of running behind the Browns chasing bits of cotton and trying to wrest away a part 
of the trade in discount bills they opted instead to gain the upper hand in an emerging 
market in California forgoing the establishment of a Rothschild house in New York for 
the time being.  
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Davidson’s operations in San Francisco expanded and in 1850 Johannes May was 
dispatched from the Frankfurt house to assist him in running the firm and, perhaps, to 
keep him in line as well. In 1851 May was made a partner and shipments of gold 
increased. This proved to be of particular benefit to the London house, which acquired 
the lease on the Royal Mint Refinery in 1852, allowing them to refine gold independently 
and mint bars in London. This movement into refining and processing was one that the 
firm did not consider with either tobacco or cotton but that proved immensely profitable 
with gold. The lease on the refinery allowed them to ride the wave of heightened levels of 
gold production through the nineteenth century, capitalizing on discoveries in California, 
as well as Australia and, later, South Africa.280 
In the 1850s England was receiving around 616 million pounds of cotton annually 
from the United States. The majority of this cotton was sent to Liverpool. In 1853, the 
New York correspondent of R. G. Dun remarked that Brown Brothers was, ‘… the 
richest house doing business in America and reported to be worth as a firm about twelve 
or fourteen million dollars.’281 This fortune was amassed in large measure through the 
trade in cotton and bills of exchange generated from the triangular trade in agricultural 
commodities produced with slave labor. Additionally, the Brown Brothers, in a very 
competitive Southern cotton market, for many years dominated the trade from 
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Charleston, Savannah, Mobile and New Orleans.282 Obviously, this trade linked the 
Northern and by extension Southern United States to a larger Atlantic network of credit 
and manufacturing. When the Browns moved into exchange and discounting bills they 
exerted dominance in that field, but by the 1850s the Southern states accounted for less 
and less business. In the years preceding the Civil War the purchase of sterling bills was 
basically the only activity that occupied their Southern offices. The profits from what was 
in essence a seasonal business seemed insufficient to justify the amount of time required 
to maintain the different branches. When war broke out the Northern offices were 
compelled to limit their bill sales to the corresponding volume of Northern purchases, a 
move that had been suggested by the Liverpool partners Collet and Hamilton, in previous 
years.283 They had determined that less reliance on Southern purchase was one possible 
remedy for declining profits in the bill business, and it seems quite likely the Browns 
would have moved out of Southern markets entirely regardless of the Civil War. For 
them, all operations in the South had become nothing more than a liability.284 
In the 1850s Barings alone of the larger financial houses remained involved in 
cotton and continued to evince a preference for purchases of cotton instead of offering 
advances on the article.285 It is not that Baring Brothers perceived any less risk in holding 
the article, or had necessarily gained greater confidence in the market. Barings and others !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
282 See Beckert, "Emancipation and Empire."; ibid. For a description of the exchange activities of 
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certainly realized that the actual risk of ownership was not that much greater but the 
profits in ownership were far higher than the 2.5 - 4 percent commission for handling the 
sale to a third party. The move towards outright purchases was therefore a smart one and 
their timing was good in this regard. On the cotton they purchased they enjoyed good 
returns.  Nevertheless, this shift by most firms towards purchasing cotton on their own 
account has been suggested as one explanation for the Browns’ abandonment of the trade, 
and it may have influenced Barings as well. In addition to their other activities they 
became increasingly involved in the offering of American securities on European 
markets, putting their knowledge of the United States financial system to very good use 
while also stepping away from the trade in cotton. The firm also worked to intentionally 
avoid the narrow specialization they saw other houses embracing. They thought the 
diversity of their activities was an asset, although they were moving, unconsciously it 
seems, towards a specialization in American securities, and the marketing of American 
loans in Europe.286 
But as larger Anglo-American houses preferred less volatile ventures there were 
always more smaller traders, factors and agents happy to move into the vacuum. The 
Leverich brothers with their family network of traders spread through the South and New 
York picked up part of the trade. The Lizardi also briefly tried their hand at cotton. 
George Peabody entered the fray in cotton and bills of exchange in the 1850s but soon 
found the volatility too much of a challenge. What the majority of these traders 
discovered was what the larger houses had found in the 1840s – cotton might be booming 
but few in the finance business were making very large profits, in part because of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
286 On avoiding specialization see Hidy, House of Baring. chs 11, 13 and 14. See also Austin, 
Baring Brothers. 
!168!
bloated advances still demanded by planters. The fact that there were simply too many 
players in the game from one year to the next only compounded the problem. In flush 
years more traders and many operators with little experience contributed to increased 
volatility. The heady profits to be made in cotton were made much earlier in the 
nineteenth century, yet green investors would enter markets again and again. Since no 
house was ever able to get a decisive handle on cotton for one year, let alone a string of 
trading seasons, the market was easily swayed by ignorant and impetuous trading that 
often resulted in ruin for the foolhardy agent or factor and contributed to instability in the 
larger market as well. For larger houses that could operate in different areas, more than 
occasional investment in the article was not worthwhile.  Cotton remained important in 
the American economy generally right up to the Civil War, but in the steps of these larger 
houses away from the article it is clear that cotton interests no longer had the political 
sway they once did.287 In the end, it can be argued that this was an important factor in 
precipitating secession and eventual armed conflict: the South had lost a good deal of 
power because the dynamics of trade had little appeal to larger merchants and financial 
houses.  
In 1855 David Christy, in his Cotton is King, made a point about slavery that 
shamed many of his contemporaries and has escaped many historians. He noted that 
‘slavery is not an isolated system, but is so mingled with the business of the world, that it 
derives facilities from the most innocent transactions.’288 These transactions, varied as 
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they were, might involve bills of exchange, the discounting of bills by London 
commercial houses such as Overend and Gurney, Brown Brothers or the Bank of 
England. It has been said that ‘cotton catapulted the United States onto the center stage of 
the world economy’ and that was obviously the case.289 In the late 1850s America 
supplied about 70 million pounds of cotton to the German Zollverein, 90 millions pounds 
to Russia, 190 pounds to France. These quantities met more than 90 percent of demand in 
these countries.290 The majority of this cotton was sent to Liverpool. Obviously, this trade 
linked the Northern and, by extension, Southern United States to a larger Atlantic 
network of finance, production and manufacturing. Although all regions derived benefit 
from the arrangement, the South was dependent at this point on obtaining credit and 
selling their cotton in an international market. The South was also dependent on imports 
both from the North as well as Europe.  
 In the antebellum period it seemed almost everything in one way or another 
ended up linked to cotton, and by extension, to slavery, a point that did not escape 
Christy. ‘Capital and labor, in Europe and America, are largely employed in the 
manufacture of cotton. These goods, to a great extent, may be seen freighting every 
vessel…that traverses the seas of the globe, and filling the warehouses and shelves of the 
merchants over two-thirds of the world.’291 Christy could only conclude that cotton was 
king, and that the labor regime and credit mechanisms that enabled and supported the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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cotton empire would continue to do so, as did most involved in cotton planting and 
cultivation in the nineteenth-century United States, those involved in the manufacture of 
textiles in the English Midlands and mills across Europe. Yet, as we have seen, it was not 
only the Rothschilds that had different views of cotton. Trade in cotton was volatile and 
the entire operation was credit dependent to a degree that left most bankers squeamish. 
With no regulation of cotton markets they were wild, prone to extreme sways in pricing 
and the whims of the most ignorant of traders. So, although many planters and more than 
a few business leaders outside the cotton belt may have remained exuberant regarding 
cotton, the economic terrain of the United States had changed. Cotton had been 
unceremoniously dethroned and slaveholding states lost much of their political might in 
the process. Additionally, these slave holding states seemed unaware of their own 
vulnerabilities in terms of finance as well as a lack of development of regional 
manufacturing or industry.  
Nevertheless, planter response to increasing marginalization within the United 
States was to look beyond the borders of the United States to expand slavery, cotton 
interests and their own influence. In the 1850s, many planters in the Deep South had 
begun to agitate for the reopening of the African slave trade, and some harbored imperial 
aspirations viewing both Cuba and Nicaragua as potential sites to facilitate the 
development of the re-opening of the trade as well as facilitating agricultural production 
and direct trade with European nations.  James D. B. DeBow, in his DeBow’s Review, 
came out in favor of this idea. The reopening, the logic ran, would not only provide 
needed slaves, but also strengthen the political power of the South. With the skyrocketing 
price of slaves in the market marching in lock step with rises in the price of cotton, 
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African importation would help to reduce costs, allowing more people to become slave 
owners, thus increasing the appeal of the peculiar institution. Additionally, slave sales 
would give the economy an added boost.  Not surprisingly, Virginia was furiously 
opposed to the idea. In earlier decades Virginians had held a positive view of the 
westward diffusion of proslavery views but by the 1850s it became clear that reducing 
profits from the domestic slave trade, one of their most important revenue streams, and 
decreasing the value of the negroes still owned by planters, was economically damaging 
to the state. One report estimated that reopening the African trade and importing slaves 
would reduce the value of slaves by half, and postulated that the loss of people’s interest 
in raising and keeping slaves as a valuable investment could lead to social unrest. In the 
end, the African trade did not resume, but the debate demonstrated how the South 
attempted to pursue every possible avenue to bolster and expand the system of slavery, 
even at the risk of weakening solidarity among Southern states, and possibly angering 
their European trading partners.292 
The increasingly contentious struggles around slavery, free trade, tariffs and 
homesteading can be read as intimations of a nation divided. Southern planters seemed to 
believe that the institution of slavery and issues of trade were under less threat in an 
international arena than from fellow states in the Union, a far cry from the views of 
Southern planters at the tail end of the American Revolution. Compromises and 
conciliatory gestures looked very different amidst the modern glare of international !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
292 Deyle, Carry Me Back., 78-84. The domestic slave trade was so central to Virginia’s economy 
that the state refused to join the Confederacy if the African slave trade was reopened. See Ronald 
T. Takaki, A Pro-Slavery Crusade: The Agitation to Reopen the African Slave Trade  (New York: 
Free Press, 1971)., 232-43. 
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finance for both North and South. With John Brown’s attack on Harper’s Ferry it seemed 
the threats to the Southern way of life would only increase. Granted, British sentiments 
toward abolition were worrisome to Southerners but they felt assured by the fact that 
Britain remained deeply reliant on Southern cotton, and respectful of the institution’s 
existence on American soil, as was demonstrated by the Negro Seamen’s Acts of the 
1850s. Southern planters seemed to feel that the British respected slavery. In truth, 
shippers likely went along to simply load their cargoes and be on their way.  It is true the 
cotton trade had reached dizzying heights, but with yet another set of players, and these 
were mainly smaller traders once again. Southerners were confident that Britain and 
France would come to their aid if need be based on their dependency on cotton. What 
Southerners seem not to have noticed is that Northern merchants and British financiers 
had moved on to other ventures. Granted, there was still a seemingly insatiable demand 
for the crop but not from major financial houses or larger merchants. New York traders 
were increasingly involved in commercial activities in the West and Anglo-American 
financiers had diversified into other areas of business. The Rothschilds had their gold, the 
Browns shipping and financial services and the Barings were back in securities.  
The lack of appeal of cotton at this juncture is captured well by Belmont writing 
after the election of Lincoln: ‘Cotton is dull at present prices which must pay a handsome 
profit in Liverpool during the coming spring + summer. I wish you would feel induced to 
buy 5-10000 bales at present rates … Should political events become still more 
complicated … then serious fears must necessarily be entertained for next year’s crop 
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which would of course raise the price of the raw material in Europe.’293 Of course, 
neither house acted on this offer, and Belmont chastised them for passing on the 
opportunity. At this point it was a familiar refrain to all the larger houses: you might 
make money but it was just as likely any house might end up storing large and unwieldy 
bales of highly flammable and remarkably delicate cotton, or selling at a loss. Other areas 
of investment were simply more attractive.  
In sum, although economic tides had shifted, Southern planters, it seemed, still 
felt their own future was assured. With the admittance of Texas as a slave state in 1845 
and the sustained rise in slave prices it looked for a brief moment as if cotton would 
remain king. In some ways Southern planters seemed justified in their optimistic pursuit 
of a free trade policy for cotton, and no federal measure or territorial development 
seemed a major setback for the expansion of the slave trade or the American empire of 
cotton. Nobody could disagree with David Christy’s claim that ‘mankind (was) better 
clothed; their comfort better promoted; general industry more highly stimulated; 
commerce more widely extended; and civilization more rapidly advanced than in any 
preceding age.’294 Cotton had proved to be a wonder material that improved lives, 
stimulated global commerce and interconnectivity, accelerated industrial and 
technological development, created employment and even made people look more 
fashionable. That being said, cotton planting and insatiable greed had also contributed to 
environmental destruction, forced migrations, the enslavement of Africans, Indian 
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removal and the perpetuation of a regime of forced labor in the South that caused 
distortions on social arrangements in the United States.  Further the industry contributed 
to the relocation of families to mill towns throughout Lancashire and Yorkshire, and 
fomented the development of class-based strife, social unrest and the disruption of family 
life in Lancashire, which continued to develop unchecked throughout the nineteenth 
century.295   
Regardless of the advances, and in cruel indifference to the destruction of the 
cotton regime of the South, the tides of finance had shifted and Southerners had not noted 
the change in direction. The end result, with the election of Lincoln in 1860, was 
something unimaginable previously: the threat of secession, one that might have carried 
more weight had it come in 1848. Those twelve years made a very large difference. South 
Carolina’s threats of secession did not elicit the response they expected, so Southern 
states began to leave the Union.  The newly formed Confederacy found itself adrift in a 
world no longer so committed to cotton, toleration of slavery or willing to risk potential 
war with the Union in order to have access to the material. Larger Anglo-American firms 
and British commercial houses learned the ways of American markets. The merchants 
and bankers had decisively moved on to other, more profitable, as well as 
characteristically modern avenues of activity. The Rothschilds, like the Barings and 
Browns, moved away from cotton and into more lucrative exchange markets, selling 
specie, making arbitrage trades, operating in gold and behaving much more like modern 
investment bankers. This shift in activities was not a conscious choice. Nor was it 
immediately apparent. It was governed by the availability of opportunity and can be seen !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
295 Married Women in Factories,” Contemporary Review, 1882.  
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in retrospect in changing patterns of investment and specialization. At its root lay changes 
in the American economy and the incorporation of the American West into larger 
American markets and institutions. In these shifts lie also some of the roots of the Civil 
War.  
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Chapter Five: The Great Unraveling  !
For many observers it was difficult to imagine that Abraham Lincoln, a candidate 
with no support in slave holding states, would carry the election of 1860. Yet a split in 
the Democratic Party made the unimaginable a distinct possibility as Election Day drew 
near. The results were especially surprising given the advantages the South had in the 
electoral college and the fact that political divisions had grown distinctively more 
regional in character in the 1850s. August Belmont wrote to N. M. Rothschild & Sons on 
the eve of the election that ‘the southern ultra proslavery men are threatening disunion in 
case of Lincoln’s election but I do not believe that they will be able to carry out their 
threats. The dispersions in the Democratic Party render it very probable that Lincoln will 
be our next president. The success of the sectional party whose candidate he is will 
undoubtedly create a good deal of trouble + excitement but I have no fears of serious 
disturbances.’296 When Lincoln carried the election in 1860 many perceived the Atlantic 
economy to be functioning at its highest level.  The prices of slaves and cotton were high. 
Banks were well capitalized.  Prosperity, it seemed, had returned and few, at least in 
financial markets, anticipated a quick and radical dissolution of the Union or of the cotton 
trade. When South Carolina seceded in December of 1860, most expected an expedient, 
and decidedly peaceful end to a small disagreement. There was wide acknowledgement 
that the South would be, and was in fact, troubled by the election. But contemplation of 
the social and economic consequences of disunion was not something most financiers on 
either side of the Atlantic saw as realistic: the economy was just running too well. 
Lincoln himself made clear, at least initially, that he was not interested in disrupting !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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slavery, either. But the South had not supported his candidacy and planters in particular 
were not pleased with their new president or the pending Morrill Tariff legislation. 
Nevertheless, few people took the specter of separation of the Union seriously. When 
disunion, and eventually war, carried the day the issue of finance came to the fore once 
again and, with finance, the difficult question of alliances. It is with the Civil War that the 
alterations to the financial landscape from 1848 become readily apparent.  The larger 
financial houses had moved away from reliance on cotton but planters still did not see 
they lacked the pull they previously had. The South no longer had the importance, or 
political cachet, it once did, either in the United States or internationally. Not for the first 
time, Southern planters overestimated the importance of cotton in a global market; this 
proved a costly error for the Confederate states. 
Although financiers had been backing away from cotton for years, Southern 
planters and politicians did not see that cotton was losing ground in terms of the power it 
held over the American economy. Although!there!were!intimations!of!conflict,!including!John!Brown’s!raid!on!Harper’s!Ferry,!few!thought!the!disagreements!would!result!in!either!secession,!or!eventually,!Civil!War. This is not surprising given 
that on!the!eve!of!the!Civil!War!foreign!investment!in!the!United!States!amounted!to!$444!million,!an!effective!doubling!of!the!total!investment!ten!years!previously.297!Additionally,!the!cotton!crop!of!1860!was!the!largest!to!date.!To!compound!matters!Great!Britain!had!been!buying!prodigious!amounts!of!grain!to!compensate!for!a!series!of!poor!harvests!at!home.!There!was!no!reason!to!suspect!that!the!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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companionable!interdependence!between!the!two!countries!would!be!disrupted!by!interregional!strife.!!Salomon!de!Rothschild,!the!third!son!of!James!de!Rothschild,!traveling!in!New!York!in!1860,!described!the!situation!well:!‘…!there!is!a!great!uproar!and!talk!about!disrupting!the!union,!about!resistance!by!force!of!arms,!and!much!else.!But!when!the!“almighty dollar’” is in jeopardy these great patriots will look 
twice, and I think all these great movements, these fine projects, will fizzle out.’298 In the 
end, most thought peace would prevail because it seemed in the best interests of all 
parties. It cannot be denied that many of those with greater financial interests, like Baring 
Brothers, and the Rothschilds, both hoped for and expected peace as well. The Browns 
alone realized their trade would suffer little disruption.  
These banks, involved in every facet of American life, even if they were not as 
deeply involved in the cotton trade as they once were, stood to lose a good deal in the 
case of war: operations would be disrupted, debts very likely might not be paid, states on 
either side of the conflict might once again suspend payments. The situation was 
exacerbated by the passage of the Morrill Tariff under Buchanan’s administration and a 
Republican Congress in 1861. The majority of cotton planters opposed the tariff, intended 
to facilitate rapid industrial growth by limiting competition from industries in Europe. 
The measure passed easily since most of the representatives of the Southern states had 
left because their states had seceded from the Union before the vote. This tariff had the 
unequivocal support of Lincoln and he used his commitment to it to take Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey in the election, assuring a sweep of the Northern states. As Belmont !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
298 Salomon de Rothschild to family, letter xxii in Sigmund  Diamond, A Casual View of 
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noted, ‘it is the first time that a president put forward entirely by a sectional party and 
who had not even an electoral ticket run at the South will occupy the white house.’ He 
went on to say that, ‘the excitement in the southern cotton states is intense – the governor 
+ leading men of South Carolina are for immediate secession…. I think that the 
conservative men in the other southern states will prevent the accomplishment of these 
maneuvers but in the meanwhile a good deal of apprehension must exist which will 
paralyze business.’299  
This!tariff!brought!to!an!end!an!era!of!relatively!free!trade!that!had!been!in!place!since!1846!with!the!repeal!of!the!Corn!Laws!and!the!passage!of!the!Walker!Tariff,!which!substantially!reduced!American!duties.!It!seemed!the!boom!years!had,!once!again,!been!brought!to!a!close.!British!financiers!viewed!these!developments,!along!with!panic!in!the!stock!markets!that!followed!the!election!of!Lincoln,!as!heralding!the!advent!of!a!prolonged!financial!crisis.!This!crisis!would!receive!additional!steam!from!the!financial!and!social!upheaval!created!by!sectional!conflict.!Lincoln’s!announcement!of!a!naval!blockade!of!Southern!ports!in!April!of!1861!was!a!pronounced!threat!to!the!British!textile!trade,!the!nation’s!largest!industry!and!source!of!employment!for!thousands!of!people!in!the!British!Midlands.!Additionally,!many!of!these!British!financiers!realized!with!no!small!amount!of!frustration,!that!all!of!their!returns!on!American!investments!were!now!uncertain.!Their!response!to!the!conflict!was,!first!and!foremost,!concern!with!the!material!and!financial!consequences!of!the!crisis,!and!potential!war.!Joshua!Bates!voiced!fears!of!‘…!a!long!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and!bloody!war!that!will!be!destructive!to!commerce!and!will!naturally!reduce!the!profits!of!Baring!Brothers.’300!Lord!Overstone,!one!of!the!largest!holders!of!American!securities!was!more!direct:!‘I!doubt!whether!we!are!not!as!deeply!interested!in!the!matter!as!the!parties!themselves.’!301!
The!hungry!mills!still!had!a!taste!for!American!cotton!going!into!the!Civil!War,!and cotton was still vitally important to the British economy as well as a valued 
import of other European nations. On the eve of the American Civil War 500,000 people 
were directly employed in the English cotton mills. More than four million of England’s 
21 million people were dependent on the cotton industry for their daily bread. Britain’s 
need for raw cotton was stupendous: in 1859, it imported 2,610,898 bales, more than 
50,000 bales per week.302 Britain’s mills were dependent upon the Southern states of the 
United States for three-quarters of that cotton. Nor was Britain the only European nation 
whose industrial base was dependent on American cotton. From September 1, 1859 to 
August 31, 1860 the U.S. exported 589,587 bales to France, 295,072 bales to the 
countries of northern Europe, and 220,082 bales to other foreign ports.303 
The cotton trade also supported a multitude of people not directly employed in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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mills. Britain exported 2,776 million yards of cloth and 197 million pounds of yarn in 
1860. Yarn and cloth accounted for one-half of the value of all British exports. Handling 
that staggering quantity of cotton provided employment to a vast number of seamen, 
railroad workers, stevedores, clerks, etc. Cotton dominated the United States’ economy as 
well. In 1858, the total value of all U.S. exports was $238 million; $161 million, or a 
staggering 68 percent, was cotton. In the decade before the Civil War, more than 2,000 
U.S. merchant ships, totaling 1,100,000 registered tons, and 55,000 seamen were 
employed in the coastal navigation that brought cotton from Southern ports to New York. 
Another 800,000 tons of American shipping and 40,000 seamen were employed in the 
transoceanic cotton trade. Even the fast New York to Liverpool passenger packets relied 
upon cotton to fill their cargo holds on the eastbound voyage across the Atlantic. Without 
cotton outbound ships would have had to cross the ocean empty, other American exports 
being insufficient to fill the cargo space that on westbound crossings was taken up by 
British manufactured goods. Banks, ship-owners, railroads, and merchant houses in Great 
Britain and the Union states were all heavily invested in or dependent in one way or 
another upon the cotton trade.304 
Politically,!British!financial!leaders!responded!to!the!American!crisis!by!attempting!to!find!ways!to!broker!effective!mediation!and!resolution!of!the!disagreement.!The!majority!of!financiers!agreed!with!Belmont!that!armed!conflict!would!be!disastrous.!Belmont!urged!the!Rothschilds!to!lobby!for!intervention,!an!idea!which!Lionel!de!Rothschild!agreed!with.!He!promoted!the!idea!of!British!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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arbitration!during!a!meeting!with!foreign!secretary!Lord!Russell!and!Prime!Minister!Palmerston!in!1861.!Likewise,!Thomas!Baring,!a!Tory!MP!and!head!of!Baring!Brothers!bank!had!urged!Lord!Russell!to!act!as!a!mediator!in!the!dispute!as!early!as!1860.!The!idea!of!mediation!sounded!good!but!it!was!unclear!how!it!would!have!worked,!and!as!some!parties!noted!it!might!have!precipitated!armed!conflict.!At!any!rate,!this!intervention!was!not!realized!and!on!April!12,!1861!Confederate!forces!fired!on!Fort!Sumpter.!
The!confederate!government!was!operating!from!an!outmoded!notion!of!the!power!of!cotton,!both!to!the!Union,!and!Great!Britain.!Many!in!the!South!assumed!Great!Britain!would!rally!to!their!cause,!and!cotton,!in!this!way!opening!up!the!route!to!free!and!direct!trade!with!Europe.!The!Southern!view!of!modernity!was!one!rooted!firmly!in!the!production!of!commodities!for!international!sale!and!the!perpetuation!of!slavery.!!The!outbreak!of!the!war!highlighted!the!dependency!of!the!South!on!credit!and!manufactured!goods!from!Europe!and!the!Northern!states.!The!war!also!made!clear!the!declining!importance!of!cotton!to!the!American!economy!as!a!whole,!and!the!stranglehold!the!factorage!system!had!on!American!banking.!!A!consideration!of!the!political!economy!of!the!Civil!War!makes!clear!that!the!position!of!cotton,!slavery!and!the!South!had!shifted!radically.!Indeed,!in!some!ways!secession!and!the!occupation!of!Fort!Sumpter!can!be!viewed!as!reactions!to!a!nascent!awareness!of!a!profound!shift!in!the!balance!of!power!in!the!United!States!in!the!1850s.!This!shift,!and!the!corresponding!rupture!created,!becomes!all!the!more!clear!when!viewed!within!the!same!Atlantic!context!that!had!financed!cotton!cultivation!throughout!the!antebellum!period.!!
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On 15 May 1861 the Palmerston government issued a Proclamation of Strict 
Neutrality. By assuming a neutral position Britain acknowledged the rights of the 
Confederacy to rebel and granted the Confederacy equal status with the Union, which 
amounted to quasi-recognition of Southern independence. However, the proclamation 
clarified that the United Kingdom was only recognizing the fact that the South was a 
belligerent in a fight that was undecided, and declared that Britain would support no side.  
It was less than the formal recognition of Southern independence that the Confederacy 
hoped for, but it was a small victory for the Confederacy nonetheless. Under international 
law as it then stood ‘rebels’ or ‘insurgents’ were not legitimate combatants and could not 
lawfully buy arms or secure loans in a foreign country. By declaring neutrality, the 
British government had recognized the South’s right to fight for its independence, but did 
not recognize that independence itself. More importantly, the proclamation allowed the 
Confederacy to contract loans and buy arms in Britain. This limited recognition of the 
Confederacy infuriated Union officials in Washington, where President Lincoln had 
referred to the war as an ‘insurrection’ in his declaration of a blockade of the South on 
April 19. The Union government understood all too well that if the South could secure 
arms and a loan, they could effectively fight a war. !
As disunion progressed to Civil War both the Union and Confederate states 
looked to Europe for financial support of their battles. The Confederacy naturally felt 
they had an advantage here: they supplied the cotton, but provisioning the article to a 
global market came at a high cost in terms of infrastructure and development, leaving the 
South dependent on others to meet even the most basic of needs. In seeking a loan, the 
Confederacy sought funds, obviously, but legitimation as well, beyond the status of being 
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simple belligerents. The Union also sought loans, but did not need them as desperately as 
their Confederate adversaries, both for diplomatic as well as pecuniary reasons. This 
seeking of funds by both sides is not surprising given the heavy involvement of 
European, and more pointedly, British financiers in the American economy. What is 
noteworthy is that in spite of ties to both regions, some based on cotton, no British bank 
stepped forward to provide a loan or large-scale finance to either side. Part of this was 
undoubtedly diplomatic, partially pragmatic, but this also is testament to the decline in 
importance of cotton to larger Anglo-American houses.  
As the conflict escalated into war, the hope of a peaceful return to business was 
lost. British financiers were put in the position of having to choose. The Union had the 
business ethic and financial infrastructure with which British financial houses felt a 
certain sympathy, and which they understood.  The South held out alluring promises of 
free trade that were strongly rooted within the intellectual thought of many planters, and 
would be advantageous to British traders. It seemed on this issue there was no question of 
their commitment. It also seemed they had ended their own unofficial cotton embargo 
and the article was in high demand. The largest issue here though was that in the 
beginning at least, nobody had any idea who would win. The South in some ways seemed 
to have the advantage. The British government claimed neutrality but for many financial 
houses this was not an effective option, and even in nominally choosing a neutral stance, 
they abandoned the Southern states to their own resources.  At Barings, Joshua Bates 
supported the Union, while Russell Sturgis, also an American from the North, supported 
the Confederacy. The firm was approached in 1861 by Governor Francis Pickens of 
South Carolina seeking a loan for the procurement of arms and munitions. The loan was 
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not forthcoming. Two other loans to the Union were proposed first by Samuel Ward, their 
American agent, in May of 1862. John Murray Forbes and William Aspinwall attempted 
to negotiate a $50 million loan in April 1863.305 
The Rothschilds were also seemingly divided regarding the war. August Belmont 
vociferously supported the Union; he began to advise Lincoln and became actively 
involved, along with other New York merchants, in finding ways to bolster Union 
defenses. In a series of letters to the London house he urged their outright support of the 
Union and discouraged them forcefully from any involvement with the South. In contrast, 
Salomon de Rothschild, who was traveling in the United States at the time, stated his 
empathy with the South before the states seceded. After war broke out, Salomon was 
caught behind Confederate lines and wrote from New Orleans that ‘I cannot urge you 
enough to use all the influence of our family and friends to recognize the republic of the 
Southern confederacy as quickly as possible…  in this way one would stop both the 
shedding of blood and an immense destruction of property.’306 He saw leveling in the 
ambitions of the abolitionists, and missed the important international political context in 
which his support of the Confederacy would sit.307 His stance on abolition and his 
support of the Confederacy was in keeping with his social position and aspirations, yet 
the young Rothschild failed to perceive was that support of the Confederacy might entail 
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war with the Union, something none of the European powers cared to be involved in. 
The ramifications of any intervention became clear during the Trent crisis in 
1861, when James Mason, and John Slidell, confederate envoys to Britain and France, 
were found aboard the British mail packet, the RMS Trent, and removed, as contraband 
of war, by Union captain Charles Wilkes of the USS San Jacinto.308 Both former senators 
before the outbreak of hostilities, they were bound for Europe in hopes of securing 
support for the Confederate cause and to push for diplomatic recognition from European 
nations.  This was a potential disaster in the making, which Britain and the Union 
government quickly realized. Both countries stepped back from the precipice of war. 
Lincoln released the diplomatic envoys to the British and disavowed Captain Wilkes’ 
actions but did not apologize. Mason and Slidell resumed their mission but failed to 
achieve diplomatic recognition for the Confederacy. Aiding the Confederacy, on the part 
of Britain or France, would have led to certain war with the North, and generated more 
financial instability. Neither Britain nor the United States wanted a third war. The first 
two had been costly enough.  War with the Confederate South was undesirable as well. 
The South did not have the maritime power of the Union and lacked resources yet they 
did have cotton, which the world still found desirable.  Many surmised initially that the 
South would gain independence. In fact it was assumed that the United States would be 
split into two nations. In the end neutrality was the most expedient, but nevertheless very 
delicate, option. 
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308 This same John Slidell was the uncle of Caroline Perry Slidell, August Belmont’s wife. The 
two had been very close friends until Buchanan passed Belmont over for a diplomatic 
appointment in Madrid. With the outbreak of fighting, they never spoke again and John Slidell 
spent the remainder of his days in Europe.  
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The threat of this potential war between England and the Union caused securities 
to plummet on both sides of the Atlantic in 1860. Belmont commented on the crisis in 
American markets shortly after South Carolina’s secession stating, ‘the financial and 
political crisis into which the election of Mr. Lincoln has thrown us continues unabated... 
With all this I cannot be made to believe in any actual dissolution of the union… You 
will see by the enclosed stock list the very great depreciation or our state R Road 
securities. I think the worst of the panic in the stock market is almost over... – Though 
politically and financially affairs look very gloomy.’309  
Unfortunately, things did not improve, in spite of Belmont’s hopes. Continued 
volatility in financial markets and the banking system contributed to a run on New York 
banks that resulted in the suspension of specie payments at the end of December, 1861. 
Additionally Anglo-American financial houses were forced to suspend most of their 
operations at this juncture while they hoped and encouraged politicians on both sides to 
peacefully resolve the dispute. Until this happened business was at a standstill. James 
Brown, the head of the Browns’ Liverpool house, observed that ‘it seems very important 
that the bankers and merchants make themselves heard in their desire to maintain 
peace.’310 The threat of war was a nightmare for these Anglo-American financiers who 
had enjoyed a long and fruitful run of business since the treaty of Ghent in 1815. The 
Economist averred that ‘a war with either of the belligerents would be a terrible calamity, 
but a war between England and the Northern states of America would be the most !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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affecting misfortune which could happen to civilization.’311 British shipping and 
commerce would be endangered in such a war, though recognition of the Confederacy 
would end the South’s cotton embargo and would likely benefit England, at least in the 
short term. Belmont pointed out to Lionel de Rothschild that it was preferable to endure 
the cotton famine than engage in another war with the North that would basically ruin 
business globally.  
The problem then became a diplomatic one, leaving John Slidell at a loss when 
attempting to explain the dearth of cotton reaching European ports if the blockade was 
ineffective. As Owsley notes with some humorous effect he ‘…could have answered 
because the south will not permit cotton to leave the ports as long as Europe recognizes 
an ineffective blockade, and because, furthermore, the south believes that by holding 
back the cotton, a cotton famine will be produced and Europe will intervene to get 
cotton.’312 Obviously, this was a huge miscalculation on the part of the Confederacy 
economically, politically and diplomatically. Their cotton embargo had made the 
blockade look more effective than it was initially. They also had miscalculated the 
immediate need Europe might have for the article. This cotton could have been sold 
earlier, during the first year of hostilities, and funded the war effort but instead was left to 
sit, leaving the South no recourse but to eventually accept any terms on which they might 
secure a loan.  
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After the outbreak of hostilities Belmont undertook a series of missions on behalf 
of the United States government, although his first task was to ensure safe passage for 
Salomon de Rothschild back to New York from New Orleans. Belmont headed south and 
then left, nominally, for a European vacation with his family. On this holiday he was in 
fact lobbying European heads of state to support the Union war effort. Lionel de 
Rothschild also arranged a meeting between Belmont and Palmerston in October of 1861. 
Belmont hoped to obtain a government loan to support the Union war effort. At this 
juncture Belmont framed the conflict in terms of slavery, thinking to appeal to 
abolitionist sentiment, but Palmerston saw the conflict very differently. In the end he told 
Belmont, ‘we do not like slavery, but we want cotton and we dislike very much your 
Morrill Tariff.’313  He also informed Belmont squarely that the British government had no 
intention of interfering with slavery, or the hostilities: Britain would remain neutral.  
Politically, Britain was wisely committed to neutrality and most banks did not 
need too much encouragement to avoid financial relations with the newly established 
Confederate government. Memories of the debt repudiations of Mississippi, Florida and 
Arkansas after the panic of 1837 remained.  That being said, even previous to repudiation 
and the rise of King Cotton the South had an image problem. Alexander Baring observed 
in 1797 that ‘to the south of Baltimore, I understand there is nobody worth trusting.’314 
Further, every financial house had in their past at least a few bad deals with cotton, 
whether it was simply buying bales padded with a higher grade around the outside and 
stained cotton in the middle, or losing money on bad consignments. These memories !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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lingered, along with being left with slaves as collateral. Anti-slavery sentiment on the 
parts of many financiers played a role, although not as decisively as many might suggest 
was the case.315 Between abolitionist sympathies, the conflicts inherent in viewing people 
as property and the repudiation issue, many investors were rapidly convinced to avoid the 
bonds of Southern states and reduced the temptation any Confederate loan might offer.  
Thus the Civil War was fought in counting houses, in the press, as well as on the 
battlefield. Unionists realized early on that the Confederacy might be handily defeated 
solely through finance, or the lack thereof. Several supporters of the Union undertook a 
concerted campaign impugning Confederate creditworthiness, realizing presciently the 
truth that in this new world, where money was more vital than land, a different force 
decided what wars might be fought, and which would be abandoned early on. This was a 
truth acknowledged as early as 1828 by Prince Pückler-Muskau, when he referred to: 
‘Rothschild… without whom no power in Europe today seems able to make war.’ 316 The 
repudiation of state debts became a current topic of conversation once again.  Union 
agent Robert J. Walker produced and distributed a series of pamphlets in Great Britain 
entitled Jefferson Davis and Repudiation reminding Britons of the repudiation imbroglio 
of the 1840s and more significantly, of two letters penned by Jefferson Davis, which were 
reproduced in The Times of London in 1849. In these letters Davis upheld the actions of 
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Mississippi and became known as ‘the champion of repudiation.’317 August Belmont 
reminded the Rothschilds on close to a daily basis of just why they wanted no part of any 
loan to the Confederate states, asking in 1861, ‘who will take a dollar of a confederacy of 
states of which 4 have already repudiated their debt? ... unless it be that the name of 
Jefferson Davis… should have a sweeter sound to European capitalists than I think.’318  
When the firm finally confirmed, in no uncertain terms, that they would have no 
involvement with any loan, Belmont expressed great relief. Robert Walker obviously saw 
the value of repudiation in the financial fight stating in a letter to Salmon Chase, ‘Slavery 
takes the philanthropic, the sentimental and the religious classes and the people, but 
repudiation touches the pocket nerve and sweeps away the lenders of money.’319 
Although there were many reasons for British financiers to steer clear of the 
advance of loans to any side, particularly the South, all this begs the question of why they 
would bother entertaining the premise of a loan to the South when all of these houses had 
moved out of the cotton business at this juncture. Their initial reluctance to have any 
involvement is testament to the fact that, for these Anglo-American houses, trade in 
cotton and the disturbing associations with slave labor, was now an unnecessary evil. The 
South no longer had the political sway it once commanded. Like their fellow merchants !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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in New York, these financiers were no longer ensnared in cotton’s web and felt no ties to 
the South, or a need to ameliorate planter bellicosity. In their outwardly stated neutrality 
these larger financial houses hindered the Southern cause. Baring Brothers remained the 
Banker of the United States in Europe and continued to pay drafts on the American 
account through the war. This was particularly helpful given that these drafts provided 
sorely needed funds to Union agents and representatives.  
Fortunately for the Union, they possessed sufficient resources to manage without 
the loan. Given that the majority of the nation’s infrastructure, wealth and resources were 
located in Northern states the Union cause had a distinct advantage over the Confederacy. 
The slaveholding states were largely agrarian and structured around the commercial sale 
of commodities produced with slave labor. This meant in practice that the region lacked 
infrastructure, towns, adequate transportation connections and production facilities.320 
The South found itself bereft of food, fabric and even the most basic necessities. 
Although rich in cotton the Confederacy lacked the ability to even spin cotton into cloth. 
In fact, they did not even have combs to ready the cotton for spinning.321 Thus British 
neutrality worked to the distinct disadvantage of the Confederacy, and by depriving the 
South of funds these financiers effectively decided the fate of the war. Thus, the decision 
came down to decisions of many individual financiers, and not just the Rothschilds in this 
case.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The Rothschilds, like many of their compatriots, did not believe that restoration of 
the Union was possible without mediation and did not see the war ending in a decisive 
victory for either side. Like Palmerston, what they saw, and with a certain perspicacity, 
was a humanitarian disaster. It is difficult to argue against this viewpoint given the 
extreme loss of life: the Civil War is still the deadliest war in American history. Sheer 
numbers are suggestive of the scale of the carnage: 618,000 soldiers died, a total of two 
percent of the entire American population at the time. All other American wars 
combined, through the Korean War, claimed fewer lives than the Civil War alone.  For 
the sake of rough comparison, during World War II, 30 out of every 10,000 men in 
uniform perished. The Civil War was over six times as deadly, killing 182 per 10,000. 
Based on 1860 census figures, eight percent of all white males aged 13 to 43 died in the 
war, including six percent in the North and an unfathomable 18 percent of the Southern 
male population.322 That being said, Palmerston feared the escalation of the Civil War 
into a racial one that would draw other nations into a truly bloody conflagration. The firm 
explored the possibilities of mediation with Belmont, who was also corresponding with 
Abraham Lincoln during this period. After testing the waters Belmont determined that, in 
fact, mediation would be unwelcome. Belmont noted, in a reversal of his own earlier 
hopes, ‘…that any intervention on the part of England or France would only result in a 
protracted war with the United States.’323 A similar conclusion was eventually reached by 
both countries.  
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Members of all of these firms did buy Union war bonds and individually 
demonstrated greater or lesser support for the Union cause. Yet they remained 
remarkably distant from American finance during the war. This is intriguing in that the 
provision of resources to either side by even one of these banks could, and likely would, 
have decisively shifted the conclusion of the war. The amount of funds one of these firms 
could have delivered victory to the receiving side. Probably the greatest stumbling block 
for the South was that they lacked any type of support amongst financial titans like the 
Rothschilds or Barings. Frasier, Trenholm and Company of Liverpool provided some 
support, but not enough. They issued letters of credit to Southern agents but were forced 
to limit them as they simply did not have the gold to back them. The Confederacy had 
nobody to blame here but themselves. Their notions of the extreme importance of cotton, 
had led them to this position. 
The policy of King Cotton diplomacy is demonstrative of the misapprehension of 
Southerners of changes in global markets, politics and finance by 1860.  James Henry 
Hammond notoriously exclaimed in a speech before the Senate in 1858 that, ‘old England 
would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world with her... No, you dare not 
make war on cotton. No power on earth dares to make war upon it. Cotton is king.’ 324 At 
the point of secession and the first year of the war Southerners believed this as well, 
implementing an embargo on cotton that they believed would force the hands of both 
England and France, drawing them into the conflict. As early as the 1860-1 season 
planters had begun holding cotton, a fact that created hardship in cotton markets and hurt !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Southerners just as much as New York merchants. As Belmont noted, ‘cotton has 
advanced to 10 cents in New Orleans in consequence of the larger falling off in the 
receipts. The planters refuse to send their crops at present prices and many factors have 
been obliged to suspend, among them some of the richest houses in New Orleans.”325 
Southern planters withheld cotton intentionally, hoping to create a cotton famine that 
would force either intervention or the running of the Union blockade.326  
In spite of the demonstrated dependence on American cotton, the anticipated responses 
from Britain and France, such as large-scale blockade running, pledges of support for the 
South or involvement in the war did not happen. As to the purported immediate 
devastation that a disruption in the supply of American cotton would wreak upon the 
British economy, an article in The Times stated, ‘it is easy to over-estimate the extent or 
gravity of the consequences to Great Britain of a cessation, or even of any large or 
sudden diminution, of the supply of cotton from the United States.’327 Even the most 
pessimistic parties did not expect the war to carry on five years. On one point, many 
agreed: European powers had no desire to become involved in the American war for any 
reason, let alone to secure the supply of cotton. The South, in spite of various ruses, 
would not be able to lure European powers in to a war in this way. August Belmont and 
others discussed the South’s strategy explicitly and were aware that the South believed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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King Cotton diplomacy really would prove effective. A few weeks later, in May of 1861, 
he observed, ‘letters from all sections of the south confirm the fact that a good many 
planters have ploughed up their cotton fields in order to plant grain and corn.’328 The 
bales sat unpurchased. Manchester experienced a cotton famine and many Mancunian 
spinners and mill workers were thrown out of work, but Britain did not intervene. This 
did create hardship throughout the British Midlands, but it also created difficulties in the 
Confederate states. As the situation grew more desperate they steeped up measures to 
secure a loan on any terms. 
Eventually, the cotton that had been left sitting was employed as security on the 
issuing of bonds from a loan arranged by Erlanger & Co. Bonds of the £3 million loan 
were convertible into cotton at six pence per pound, if the cotton could be retrieved from 
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Figure 5: Erlanger bond.  
000/106, RAL. 
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Southern ports. Since cotton was selling at 48 cents a pound at that juncture, the bonds 
made blockade running incredibly attractive. Of course, there was that small detail of 
actually getting through to pick up the cotton within ten miles of a navigable river or 
railroad terminus.  In addition, the bonds paid a seven percent annual interest rate. Put 
another way, a buyer of a £1,000 bond could convert it into 80 500-pound bales of cotton 
worth almost £4,000. If the price of cotton continued to rise, the underlying bond’s 
conversion value would climb in lockstep. When the bonds were offered on European 
markets in March 1863 most of the subscriptions were taken up in Britain, although it is 
not clear who exactly bought or held these bonds, which were offered by Fraser, 
Trenholm & Co. in Liverpool and J. H. Schroder & Co. in London.329 Neither firm had 
issued a loan on behalf of a government previously, but the loan was oversubscribed by a 
factor of five. This was a bit deceptive though, given that government issues were often 
oversubscribed. The bond also was bought not primarily by long-term holders wishing to 
support the Confederacy, but by speculators and opportunists eager to turn a profit.330  
Worries compounded as the bond dropped below par in the first week of April 
1863, and continued to fall. This meant the loan could collapse if investors who had 
bought in opted to forfeit their 15 percent down payment and not meet the next 
installment. Confederate agents saw the potential problem and bought back half the 
bonds to bolster the market, but this provided only a short-term fix. The bond issue !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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plummeted as investor confidence waned in the face of Union victories at Gettysburg and 
Vicksburg. The bond issue was additionally troubled by the fact that most of these 
investors were opportunists, looking to make a quick profit. As Jay Sexton has noted, 
before 1864 private firms in Britain charged extortionate rates and wasted premium space 
in blockade-runners to include luxury items that would yield a high return in isolated 
Southern markets. One firm that dealt with the Confederacy during the war went so far as 
to keep two sets of books to legitimate their gouging of gullible Southern agents.331 
In the end the loan hardly qualified as a success, although one historian has 
proclaimed it to have been, based on the idea that it was the best the Confederacy could 
do. They were the only party in the war to successfully secure a loan and they were able 
to use the bonds to pay down debts in Europe.332  This of course does not address the fact 
that the terms of the loan could be well described as draconian, although extortionist is 
another term that would have worked just as well.  Erlanger was to earn a commission of 
five percent, in addition to being allowed to purchase the bonds at 77 percent of face 
value, while reselling the initial issue at 90 percent of face. In other words, the Erlanger 
syndicate would siphon off nearly a fifth of each investor’s money as middlemen. Even 
these terms, it seems, were not enough to motivate Erlanger to make the loan 
independently. Additional motivation was provided by the fact that Frederic Emile 
d’Erlanger had fallen in love with Mathilde Slidell, a daughter of John Slidell, the former 
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senator of Louisiana and Confederate envoy to Britain and France. Secretary of State 
Judah Benjamin accepted the deal only because he figured it would make European 
financiers financially invested in Confederate success, stakeholders in the cause, as it 
were. In the end Confederate agents received around £1.7 million and Union 
sympathizers could only feel overjoyed as the markets testified to the extreme loss of 
faith in the Confederacy. 333 This paltry sum came nowhere near meeting the dire need 
for funds experienced by the Confederate government and was in fact a very low return 
on such a large float.  
On the one hand, it can be claimed that the Confederacy succeeded where the 
Union had failed: they did manage to secure a loan, but did not attain the support of any 
house large enough to turn the tide in their favor. The one firm that had supported a 
mediated settlement during the war, the Rothschilds, were far from supporters of the 
Confederacy, or of the Erlanger loan. Their support of mediation came from humanitarian 
concerns and a belief that the Union effort was a lost cause. Nevertheless, their activities 
with the Palmerston cabinet do demonstrate the overlap between diplomacy, policy and 
finance. The actions of these financiers and indeed of the British government are all the 
more striking given the facile expectations of the Confederate government that England 
would simply go after the cotton, jeopardizing economic connections with the North and 
possibly igniting a third Anglo-American war in the process.   
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Figure 6: Coupon from the Erlanger bond.  
000/106, RAL.   
Although Atlantic finance was silenced during the war, in the United States the 
Civil War proved to be a blessing to banks in the North, as they were able to form 
strategic partnerships with the Federal government. The position of banks and 
industrialists strengthened while merchants lost standing. And with the absence of 
slaveholders from national politics the resulting power vacuum was filled by New York 
City elites.334 This obviously gave this group of industrialists and bankers an incredible 
amount of power within the federal government and allowed them to shape institutions to 
a remarkable extent during the Civil War era. Clearly, this was an unqualified good for 
industrialists and manufacturers who benefitted greatly from provisioning the war effort. 
Bankers were in a different position, extending money to the government and hoping for 
victory, and some return on their outlays of cash, while at the same time being forced to 
adapt to a shift in lending patterns, power and economic control. The banking and 
monetary system of the United States was in a state of flux, breaking down as the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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difficulty of responding to the war effort made the need for new structures both obvious 
and necessary.  
The initial revelation of a need for change came with the suspension of specie 
payments in New York City in 1861 (these would not resume until 1879). This 
suspension was enacted partially in response to the government’s demand for gold. In 
1862, in turn, Congress authorized the issue of $150 million in paper notes, greenbacks. 
Needless to say, many bankers worried about the inflationary power of such a move and 
objected to the seizure of this type of power by the government.  Further changes came 
with the decision to charter a series of national banks, which met with the further disdain 
of many bankers in New York. Their objection to this program resulted in changes to the 
government’s plans. In the end, these bankers had made a profound investment in the 
future of the Union and bound their fortunes to that of the Federal government. Because 
of these acts they were brought into contact and conversation both with the Federal 
government and the large-scale plans for change that were developing during the war. 
Their unique position created the opportunity for them to influence the development of 
the new financial system which worked to their benefit once the war ended. 
The institutionalization of national banking regulations, the issuing of a national 
currency and shifts in the commercial landscape resulted in a radically altered financial 
landscape in New York City and beyond. These bankers were no longer tied to the whims 
of planters or the political economy of the cotton South but they were deeply linked to the 
Federal government and a new financial structure. The new bankers that came of age 
during the war derived the greatest benefit. The Seligmans, Morgans and George Baker 
come to mind. Earlier names like Prime, Ward and King, or August Belmont belong to a 
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bygone era. These firms continued to be active in New York but they did not do business 
on the scale of the Morgans or Seligmans, and they did things differently.  The changes in 
banking and finance made necessary by the war gave rise to a different financial system, 
one in which much larger operations were possible and bankers worked on a scale that 
was inconceivable in the 1850s. As Sven Beckert has highlighted, by 1865 the 
composition of New York’s banking community, its ties to the nation state and its 
developmental vision were all irrevocably altered. The reality after the war was a very 
different one with a centralized banking system and a world of finance that had moved 
far beyond the reach of cotton, factors and the scale of the personal.335  
The opening of the West and new markets in agricultural products produced there 
decreased the importance of the South and Southern markets long before the war. The 
effect was seen in a most pronounced way after the conflict, but what gave rise to the 
war, in large measure, was that cotton had been dethroned years previously. Cotton lost 
ground to gold, and the appeal of financial operations. For New York merchants the 
appeal had dimmed as well. They were able to deal in a wider variety of goods flowing 
into the city from across the country, which meant more opportunity to engage in a wider 
variety of transactions, diluting the former primacy, and much of the appeal, of cotton. 
Obviously, these New York merchants and bankers, like their colleagues in London, had 
moved into other ventures far beyond the sway of cotton, a fact lost on cotton planters 
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until they were in the midst of a war they could neither fund nor effectively fight.336 
These new bankers who played a part in the creation of a Federal financial system during 
the Civil War made deals on a much larger scale and did not employ agents or work as 
merchants in any way. This new world was one that permitted industrial statesmen, or 
robber barons, (depending on your point of view) to grow and thrive, eventually giving 
way to gilded age excess.  
Against a background of increasing sectionalist strife Anglo-American financiers 
moved away from cotton as slaveholding states experienced a deepening rift with their 
free labor contemporaries. Political parties in the United States seemed to increasingly 
split along the lines of slavery versus abolition. Some historians have suggested that this 
rift, or clash of disparate economic systems was what led to the Civil War.337 But this 
ignores the fact that slave holding and free labor states worked together to form a larger 
economic system which functioned incredibly well and allowed the United States to raise 
enough surplus capital to fund industrialization and give rise to self-sustaining economic 
growth.  In sum, these histories isolated the South and as we have seen, the South was 
very much a part of a larger economic system.338 To suggest that capitalism and slavery 
were two antithetical forces tearing apart the Union ignores the economic and social 
realities of the era. In the end, Palmerston’s remark to August Belmont that the war was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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not about slavery but rather tariffs and free trade ideology seems much more insightful, 
because without these disagreements the larger integrated American economic system 
might have continued to function.  
That being said, this earlier system would have had to face the challenge of 
finding different ways to provide credit, finance development and effectively control the 
money supply. Regardless of the Civil War, credit and the financial systems were due to 
change in the United States. The breakdown of the Union banking system shortly after 
the outbreak of hostilities is suggestive of some of the shifts that were likely inevitable.  
The increasing diversification of markets and movement of larger Anglo-American 
houses away from the volatility of cotton resulted in a loss of power and influence for the 
South around issues like tariffs, free trade and protection of the institution of slavery, but 
these were, at heart economic shifts that resulted in a denigration of Southern political 
capital. Different financial mechanisms, others sources of capital or increasing political 
harmony, and perhaps most pivotally, the earlier development of a futures market could, 
and quite likely would, have had far-reaching consequences.   A pivotal argument of this 
dissertation is that economic changes resulted in a loss of political power and economic 
influence for the cotton South, which highlighted sectional disagreements over free trade 
and tariffs, giving rise, eventually, to armed conflict.  
When viewed in this way the crucial question is not what type of economic 
system or labor regime was in place in whatever region but rather the way in which 
different systems, institutions and ways of organizing social and political life came 
together both harmoniously and in more acrimonious encounters. The end result was 
vitriolic political dialog, fierce debates and passionate interactions in Congress, between 
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planters and agents in New York and in local communities. These debates around foreign 
policy, tariffs, trade policies, private property and structural improvements were 
conversations where the South as a region seemed increasingly to lack power, or the 
political capital necessary to sway opinion. In spite of the fact that the South produced the 
most important export item for the country, the region generally was falling behind in 
terms of wealth, economic development and infrastructure. 
Certainly the decision by individual states to secede was an economic one, but it 
was also ideological and shaped within the context of debates stretching all the way back 
to the ratification of the constitution. The cotton South shaped the beliefs, ideologies and 
political leanings of cotton planters just as surely as they cultivated crops for optimal 
harvest. These planters were shaped by their environment and interests, as were residents 
of the North and the financiers that profited from these transactions. All were keenly 
aware of their own immediate interests. Cotton planters handled political discussion 
adroitly and remained firmly in control of state and local government and policy.  Yet 
cotton planters seemed increasingly unaware of their decreased advantage in national and 
international dialogs and markets, to their detriment. 
In sum, by the Civil War, the larger Anglo-American houses had learned their 
lessons from cotton very well, and navigated American markets, and the political 
economy of the cotton South with great skill, in large measure by avoiding financial bets 
around cotton entirely. In the case of the Civil War this meant, in essence, a stance of 
neutrality because decisive support for the Union would have amounted to a bet against 
the Confederacy, and by extension against the cotton South.   Their policy of a lack of 
direct support for either side shows their acknowledgement of both the importance of 
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cotton and its inherent risks. This approach also illustrates just as clearly a lack of 
confidence in the Union government, and it’s ability to effectively wage war against the 
confederate forces, as well as the ability of the government to shoulder the burden of 
repayments. The fact is, even though the role of cotton had changed it had widely been 
perceived as one of the treads that held the union together. When the ties of cotton and 
finance were broken, it was not clear which side would prevail. The only certainty 
seemed to me that the war would result in unprecedented bloodshed, which proved 
prescient. 
 
!  
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Conclusion 
In a letter to the London Rothschild house in 1863 August Belmont commented 
acerbically, ‘It will always remain a mystery to the future historian to explain the 
sympathy which a large portion of civilized Europe gave in the nineteenth century to a 
rebellion the principal aspect of which was the extension & perpetuation of the odious 
system of slavery.’339 Belmont’s disingenuous claim belies the fact that he, like most 
agents of Anglo-American financial houses, was well aware that the American Civil War, 
at least in part, was not simply about slavery alone. Tobacco, sugar, cotton and rice, all 
commodities produced in the Southern United States with slave labor, were vital exports 
for the United States.  The issues that arose around the trade and finance of this business, 
including disagreements about limitations on trade, including tariffs, political 
representation, and the development of manufacturing and infrastructure all played a role. 
In the end, this was a war motivated not by humanitarian concern but out of the creation 
of a unique political economy in the United States that from the beginning was rent by 
disagreements fomented by cotton and the funds that financed its production, harvest and 
sale.  The income from the sale of these goods became less important with the opening of 
the West and shifts in the American economic landscape, diminishing Southern political 
influence. Financial and economic historians seem intent on indulging a similar penchant 
for occlusion regarding the pivotal role of slavery in economic and financial development 
across the Atlantic world.340 The earlier trade in people and goods facilitated the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
339 August Belmont, New York, to N. M. Rothschild & Sons, London, July 17, 1863, XI/62/11, 
RAL. 
 
340 See Williams, Capitalism & Slavery. Scholars who have examined the profitability of slavery 
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development of financial instruments that in turn eased the completion of these 
transactions; transactions that, not coincidentally, were also reliant on forms of credit.341 
The evolution of many of these Anglo-American firms from merchant banking into 
financial operations more characteristic of modern investment houses is attributable to 
involvement with this trade in commodities produced with slave labor and lessons 
learned from the trade in cotton. 
The divergent economic and financial goals of manufacturers and planters created 
tensions in the Union that multiplied throughout the antebellum period, an irony given 
that together, the two regions had an integrated and balanced economy that functioned 
very well in terms of the laws of comparative advantage.  The American South produced 
cotton at a competitive price and at a volume that allowed the United States to dominate 
production of the article throughout the antebellum period. The North supplied the goods 
and services requisite to allow the South to produce agricultural commodities for sale on 
a global market. Northern banks and Anglo-American merchant bankers provided capital 
and this system of trade worked well enough when the different interests in play were 
approached with a spirit of compromise.342  Slaveholding and free states had !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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demonstrated an initial willingness and ability to work together, to form a larger Union. 
In the compromises negotiated around the Constitution and the War of 1812 this is 
abundantly clear. All of these areas, North, South and Great Britain, profited directly or 
indirectly from the labor exerted by slaves in the growth and harvesting of cotton in the 
Deep South. Somehow, in the history of these financial houses, and the historiography of 
plantation slavery, the pronounced role played by slaves in the development of this other 
Atlantic system has been overlooked. 
In the nineteenth century aggregate debt generally declined during depressions 
and increased during periods of prosperity although the view of debt as a burden would 
suggest the opposite. The fact is the debt taken on by planters in the cotton South 
contributed to the expansion of the American economy. This was not accommodation 
debt and was markedly different from the consumer debt around which much of our 
economy revolves today.343 Any burden associated with the payment of interest on this 
debt must be paced within the context of profit. In other words, the cost of the money is 
second to profit.344 Many modern economic theories suggest that an economy will 
experience a rising debt/income ratio as growth proceeds. Rising debt also often indicates 
rising assets in another set of hands, since in the end credit and debt are Siamese twins; !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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they are born of the same transaction and can never be separated. The trick with the 
development of the antebellum American economy is that these Siamese twins were 
caught between two independent nations with deep economic links, partially the result of 
earlier colonial ties.  Nevertheless, the money these planters borrowed was plowed into a 
peculiar type of development that necessitated slaves and land. This was how planters 
expanded operations, and coincidentally increased their own social prominence. In the 
antebellum period cotton planting and picking was not mechanized. This was labor-
intensive work performed by people in the hot summer sun. The Southern version of 
industrial expansion was purchasing more slaves and increasing cultivation. As has been 
demonstrated the South consistently increased production of cotton throughout the 
antebellum period. Some of that increase is attributable to scientific obsession with the 
details of increasing plant yields, and the productivity of slaves. Some of that increase 
was also the result of increased investment in slaves and land. As George Green has 
noted, even what looked like accommodation paper, or what we today might call personal 
or consumer credit, was in fact standard commercial paper. 345 
Aside from the sale of cotton providing a huge boost to the American economy, 
the proliferation of credit effectively increased the money supply, which in turn 
stimulated trade and development, although it also contributed to the formation of 
bubbles resulting in a series of panics. Every time an advance was made on cotton, a bill 
was issued and discounted, or a merchant draft was accepted at a bank and became a 
bank credit, the monetary supply increased, giving all of these merchants and bankers 
much more control over the economy than was obvious to many. All this money moving !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
345 See ibid., 75.  
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through the young country contributed to economic expansion. When too much credit 
eroded faith in paper and people began to call in debts, that is when panic spread; the 
whole system collapsed, gradually gaining momentum again. Anglo-American financiers 
made money from these transactions and learned from them as well, as did their 
American colleagues. Merchants in New York, planters in the South, factors, cotton 
brokers, agents, slave traders all became increasingly financially savvy over the course of 
the nineteenth century. Many of the transformational effects of the knowledge gained in 
the antebellum period resulted in large-scale shifts in banking and economic policy in the 
United States after the Civil War, but the key point here is that many of these changes 
were implemented by the Union during the Civil War, thus the South returned to a 
radically altered country from the one it had left five years previously. Given the terms of 
their loss the South ended up accepting many of these financial changes as well. It is not 
at all clear that they would have agreed to the establishment of a paper currency or any of 
the other shifts to which they were not party.  
Involvement with cotton was just as beneficial in terms of the growth and 
development of an Anglo-American financial system as it was to American development. 
From involvement in this trade larger British houses developed adroit strategies for 
navigating within Atlantic as well as global markets.  Many larger Anglo-American 
houses made a good deal of money in their dealings with cotton as well. The Browns 
made their fortune in dealings on consignments, advances and the outright purchase of 
the commodity. Eventually they transferred their knowledge of Southern markets into 
working in discount paper and bills of exchange. Baring Brothers in turn bolstered their 
fortune in later involvement with cotton through the 1850s. Rothschild made money in 
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the article as well, and like the Browns, deployed lessons learned into larger American 
ventures, in their case with gold. Interestingly, all of these firms began as textile trading 
ventures. Alexander Brown initially dealt in linen, N. M. Rothschild was a textile trader 
in Manchester, John and Francis Baring were cloth merchants, dealing predominantly in 
wool. Their respective shifts in and out of cotton mirror larger changes in the economies 
of both England and the United States. All three eventually moved exclusively into 
financial operations that are characteristically modern. That is to say, by the end of the 
Civil War all three firms resembled modern banks.  There was a similar shift in banking 
and finance in the Union states as well, resulting in a dramatically altered Atlantic 
financial landscape after the Civil War.  
Cotton played an integral role in the development of the political economy of the 
antebellum United States. A combination of necessity, money, technological advance and 
unintended consequences all created the conditions ripe for the development of a cotton 
South. Some might claim British demand drove the development of the plantation South 
and expansion of cotton, but it could just as easily be argued that demand for finance and 
credit, in essence a need for money, drove the creation of the industry. In the early 
nineteenth century many planters were simply following the money and would have 
likely engaged in a wide variety of projects in order to get it, utilizing whatever form of 
labor proved most profitable and expedient. Obviously this comes into direct conflict 
with the Jeffersonian vision of an agrarian republic. Instead of a nation of yeoman 
farmers this version of the antebellum Deep South is populated by money-hungry and 
motivated speculators and business savvy, cosmopolitan planters eager to embark upon 
large-scale production of goods for an international marketplace. These men had much 
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more common ground with Alexander Hamilton. The Louisiana Purchase simply 
furthered their ability to develop plantation agriculture. This is not to imply that this is 
what Jefferson had in mind. Nevertheless, it is what happened and it prompts a 
reconsideration of many conceptions of the early American Republic. The idea of an 
agrarian republic of yeoman farmers conflicted directly with economic and political 
realities of the time. The reality was that the young nation needed to produce goods for 
sale in an international marketplace and develop policies that facilitated access to credit. 
These early planters had a different vision, more aligned with the future that Hamilton 
hoped to see manifest financially, at any rate. These planters understood the importance 
of international trade, access to markets and the crucial role of credit in economic 
development. . The ability to deploy labor at will, the absence of the necessity to develop 
smaller towns to serve wage earners, and the lack of financial incentives to do so have 
left the South a different place. The logic of plantation society has shaped the region in 
ways that are visible in the built environment of the Deep South, and the British Midlands 
for that matter, to this day.  
In the end, the Jeffersonian vision was more effective as a rhetorical device 
implemented effectively to sweep a presidential election than as any type of road map for 
the development of a nation, let alone an economy. Jefferson’s vision was utopian, but 
economies evolve and develop in the give and take of trade, exchange and people 
pursuing and distributing resources in the real world in all of its mean messiness. Credit 
and finance have been a part of that since time immemorial, along with long-distance 
trade. By the nineteenth century there was a long history of long-distance trade, finance 
and accounting that linked China, Malabar and the Swahili coasts, the entire 
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Mediterranean world, and an Atlantic world of European traders, ports along the gold 
coast of Africa and South as well as Colonial North America. Many of the early planters 
in the Southern United States had arrived from Haiti, Barbados and other points in the 
Caribbean; like Alexander Hamilton, they were very familiar with these larger networks 
of exchange and the importance of credit.346 
The employment of an Atlantic perspective, one that supersedes the limits of the 
nation state is vital to an understanding of the dynamics in the United States that led to 
the creation of the cotton South and that planted the seeds of eventual disunion. This 
approach also conflicts with the long reach of Jefferson’s vision into the historiography 
of the early American Republic. The fact is that slavery was not set in some 
ideologically, politically and economically isolated region. In spite of our best attempts to 
elide it, the commodities produced with slave labor in the American South were vital to 
American and Atlantic economic development – development which occurred in a global 
context and which was driven by international trade. An Atlantic perspective 
demonstrates much more clearly what drove the expansion of slavery across the Deep 
South. So many arguments seem to suggest that the Louisiana Purchase opened new 
lands and these were quickly gobbled up by planters without any explanation of what 
might have driven such rapid expansion of slavery. Additionally, the investment of 
British and European houses in the Deep South is not placed squarely within the context 
of cotton and slave labor, although those connections were understood at the time as well. 
Some of these occlusions in historical writing and the way histories are viewed and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
346 A related point, regarding the role of immigrants in shaping the early American financial 
system is made by Thomas McCraw in Thomas K. McCraw, The Founders and Finance: How 
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constructed may also very well be attributable to a variation of American exceptionalism, 
something the employment of a larger regional perspective, one that in this case involves 
an ocean, helps to avoid. 
American exceptionalism can best be characterized by an isolation of incidents, 
and in light of arguments here, regions, in American history from international influences 
and the global arena. In this context the United States is viewed as somehow unique, 
different or superior:  in sum, exceptional. The long tradition has distorted the writing and 
memory of American history in different ways, prompting exclusions and flawed 
argumentation either in favor of viewing the history of the United States in a vacuum, or 
alternately in trying to compensate for this impossibly isolated approach to historical 
writing through the application of a comparative corrective, in which history is placed in 
different contexts. Yet comparing countries only reaffirms the primacy of the nation state 
in the construction of historical narratives, reinforcing an already strong historical 
predilection towards exceptionalism. As Ian Tyrell has pointed out, ‘in this liberal world 
view the United States avoided the class conflicts, revolutionary upheaval, and 
authoritarian governments of “Europe” and presented to the world an example of liberty 
for others to emulate’347. From this perspective, the United States is distinct, and superior, 
with a different history from other societies. We have upright, stout yeoman farmers and 
mechanics making a new world on the frontier, and visions of an agrarian republic as 
opposed to large-scale plantations spreading across the Deep South producing cotton for 
a global market, feeding in turn the hungry mills of Manchester and contributing to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Historical Review 96, no. 4 (1991).), 1031. 
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development of coercive labor regimes on both sides of the Atlantic. Joyce Chaplin 
reaffirms this, pointing out that, ‘exceptionalism emphasizes the United States’ – and 
earlier the colonies’ – separation from the rest of the world and development of 
unprecedented forms of society and politics. In its old form, it stressed the positive 
achievements of white residents of North America and shunned whatever might have 
been tragic and ambiguous about their handiwork’348. A key point in Chaplin’s argument 
is that American exceptionalism is not an ideology or consciously constructed school but 
rather a mere tendency. Likewise, it is no longer so rosy:  ‘newer forms of exceptionalism 
look beyond the white population; one new variant examines the multicultural bases of 
American society (told as a positive achievement) and another stresses the uniquely 
negative character of American culture, as in the paradoxical relationship between 
slavery and freedom. All variations of exceptionalism ignore how the colonies and 
United States shared history (including reprehensible histories) with other societies and 
peoples’349.  Placing the history of slavery and, more narrowly cotton, in the context of an 
Atlantic world of finance and economic development makes American slavery not quite 
such an exceptional anomaly.  
When considered in this larger context, the world of planters and slaves in the 
antebellum American South is not far at all from the world of spinners in Manchester or 
operations on Lombard Street. And slavery runs through this financial world, harvesting 
the cotton and providing labor at will. The finance, and a fair deal of the initial impetus to 
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the development of the cotton kingdom originated in Britain, and the provision of finance 
enabled this system to continue and hold the development of the larger American banking 
system still until the Civil War. An Atlantic view makes clear the links between political 
institutions, regions, actors, labor systems and financial practices. An Atlantic context 
also contributes, to a certain extent, to a deeper understand in of how and why American 
slavery flourished in the nineteenth century. I have attempted to demonstrate one aspect 
of this puzzle, the role of finance in the development and maintenance of slavery through 
a consideration of the trade in cotton.  
The role cotton and slavery played in the growth and development of banks and 
financial houses as well as British and American economies is clear when looked at from 
a larger regional perspective. In this light, slavery does not seem quite as perversely 
unique to the American landscape either. In fact, it looks like an externalized labor 
practice that markedly boosted British development. In fact, this is more or less how 
nineteenth-century contemporaries understood the world they had created.  In the end, 
this world of cotton and finance was one the slaves made, and although they do not have 
center stage here, they are at the heart of this story and the most fundamental argument of 
this dissertation: slave labor was vital to economic development and industrialization in 
both the United States and Great Britain. Further, the labor of these slaves contributed to 
the development and expansion of a larger Atlantic financial world, a point seemingly 
lost in the twenty-first century but one that was abundantly clear to many at the time. In 
the 1830s Bacon Tait stated in a letter to Rice Ballard that, ‘the truth is that [slave] labour 
is the actual and certain source of all wealth,’ and that it was the ‘basis of all calculations 
of profits from banks, railroads, or other internal improvement stock, for without the 
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product of labour, there would be no commerce, and without commerce, neither bank, 
railroad, nor any other kind of stock would be worth anything.’ He continued that if you 
‘increase banks and internal improvements you at once enhance the value of labour.’ He 
further pointed out that the benefit of slave labor was not only limited in the South. 
‘Without the produce of southern slaves,’ he stated, ‘the northern parts of the Union 
would be barely able to live without adding to their wealth’ and ‘our whole country ... 
nearly the whole world is blessed with peace and prosperity and with a fair prospect of its 
long continuance.’350 In the nineteenth century most citizens were aware of the incredible 
value of slave labor and that it formed the bedrock of American as well as Atlantic 
economic development. It seems than in much of our perpetuation of freedom and 
democracy across the globe we have lost sight of the crucial elements at play in the 
development of our political and economic system here in the United States, and in Great 
Britain as well.   
It is important that we acknowledge the pivotal role played by slavery in the 
development of a larger Atlantic economy in the antebellum era. As one historian has 
recently highlighted, ‘freedom, capitalism, and democracy appear as synergistic forces 
flowing from the inherent logic of the American Revolution. Capitalism in the early 
Republic is so strongly associated with democracy and freedom that its relationship to 
unfree labor stands unexplored, unmentioned, and ultimately unfathomed.’351 This is a 
question that has been raised in various forms by Eric Williams, Joseph Inikori and, more 
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recently, by Seth Rockman. We distort American history, Atlantic history and the history 
of capitalism by not looking directly at these relationships and their ramifications. 
Whether ‘the economic history of the United States simply makes no sense without 
slavery and coerced labor as central components’ is likely still open to debate, but we 
have an obligation to grapple with the issue and endeavor to understand more fully all the 
elements and people that contributed to the growth of the American, as well as global 
economic system.352 
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